The Actuarial Subject: Legitimacy and Social Control in Late Modernity by Munro, William George.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Actuarial Subject: Legitimacy and Social Control in 
Late Modernity 
 
 
 
 
 
William George Munro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
University of Stirling 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Declaration 
 
I declare that none of the work contained within this thesis has been submitted for 
any other degree at any other university. The contents found herein have been 
composed by the candidate, William G. Munro. 
 
 
 
 
 
William G. Munro. 
 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
Firstly I would like to thank the late Ian Manson and Perth and Kinross Council for 
supporting this research in its early stages. I would also like to thank my academic 
supervisors, Dr Jim Valentine, Professor Gill McIvor, Professor Jackie Tombs, and 
Dr Ian McIntosh. In particular, I am grateful to Dr Julie Brownlie, without whose 
belief, encouragement and persistence, this thesis would not have been completed.  
 
I would also like to thank the staff and students at the Department of Applied Social 
Science for their support and encouragement and Ashley Rogers for her help in 
compiling the bibliography. 
 
Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank Kirsten and Jamie, for their 
continued support, encouragement and patience over the duration of this work. 
Without their support this thesis would not have been possible. 
 
 
 4 
Abstract 
 
The following thesis can be read as a socio-historical case study of the emergence of 
risk discourses within the Scottish Criminal Justice System, particularly in relation 
to offenders who are defined by their dangerousness. It focuses on the emergence of 
the Risk Management Authority (RMA) which was set up under recommendation of 
the MacLean Committee in 2000. The thesis examines the broader social and 
cultural forces from which the Risk Management Authority emerged by drawing on 
Hegel‟s notion of „Ethical Life‟ (Sittlichkeit) as a means of framing institutional 
change. By way of a re-interpretation of Hegel, through the lens of critical theory, it 
seeks to historicise and make problematic the concepts and assumptions 
surrounding our understanding of modernity. Through the concepts of reflexivity, 
legitimacy and indeterminacy it offers a critique of the existing sociology of risk, 
which places risk at the centre of debates on modernity, contingency and the self-
understanding of society. This critique offers a conceptualisation of penal 
institutions as not just administering punishment, but as instrumental in the 
constitution of human subjectivity.  
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FAUST: 
…who are you then? 
 
MEPHISTO:  
Part of that force which would 
Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good. 
 
FAUST: 
What is it that this puzzle indicates? 
 
MEPHISTO: 
I am the spirit that negates. 
And rightly so, for all that comes to be 
Deserves to perish wretchedly… GOETHE (1808/1961:160-161) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The following chapter introduces the thesis as a whole. It locates the origin of the 
thesis in Scottish criminal justice practice of a decade ago, particularly government 
reports and debates surrounding the emergence of the Risk Management Authority 
and the growing interest in Risk/Needs
1
 approaches to offender behaviour being 
developed in Canada at that time. The chapter goes on to describe how the thesis 
developed and, to an extent, had to refocus, in order to address the broader 
contradictions and antinomies related to these approaches. In particular, it 
introduces the framework - a re-interpretation of Hegel‟s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) – 
which was created as a way of engaging with these contradictions. In doing so, the 
chapter situates the thesis as a „groundwork‟ – that is, a body of work whose 
primary aim is to generate concepts through which we can develop our 
understanding of the human subject and our relationship to modernity, and inform 
future empirical work on criminal justice responses to risk and dangerousness. 
 
This thesis began in 2000 when I was working as a research officer for Perth and 
Kinross criminal justice social work department. At that time, criminal justice social 
work was going through a period of change in relation to professional practice; in 
particular, change concerning the understanding and interpretation of risk. When I 
started in this post in 1996, risk referred to risk of reconviction and the likelihood of 
custody for an individual offender (see Creamer and Williams, 1996); the higher the 
risk of custody, the more social work intervention should be targeted to reduce that 
                                                 
1
 Risk/needs approaches are not linked to incapacitation, as in actuarial justice. The main purpose of 
risk schedules is to assign offenders to programmes that will most effectively deal with their needs 
and reduce recidivism. (see O‟Malley, 2004) 
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risk. By the time I left in 2004 the context of risk had shifted and referred to risk of 
harm to the community; the higher the risk posed by an offender the greater the 
difficulty in justifying a community based programme. One of the key documents, 
published by the Social Work Services Inspectorate for Scotland in 1997, that both 
reflected and helped to instigate this change of focus, was A Commitment to Protect 
- Supervising Sex Offenders: Proposals for More Effective Practice (The Scottish 
Office, 1997). The aim of this report was to review arrangements for the 
supervision, treatment and monitoring of sex offenders in the community; it was 
also instrumental in establishing the Expert Panel on sex offenders in 1998 under 
the Chairmanship of the Honourable Lady Cosgrove, and further influenced the 
MacLean Committee on dangerous and violent offenders established in 1999 and 
the Millan Committee, established in the same year, which had a remit to 
investigate the management of mentally disordered offenders.  As well as the 
greater attention given to risk assessment and management within these committees, 
there was also an interest in the Risk/Needs approaches to offender behaviour being 
developed in Canada; with the work of Hanson (1997), Hanson and Bussière 
(1998), Andrews (1995) and Andrews and Bonta (1998) being particularly 
influential. This latter text, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct,
2
 attempted to 
provide a general theory for understanding individual differences in criminal 
activity and became the theoretical basis for „What Works‟3 and risk/needs 
                                                 
2
 This document was not only published as an academic textbook but also doubled as the theoretical 
underpinning of the „Level of Service Inventory-Revised‟ (LSI-R), the general risk assessment 
instrument. This was the main competitor of the Scottish Executive‟s in-house risk assessment tool 
within Scottish criminal justice services at that time; the RMA I-IV. 
3
 „What Works‟ refers to a broad range of government led evidence-based policy initiatives. In 
criminology it generally refers to the effectiveness of offender rehabilitation programmes and had its 
origin in the results of the Lipton, Martinson and Wilks‟ (1975) review of offender rehabilitation 
literature. 
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approaches to offender management. In this book Andrews and Bonta (1998: 4) 
write: 
 
„Empirically, PCC [the psychology of criminal conduct] seeks knowledge 
not only of the observable facts regarding the nature and extent of individual 
variation in criminal conduct, but also knowledge of the personal, 
situational and social variables associated or correlated with criminal 
behaviour. These are termed covariates and include the correlates of 
individual differences in a criminal history and the predictors of the 
criminal futures of individuals. Perhaps more importantly, PCC seeks 
knowledge of the causes of the criminal conduct of individuals.‟  
 
The above quotation attempts to outline a methodological relationship between 
observable facts and inferences of causality based on the singular individual as the 
basic unit of scientific investigation. Within Andrews and Bonta‟s framework the 
social is understood and conceptualised as an external influence on individual 
action: „the full range of potential covariates of individual behaviour, and to the full 
range of the moderators and mediators of those covariates (i.e. soma, psyche, social, 
cultural, political, economic, and the immediate situations of action)‟ (1998:4). 
What is significant about this conceptualisation of the relationship of the individual 
to the social is that it presupposes a community of isolated „empirical‟ subjects 
which in turn is then treated as the „natural‟ starting point of human socialisation. 
Crime in this context is perceived as the isolated acts of solitary individuals against 
an external, passive and non-criminogenic community. This individualistic 
characterisation of human nature is not only highly positivistic, but is often accepted 
as a common sense
4
 representation of the human subject in both legal and practice 
settings.  
 
                                                 
4
 The prevalence of this understanding is reflected in the fact that it is at the centre not only of 
rehabilitative approaches towards offenders but also theories of deterrence (see Norrie, 2001). 
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This „common sense‟ understanding of criminal conduct formed the background to 
the ruminations of the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders in 2000, 
and provided the philosophical grounding for their recommendation in establishing 
what was to become the Risk Management Authority (RMA).  
 
The origins of this thesis are located in these initial debates surrounding the Risk 
Management Authority – debates which are outlined in more detail in chapter five. 
However, as the thesis progressed, it, too, experienced its own shift of focus: the 
main area of interest no longer lay with the criminal justice concerns of sentencing 
and the calculation of risk per se, but with how to conceptualise the concomitant 
intersection of the institutional culture of criminal justice and the construction of 
subjectivity, specifically the actuarial subject or, as it is repositioned in this thesis, 
the „dangerous other‟. The concern of the thesis is, therefore, the ontological and 
epistemological contexts, not just of the new risk/needs approaches to offender 
rehabilitation programmes, but of identity or subjectivity formation. 
 
To achieve this broader understanding it was necessary not only to locate the 
emergence of the Risk Management Authority as part of a longer history of 
legislative responses to dangerousness and risk, but to develop an approach that 
opposed the naturalism at the heart of these debates. This was achieved by drawing 
on Hegel and the work of the Frankfurt School. By way of a re-interpretation of 
Hegel, through the lens of critical theory, the thesis seeks to historicise and make 
problematic the ideologies and assumptions surrounding the emergence of the Risk 
Management Authority. In this way, the aim is less to import theory into the thesis 
to illuminate our understanding of the RMA – though this is hopefully also the case 
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– but rather to use the RMA to illuminate the work of theory.  In particular, the 
thesis is an exploration of how Hegel‟s theoretical ideas can help us think through 
the relationship between criminal justice and the subject. 
 
Why Hegel? 
It is appropriate here to explain why the thesis uses Hegel‟s interpretation of „ethical 
life‟ to frame a contemporary constellation of problems concerning risk and the 
management of offenders. There exist a considerable number of criminological 
perspectives which have attempted successfully to theorise risk (Ericson, and 
Haggerty, 1997; Feeley, and Simon, 2003; Garland, 2001; O‟Malley, 2004; Sparks, 
2000), why not draw on that body of work to develop a framework? Why instead 
draw on a philosopher whose reflections on the state are almost two hundred years 
old?
5
 The answer to this question relates to Hegel‟s notion of modernity and its 
reflexive relationship to the development of the subject. 
 
It is important to note however, that the choice of Hegel was not immediate. His 
influence and the adoption of „ethical life‟ only became significant as the thesis 
progressed. What made his work important to the thesis was the relationship 
between his work and its unconscious, or at least unacknowledged, reflection in 
contemporary texts on modernity; texts which dealt with themes of risk, the 
reflexivity of modernity (Beck 1992, Giddens, 1990), and theories of the self and 
self-identity (Giddens, 1991 Taylor, 1992). Ethical life therefore was a means of 
addressing what I perceived as the one-sidedness or positivity of such accounts of 
                                                 
5
 The Philosophy of Right was published in 1821 
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modernity. In other words, such accounts lacked the negative and critical aspects of 
Hegel‟s account.  This is an argument developed in chapters one and four.  
 
In relation to the individualistic aspects of the new risk/needs approaches to 
offender rehabilitation programmes, Hegel‟s work allowed me to problematise the 
conceptualisation of the relationship of the individual to the social, central to these 
accounts, in three key ways: 
 
First, by emphasising how the world of meaning and the intersubjective basis of 
subjectivity has been ignored in such approaches. Hegel argued that the main 
weakness of the new sciences‟ methods – collectively termed „empiricism‟ by him 
and which included physiognomy and phrenology - was that they posited a false 
perspective of the subject and its relationship to the world. He argued that the 
empiricists presupposed the individual to be the primary mode of being and as a 
result merely ended up reifying the concrete human qualities of the individuals that 
they were attempting to understand. Hegel countered positivist discourses on 
subjectivity that decontextualise social action and individualise social conduct by 
raising important questions about the intersubjective nature of subjectivity and its 
embeddedness in social institutions.  
 
Second, a Hegelian perspective highlights how such approaches treat crime as a 
„natural‟ category and avoid questions of power and the role of the State in the 
construction of law. For Hegel, it was impossible to theorise the individual 
separately from their social and historical context. A key concept Hegel used to do 
this was the notion of Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life). 
 13 
 
Third, Hegel‟s work offers a critique of the positivistic representation of scientific 
expertise, particularly in the prediction and treatment of deviant behaviour (see 
Bottoms, 1977). Hegel‟s account of physiognomy and phrenology makes clear that 
individual traits are indeterminate and therefore cannot be used as the basis of 
prediction. His basic understanding of scientific knowledge was not predictive: the 
owl of Minerva „first takes flight with twilight closing in‟ (Hegel, 1967: 13) 
suggests that knowledge appears on the scene too late. Critical science does not 
predict the future but articulates the true significance of events only once these 
events have passed.  
 
While the concerns above are not new, what is of current relevance in the work of 
Hegel is that his critique of empiricism has been left un-answered by much 
contemporary criminological thought. This thesis argues that ethical life provides a 
way to conceptualise intersubjectivity and in doing so allows us to understand crime 
and its relation to the state. It aims to explore how such concepts challenge the 
notion of crime as a „natural‟ category and bring questions of power and the role of 
the State to the fore. In particular, it aims to achieve this „de-naturalisation‟ by using 
an Hegelian reading of the concepts of indeterminacy and legitimacy.  
 
Chapters one and two of this thesis explore these problems in detail. Chapter one re-
evaluates the work of Hegel and his legacy in the form of Critical Theory. Hegel 
provides a series of concepts and their opposites through which the relationship of 
the subject, and the institutions through which it is formed, can be traced. It 
examines Hegel‟s notion of „Sittlichkeit‟ and how this relates to intersubjectivity 
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and what Hegel called struggles for recognition. The chapter ends with Hegel‟s 
critique of positivism in the form of physiognomy and phrenology. Chapter two 
explores further the concept of recognition through its relationship to legitimacy. It 
outlines the relationship between legality and legitimacy and examines the concepts 
of recognition, legal validity and their relation to subjectivity. The chapter ends with 
a discussion of the rationality of science and how the acceptance of an authority of a 
social order is based as much on technical rationalisation and expertise as it is on 
the legality of its system of law. It introduces the topic of the legitimacy of the 
scientific expert: a form of legitimacy shared by a number of scientific disciplines, 
including psychology, psychoanalysis and criminology. 
 
While the above makes clear Hegel‟s theoretical influence on the thesis, chapter 
three explores the influence of Hegel on the thesis methodology. In this case the 
socio-historical casus of André Jolles (1930), a model which allows for the 
generation of theoretical analysis as well as provides the „ground‟ for the thesis. 
 
A unifying thread, drawn from Hegel‟s thought, which runs throughout the first 
three chapters, is a conception of modernity that preserves an internal relationship 
between modernity and rationality. The importance of this link between modernity 
and rationality lies in the dialectical structure of Hegel‟s thought. Chapter three 
therefore also provides the basis of a critique of modernity which is outlined in 
chapter four. In the early chapters it is argued that Hegel‟s relevance to this thesis is 
related to recent developments in social theory that, while not explicitly drawing on 
Hegel, appear to return to central themes in Hegel‟s work.  Chapter four explores 
how notions of modernity are reframed in the conceptualisation of the risk society.  
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Drawing on Hegel and what has been loosely called the „classical‟ critique of 
modernity, it aims to recover what has been erased, forgotten, or repressed in these 
contemporary works of social theory. Chapter four, then, can be read as a critical 
confrontation with the history of social theory and modernity and as such provides a 
reference point and context for chapter five in its account of the centrality of risk in 
contemporary decision making. 
 
Chapter five provides a socio-historical framework for, and traces the 
reconceptualisation taking place within, Scottish debates on dangerous offenders. It 
provides the historical background to the notion of the dangerous offender and the 
legislation that relate to this category of offender and looks at the influence of 
psychiatry and positivist criminology on the creation of the dangerous offender. The 
chapter also argues that the reconceptualisation taking place within Scottish debates 
on dangerous offenders has been brought about by the intersection of three key 
discourses concerning community, modernisation and the resurgence of 
dangerousness 
 
Throughout the thesis, the limitations of working within an Hegelian framework are 
palpable; particularly in the relationship between theory and empirical data. I will 
return to this theme in the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SPIRIT IS BONE: THE ANTINOMIES
6
 OF ETHICAL LIFE 
 
„Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity. We 
have to go back to him if we want to understand the internal relationship 
between modernity and rationality……We have to get clear on the Hegelian 
concept of modernity to be able to judge whether the claim of those who 
base their analysis on other premises is legitimate‟. (Habermas, 1987:4)7. 
 
Introduction 
In 1906 Benedetto Croce (1915) published a book on Hegel called What is Living 
and what is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel? At the beginning of the twentieth 
century Croce felt that it was necessary to re-examine Hegel‟s work and to question 
its relevance for the new century. It is possible that Hegel would have appreciated 
such a question. For Hegel the history of thought was characterised by the 
emergence of „great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating 
straightjackets‟ (Berlin, cited in Bernstein, 1979:57). Most of his writing was 
concerned with the question of what was vital in the products of human thought and 
what had become ossified in such knowledge.  
 
                                                 
6
 As Jameson (1994:1) writes, „It is conventional to distinguish an antinomy from a contradiction, 
not least because folk wisdom implies that the latter is susceptible of a solution or a resolution, 
whereas the former is not. In that sense, the antinomy is a cleaner form of language than the 
contradiction. With it, you know where you stand; it states two propositions that are radically, indeed 
absolutely, incompatible, take it or leave it. Whereas the contradiction is a matter of partialities and 
aspects; only some of it is incompatible with the accompanying proposition; indeed, it may have 
more to do with forces, or the state of things, than with words or logical implications. Contradictions 
are supposed, in the long run, to be productive; whereas antinomies […] offer nothing in the way of a 
handle, no matter how diligently you turn them around and around‟. 
7
 Habermas‟ question of legitimate heirs to modernity was originally focused on Foucault, Derrida, 
Bataille, Lyotard and Luhmann. However the question remains relevant to the recent „return to 
modernity‟ by contemporary social theory. 
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Hegel's influence on twentieth century thought was not insignificant, both in terms 
of those directly influenced by his work: Lukács, Sartre, Lacan, Gadamer and the 
Frankfurt School among others, and, those who developed their thought in 
opposition to Hegel: writers such as Althusser, Foucault and Derrida. One hundred 
years after Croce‟s book the same question may be asked of Hegel‟s relevance to a 
social science thesis at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. In the context of this thesis 
there are two reasons why Hegel can be regarded as important. Firstly, recent 
developments in social theory which form a background to this work, while not 
explicitly drawing on Hegel, reflect a return to Hegelian themes. Works dealing 
with the reflexivity of modernity (Beck 1992;Giddens, 1990), theories of the self 
and self-identity (Giddens, 1991; Taylor, 1992) and the renaissance of the category 
of the „imaginary‟ (Carlen, 2008; Taylor, 2004) have been central to social scientific 
debate from the 1990s onward. These themes, although touched on in this chapter, 
will be examined in greater detail in chapter four. The second reason why Hegel‟s 
work is relevant to a criminology thesis is the important role that the concept of 
crime and the figure of the criminal played in the development of Hegel‟s 
philosophy. Although there has been little acknowledgement of Hegel‟s work in 
criminology
8, crime and its punishment, and the criminal‟s reconciliation with the 
community were central to his early Jena manuscripts as well as his later work on 
„ethical life‟ (Flechtheim (1947), Žižek, (2000), Honneth, (2000)).  
 
                                                 
8
 Work on Hegel‟s theory of crime usually focus on his ideas in the context of retributive punishment 
(see Bloch 1996). However Flechtheim (1947) also points out that in order to comprehend the 
significance of the concept of punishment within Hegel's work, it is essential not to mistake his 
theory with traditional theories of retribution. Within Hegel's philosophy of punishment, in addition 
to its function of retribution, punishment becomes invested with the capacity of reconciliation; law 
assumes the power of absorbing and effacing crime. There is in Hegel‟s work strong themes that 
were later to emerge in restorative justice philosophies. Punishment in Hegel‟s early work loses its 
stigma; the criminal, in serving his sentence, rehabilitates him/herself and is finally restored to the 
ethical community. 
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Drawing from a body of work now coming up for two centuries old is problematic 
and it is important to outline what is usable in a contemporary context. Due to the 
problems of interpretation in relation both to the age and to the systematic aspects of 
Hegel‟s work there can be no pure application of Hegel‟s ideas. Those such as the 
Frankfurt School
9
 who have developed his thought have tended to foreground 
certain texts, passages, themes or concepts over others. In this way, Hegel‟s 
influence has been based on a selective response to particular elements of his 
thought and a rejection of others (see Sinnebrink, 2007). This thesis is equally 
selective and in no way does it attempt to adopt Hegel‟s philosophy as a whole. The 
following work also does not claim to be a work of Hegel scholarship. The concepts 
outlined in the following chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, although originating 
in the work of Hegel, have been interpreted through the lens of Critical Theory. In 
light of this, the present dissertation does not adopt a unified or tightly bound 
theoretical framework or method - as one would do when carrying out an 
interpretative or ethnographic study for example - but rather more loosely draws on, 
what Adorno called, a „constellation‟ of themes and concepts. We will discuss the 
notion of „constellation‟ - what Jay (1984:15) termed a „dialectical model of 
negations‟ - further on in this chapter when we outline the work of the Frankfurt 
School.  However its relevance here is in its affinity with Hegel‟s insights on the 
relationship between modernity and rationality highlighted in the quotation at the 
beginning of the chapter by Habermas (1987).  
                                                 
9
 In this thesis I will refer to the Frankfurt School generically, although it should be made clear that 
the theorists who are associated with the Institute of Social Research, past and present, are by no 
means united under one philosophical or scientific paradigm. Wiggershaus (1995: 1) argues that the 
„term „Frankfurt School‟ was a label first applied by outsiders in the 1960‟s, but Adorno in the end 
used it himself with obvious pride. To start with, it described a critical sociology which saw society 
as an antagonistic totality, and which had not excluded Hegel and Marx from its thinking, but rather 
saw itself as their heir […] the label itself has long since become an indispensable part of the history 
of the influence of the ideas it represents, quite apart from the question of the extent to which we can 
speak of a „school‟ in the strict sense.‟ 
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The relationship between modernity and rationality originally outlined by Hegel is 
very different from that as understood in the recent developments in social theory 
mentioned above, despite its return to Hegelian themes. As Bloch (2000: 179) 
remarked, „[t]he essence of Hegel is to have brought all inwardness outside‟. For 
Hegel rationality referred not only to the property of an individual mind, but was a 
property of institutions, their practices and of the symbolic order itself (Habermas, 
2006). This external embodiment of reason, as Habermas argued, was fundamental 
to later developments in the theory of modernity
10
 from Marx to Weber, Lukács and 
the Frankfurt School. 
 
The notion of embodied reason was further developed in Hegel‟s notion of 
Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life). The concept of ethical life plays a central role in Hegel‟s 
later work in resolving the issues that concerned him earlier regarding the nature of 
human subjectivity and its relation to the state and its institutions. The significance 
of ethical life to this present work is in the following three areas: 
 
1. The concept of ethical life provides a structure that maintains the 
relationship between modernity and rationality, i.e. understands rationality 
as an external property of institutions. 
 
2. Ethical life provides a concept of intersubjectivity that is more critical than 
the more positive English language notion of „community‟11.   
                                                 
10
 In particular Weber‟s association of modernity with rationalisation. 
11
 See Williams (1989: 112-113) „Community is unusual among the terms of political vocabulary in 
being, I think, the one term which has never been used in a negative sense. People never, from any 
political position, want to say that they are against community or against the community. You can 
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3. Ethical life provides the thesis with a framework to conceptualise crime and 
its relation to indeterminacy and legitimacy.  
 
The notion of Ethical life was inspired by the republics (polis) of ancient Greece 
and Rome and articulated a notion of a unified ethical community (Beiser, 2005). 
Hegel‟s theory was a theory of social bonds and was developed to counter what he 
saw as the abstract, atomised individual of positivism and classical legal thought
12
. 
The subject as understood by Hegel was not the autonomous individual of scientific 
positivism or law but was intersubjectively embodied within a community. In other 
words, it was produced and intimately dependent on the recognition of others. For 
Hegel, crime was central to what he called struggles for recognition, and necessary 
for the achievement of ethical life. As Honneth (1995: 26) argues, „Hegel granted 
criminal acts a constructive role in the formative process of ethical life because they 
were able to unleash the conflicts that, for the first time, would make subjects aware 
of underlying relations of recognition‟.  
 
Drawing on the concept of ethical life as contextualised in this chapter, I will argue 
that Hegel‟s concept can provide the basis of a critique of criminological 
approaches developed from individual positivism and classical legal theory. It is 
particularly relevant to those developments based on the principle of risk 
management as the dominant goal of crime control, and what Garland (2001) has 
                                                                                                                                         
have very sophisticated individualist arguments about the proper sphere of society, but the 
community, by contrast, is always right.‟  
12
 See Smith (1989: 4-5) „contemporary Hegelians deny the tenet of methodological individualism by 
arguing that rationality may be predicated not merely of individuals but also of the institutions and 
even the political cultures that make these actions possible‟.  
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called the „criminology of the “dangerous other”‟. This discussion will be developed 
in chapters four and five.  
 
In order to make a case for the above argument, in this chapter I outline a theory of 
institutions drawn from Hegel‟s notion of „Ethical Life‟ (Sittlichkeit). Institution as 
it is used in this thesis is defined in its basic sense as „standardised modes of 
behaviour‟ (Radcliffe-Brown cited in Giddens, 1979: 96); in other words, it is 
concerned with structured social interaction and its reproduction. The chapter is 
divided into three sections: part I provides an account of ethical life and its relation 
to Hegel‟s theory of the state; part II will describe how the notion of ethical life was 
developed by Critical Theory - particularly that of the Frankfurt School (the lens 
through which this interpretation of Hegel has been drawn); and lastly part III will 
detail the relationship between ethical life and crime and its relation to 
indeterminacy and recognition in both legal and scientific settings. Through these 
three sections, I will outline the overall conceptual framework for the thesis. 
 
I 
 
Ethical Life: Modernity and the Organic State 
In the eighteenth century people could still remember what it was like to live in a 
world that was not modern at all (Berman, 1983). This sense of living in two worlds 
simultaneously - traditional or customary life and modernity - was reflected in the 
work of Hegel and in particular his notion of Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life). Ethical life 
plays a central role in Hegel‟s Philosophy of Right (1821). It was used as an attempt 
to formulate a social and political ideal that had been first outlined in his Jena 
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Lectures written earlier in 1805-6. This ideal was the synthesis of the community 
with the individual (Beiser, 2005).  
 
Although the concept of ethical life was fundamental to Hegel, it was also 
ambiguously formulated in his work. Beiser (2005) argues that this ambiguity 
begins with translation. Hegel first developed the notion of Sittlichkeit as a 
translation from the ancient Greek „ethos‟, a term which refers to the moral 
character, disposition, or custom of a nation or people. The German word 
„Sittlichkeit‟ also has no exact English counterpart; although it can often denote 
morality, its meaning can be broader and is often used to refer to manners, standards 
of politeness and decency, as well as to what is traditional or customary (Sitten). 
Hegel used the term in reference to the whole way of living and acting of a people. 
However in using the term Hegel makes an important distinction between ethical 
life and morality (Moralität). For Hegel morality referred to the individual 
consciousness
13
, the inner life of the individual, whereas ethical life was 
intersubjective; it was structured via interaction with others. Morality is abstract 
because it separates the individual from the social substance, ethical life is concrete, 
the individual is related to the social substance in such a way „that the very identity 
of the individual depends on its place in the whole‟ (Beiser, 2005: 234). One can 
                                                 
13
 Kaufmann (1951:470-471) warns that we will misunderstand Hegel if we construe his remarks 
about morality (individual conscience)  as being allied to an  authoritarian view of the state. „When 
Hegel asserts […] that "the State cannot recognize conscience [Gewissen] in its peculiar form, i.e., as 
subjective knowledge [Wissen], just as in science, too, subjective opinion, assurance, and the appeal 
to subjective opinion have no validity," he is not at all inconsistent. Conscience, as Hegel insists, is 
fallible; and, while no government or church has the right to dictate to our conscience, no 
government can afford to recognize conscience as a legal standard. As several of his interpreters 
have pointed out, Hegel, when he wrote the Philosophy of Right, was concerned about the recent 
assassination of the poet Kotzebue by a student who was convinced that he was a Russian spy and 
deserved death‟. 
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reject morality but one cannot reject ethical life, except via suicide or mental illness 
(Habermas, 1996). 
 
At the heart of the Philosophy of Right was an interpretation of ethical life and its 
relation to law and morality. Its intent was to make the abstractions of law and 
morality concrete, to provide his philosophy with what Harvey (1981) calls a 
„political body‟. 
 
„Ethical life‟(Sittlichkeit) contains the thesis that in social reality, in that of 
modernity…, spheres of action are already present in which inclination and 
moral norms, interest and values have been fixed in the form of 
institutionalised interaction‟ (Honneth 2000:19). 
 
Through this interpretation Hegel describes a series of mediations necessary for 
individual consciousness to realize itself within ethical life. Hegel first describes the 
family as a sphere of ethical life. This sphere is characterised by personal altruism. 
In contrast to the family was civil society. This second sphere was one of „universal 
egoism‟, characterised by market competition and the social division of labour. 
Here individuals sought to use others as a means towards their own private ends. 
The tension between the two spheres, between the family and civil society, the 
private and the public, can only be resolved, according to Hegel, through the 
possession of a universalistic consciousness on the part of all. The objective 
expression of that consciousness could be realised only through the institutions of 
the modern state (Harvey, 1981).  
 
That ethical life could only be realised through the acceptance of the authority of the 
„rational state‟ over the individual, has led many authors to criticise Hegel‟s politics 
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for being both conservative and authoritarian (Marx, 1975, Popper, 1966, Bloch, 
1996). This is a view confirmed for many by Hegel‟s description of the institutions 
of „the rational modern state‟ as being reminiscent of the Prussian state of his own 
time. However there is what Harvey (1981) calls an „intriguing ambiguity‟14 which 
runs through Hegel‟s work that is also combined with a radical critique of modern 
institutions of the state that would belie such interpretations. It is to his theory of the 
modern state that we must now turn in order to gain a clearer perspective of ethical 
life. 
 
Hegel‟s philosophy was grounded in an organic vision of the world. It was based on 
the perception of the universe as a single living organism. Not only does Hegel‟s 
philosophical system reflect this, but his language and central concepts can only be 
interpreted with this in mind. When Hegel advises us to observe the state 
objectively as a „thing in itself‟ he means us not only to understand the state as 
something by itself, standing apart from its relations to other things, „but also as 
something potential, undeveloped and inchoate‟ (Beiser, 2005:81). It was in his 
theory of the state that Hegel departed from much Enlightenment thought.
15
  His 
view of the organic state, inspired in part by the ancient republics of Greece and 
Rome, was based on the romantic ideal of unity with others. The inspiration for 
Hegel‟s organic worldview – and indeed for other nineteenth century philosophers 
who shared it – was Plato‟s Timaeus. This work provided the root metaphor behind 
                                                 
14
 There is a debate among Hegel scholars as to whether he intended the later section of the 
Philosophy of Right to be a normative account of what ethical life should be as facilitated by state 
institutions or whether his work merely reflected the actual institutions of the State at that time. 
Although parts of Hegel‟s Preface to the Philosophy of Right would suggest the latter, other sections 
would contradict this interpretation (see Marx, 1975; Marcuse, 1954; Norrie, 1993; Fine, 1993 and 
Honneth, 2000). 
15
 Enlightenment thought drew its political philosophy from the French Revolution and tended 
towards individualist and voluntarist models of political participation (Smith, 1989) as opposed to 
models based on unity with others. 
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organicism, as it conceived the world as „a single visible living being‟, a „living 
being that contains within itself all living beings‟ (Plato, cited in Beiser, 2005:87); a 
macroanthropos wherein all nature was conceived as resembling a single human 
being. This model of the state had a profound influence on Romantic philosophy 
and nineteenth century scientific thinking. 
 
Although Hegel‟s concept of the state, as well as the language used to describe it 
might now appear rather archaic and obscure
16
, to dismiss it as not being relevant to 
our times is to overlook what is uniquely modern in his work. As mentioned earlier, 
there is in Hegel‟s work a radical critique of nineteenth century state institutions. 
Although his ideal of the state was inspired by classical Greece and Rome it was 
also a contemporary reaction against the „nightwatchman‟17 state of liberalism, a 
state formation that was safeguarded by a contract between self-interested 
individuals (Beiser, 2005). In other words, a state dominated by the realm of civil 
society and „universal egoism‟. 
 
As mentioned above, Hegel desired a political formation that synthesised the 
community and the individual, to bring together the classical freedom of democratic 
participation with the modern freedom of rights (Harvey, 1981). These are not the 
ideals of the conservative and authoritarian defender of the absolutist state painted 
                                                 
16
See Engels criticism of Hegel‟s theory of the state, „The state is therefore by no means a power 
imposed on society from without; just as little is it “the reality of the moral idea”, “the image and the 
reality of reason,” as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a particular stage of 
development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction 
with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order 
that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves 
and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society, became necessary for the 
purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of „order‟; and this power, arising 
out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state.‟ 
(Engels, 1954: 277-278) 
17
 The „nightwatchman‟ state was based on „negative liberty‟ i.e. of doing as you pleased as long as 
you did not interfere with private property of others. 
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by Popper (1966)
18
. The institutions and practices of ethical life were more than a 
set of formal procedures for arriving at decisions. As Smith (1989) writes, although 
rooted in the customs and practices of a community, these customs and ways of life 
should not be imposed on the citizens of a state, but must be reflexively accepted as 
an expression of the popular will. If the necessary communicative channels are not 
adequate and decisions are enforced by the state, they will lack legitimacy. 
 
„Hegel starts from an ethical concept of individual freedom and derives from 
it the relative importance of formal right and of morality, mainly in order to 
show that they have necessarily to be included in the various communicative 
spheres which together represent the ultimate conditions for individual self-
realisation; therefore, he believes that the legitimacy of a modern legal 
order depends upon its capacity to guarantee each citizen the chance to 
participate in those spheres, which have all at the same time to be secured in 
their distinct normative integrity‟ (Honneth, 2000:60) 
 
Hegel claims that the rational state as the „actuality of the ethical idea‟, can 
transcend the dualities of private and public life and therefore heal the „wound of 
the social body‟ (Žižek, 2000: 95) In this way Hegel presented a theory of ethical 
life that would enable people to live their lives rationally according to socially 
accepted aims and thus experience their life as meaningful. However, he was also 
profoundly aware of the constraints at the heart of modern liberal society which 
prevented this happening. Contrary to contemporaries such as Adam Smith, Hegel 
argued that „negative liberty‟ and economic regulation by the market were not only 
defective means by which to achieve social harmony, but they also generated 
contradictions within social life. Hegel argued that self-interest and individual right 
                                                 
18
 In The Open Society and its Enemies Vol II, Popper argued that Hegel was a precursor of Hitler. 
The book not only painted Hegel as authoritarian but also as a nationalist, a racist and an apologist 
for tribalism.  
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based on property
19
 were incapable of generating institutions that could lay the 
foundations for the ethical unity of the people. At the heart of these constraints was 
what seemed to Hegel an unavoidable aspect of liberal democracies: the inability of 
such societies to accord recognition to all its members. This aspect of liberalism not 
only meant that modernity was unable to solve the problems that it created,
20
 the 
problems of poverty and of the increasing polarization in the distribution of wealth 
and income, but it also excluded a significant number in those societies from the 
opportunities to develop a meaningful and self-determined life (see Hegel, 1967, 
Avineri, 1974: Harvey, 2006: Arrigi 2007: Honneth 1999).  
 
There is a paradox at the heart of Hegel‟s ethical life: although he argues strongly 
for the transcendence of civil society and for the state as the „actuality of the ethical 
idea‟ he nowhere explains how this can be achieved within the constraints of the 
modern bourgeois state. Avineri (1974) points out: 
 
„Few people around 1820 grasped in such depth the predicament of modern 
industrial society and the future course of nineteenth-century European 
history. What is conspicuous in Hegel‟s analysis, however, is not only his 
farsightedness but also a basic intellectual honesty which makes him admit 
time and time again – completely against the grain of the integrative and 
mediating nature of the whole of his social philosophy – that he has no 
solution to the problems posed by civil society in its modern context. This is 
the only time in his system where Hegel raises a problem – and leaves it 
open. (Avineri, 1974: 154) 
 
                                                 
19
 For Hegel property was a form of recognition, „subjects mutually recognise each other as bearers 
of legitimate claims to possession‟ (Honneth 1996: 19). The „nightwatchman‟ state was not 
legitimate because those who lacked property were not accorded recognition, and therefore were 
denied rights. 
20
 Hegel showed in the Philosophy of Right that „bourgeois society appears to be incapable of 
solving through internal mechanisms the problem of social inequality and instability that arises from 
its tendency to over-accumulate wealth at one pole and deprivation at the other. A „mature‟ civil 
society is thus driven to seek external solutions through foreign trade and colonial or imperial 
practices.‟ (Arrighi, 2007: 220) 
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„[C]ompletely against the grain of the integrative and mediating nature of the whole 
of his social philosophy‟; as we will see later in the chapter, this will not be the only 
time that we find Hegel running against the grain of his own system.  
 
Earlier it was mentioned that Hegel‟s view of the state was ambiguous. This 
ambiguity also reappears in his views on ethical life and punishment. This occurs in 
the often unclear shift, (Flechtheim, 1947), from an actual ethical community to an 
ideal ethical community. As we have seen the notion of ethical life was derived 
from the ancient Greek (polis) republic and referred to a unified ethical community. 
However, in Hegel‟s own time, modern society had become fragmented by market 
competition and was based on „universal egoism‟. Individuals had become reified 
by abstract law in the form of an imagined social contract and society had become 
polarised by wealth and power (Arrighi, 2007). What then is the status of ethical life 
in Hegel‟s theory?  
 
Hegel‟s starting point was a theory of social bonds. These bonds, intersubjectively 
constituted and reproduced, already have an existence. As Honneth (1995: 14) 
argues, Hegel assumes, a natural basis for human socialization, a condition in which 
basic „forms of intersubjective coexistence are always present‟. 
  
What Hegel sought to make clear was not the origins of community formation in 
general, but rather the restructuring and expansion of these embryonic forms of 
ethical life into more immediate relations of social interaction. He argues that this 
restructuring takes the „form of a teleological process in which an original substance 
gradually reaches its full development‟ (Honneth, 1995: 15).  
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„Hegel sets out to conceptualize the path by which „ethical nature attains its 
true right‟ as a process of recovering negations, by which the ethical 
relations to society are to be successfully freed from the remaining one-
sidedness and particularities (Honneth, 1995: 15). 
 
Ethical life then is presupposed as intersubjective social bonds, it already exists, 
however its realisation is constrained by the existing social/institutional structure of 
society. As mentioned above although Hegel argues strongly for the transcendence 
of civil society he remains trapped within the constraints of the modern bourgeois 
state (Avineri, 1974). The intriguing questions that Hegel leaves open, however, 
concern the legitimacy of state institutions. Legitimacy, for Hegel, depended on 
those institutions ability to guarantee each citizen the opportunity to participate 
actively in civil society in a way that made possible their individual self-realisation; 
and it was only through this realization of an „objectively‟ possible reason - the 
rational potential already inherent in society‟s institutions, practices, and everyday 
routines - that legitimation could be grounded. If the constraints mentioned above 
cannot guarantee citizens a free and self-determined life then the intersubjective 
relations of „ethical life‟ that Hegel envisaged is transformed into what previously 
he referred to in the Jena Lectures as „the night of the world‟ (Žižek, 2000). As 
Eagleton (2009: 124) points out, while ethical life can refer to the positive notions 
of a community - habitual virtue, local affections, and kinship - it can also be used 
to describe the more negative, such as „cultural conformism, unreflective custom, 
the blind coerciveness of tradition‟; the result of a failure in the restructuring and 
expansion of the embryonic forms of ethical life. For Hegel immersion in ethical 
life, the symbolic order, can also then be pathological. This pathological aspect of 
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ethical life was reflected in Adorno‟s concept of „ethical violence‟21 (see Butler, 
2005). 
 
„Scheler talks about the disintegration [Zersetzung] of ethical ideas, an 
expression I do not care for […] you will find this expression recurs again 
and again and particularly in treatises on morality. And whenever you hear 
it, it suppresses the fact that in all likelihood nothing is more degenerate 
than the kind of ethics or morality that survives in the shape of collective 
ideas even after the World Spirit has ceased to inhabit them – to use the 
Hegelian expression as a kind of shorthand. Once the state of human 
consciousness and the state of the social forces of production have 
abandoned these collective ideas, these ideas acquire repressive and violent 
qualities. And what forces philosophy into the kinds of reflections that we 
are expressing here is this element of compulsion which is to be found in 
traditional customs; it is this violence and evil that brings these customs 
[Sitten] into conflict with morality [Sittlichheit] – and not the decline of 
morals of the kind lamented by the theoreticians of decadence. (Adorno, 
2001: 17) 
 
What Adorno is highlighting here is that moral questions do not always appear 
solely in relation to their current social context. The concrete universality of ethical 
life can take on repressive and violent forms and attempt to impose „a false unity 
that attempts to suppress the difficulty and discontinuity existing within any 
contemporary ethos‟ (Butler, 2005: 4). Ethical life can adopt, according to Hegel, 
pathological forms. It is these darker more melancholic
22
 thoughts of Hegel, the 
thoughts against the grain of his system as a whole, that influenced Critical Theory 
and its development of the concept Sittlichkeit as second nature. This notion of 
                                                 
21
 Bourdieu (1977: 192) uses the term „symbolic violence‟ in relation to „socially recognised‟ 
domination (legitimate authority): „ symbolic violence, the gentle, invisible form of violence, which 
is never recognised as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, 
confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety […] cannot fail to be seen 
as the most economical mode of domination, i.e. the mode which best corresponds to the economy of 
the system‟. 
22
 These darker musings of Hegel and Critical Theory are often labelled pessimistic and certainly 
there is a deep sense of melancholy in the preface of The Philosophy of Right (1967) , however as 
Anderson (1998: 77) notes, with regards to Hegelian thought, because of its general negativity 
„[c}ategories such as optimism or pessimism have no place in Hegel‟s thought‟. In that sense even 
the „melancholic science‟ of Adorno resists the pessimism that many (Eagleton 2003, Anderson, 
1998) have accused him of. 
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second nature will be discussed in detail later in the chapter in relation to Critical 
Theory. It is to Critical Theory‟s continuation of Hegel‟s thought that we now turn 
our attention. 
 
II 
 
Hegel and Critical Theory 
Critical theory, as an established programme of critical research, originated over 70 
years ago as the collective project of the Frankfurt School under the directorship of 
Max Horkheimer. In 1937, in exile in the United States, Horkheimer wrote a paper 
entitled „Traditional and Critical Theory‟, in an attempt to formulate the theoretical 
and political intent of a critical theory of society. In this paper Horkheimer outlined 
„a paradigm of a social theory in which the intention of a philosophically guided 
diagnosis of the times is combined with an empirically grounded social analysis.‟ 
(Honneth, 1993: 187). Horkheimer argued that traditional theory did not recognise 
its own historical context. In its desire for purity, modern science cut itself off from 
the social processes of its own production; in other words it was unconscious of its 
own constitutive context. Traditional theory was therefore, unreflexive
23
. 
Horkheimer attempted to explain this self-forgetting of traditional theory in terms of 
an interpretative framework, derived from Hegel‟s philosophy of history.  
 
Unlike contemporary accounts of modernity, Critical Theory is not a theory of 
society – although Horkheimer had ambitions for it to be - nor is it a school of 
                                                 
23
 In this context, reflexivity‟ relates to the principle where a particular discipline has the ability to 
reflect on its own constitutive and historical context (Horkheimer 1978, Rose 1978) and „reflective‟ 
refers to the process of reflection which as Bernstein (1995) explains refers to the ability of the 
theorist or researcher to locate him/herself in the research process or moment of theory production. 
Both terms will be discussed in detail in chapter three. 
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thought (despite its most famous advocates commonly being referred to as one); nor 
is it a method. Connerton (1976: 15) also suggests that it should not be considered 
either as a branch of sociology but as a specific „phenomenon of German 
intellectual history‟,24 a tradition of social thought that stands between philosophy 
and social theory (Bernstein, 1995). What connects Hegel with Critical Theory is 
the notion that „no partial aspect of social life and no isolated phenomenon may be 
comprehended unless it is related to the historical whole, to the social structure 
conceived as a global entity‟ (Connerton, 1976:12). For Hegel the „impurity‟ of 
reason refers to its unavoidable entanglement in history. Yet what is it that allows 
history to be both a source of reflection, and therefore a means to access the „social‟, 
and at the same time the foundation of constraint which serves to occlude the 
„social‟ from our categories of thought? The answer to this question is that we are 
often made blind to the sedimented forms of history by our own subjection to the 
social through language
25. That which appears most „natural‟ and „immediate‟ in 
society is a reflection of what has already been imposed by tradition, power and 
human interest. Part of this historical and „totalising‟ method involves making the 
„reflective self-understanding of the theorist a central moment in theory‟ (Bernstein, 
1995:12). However, what made this socio-historical and reflexive approach „critical‟ 
was the opposition or negation of what exists. Both aspects of Critical Theory, the 
„reflexive‟ and the „negative‟, were drawn from Hegel and were considered by its 
                                                 
24
 Although critical theory has not been influential within British or American sociology, it has 
strong affinities and influences on American Pragmatism. See Habermas „there is a certain difference 
of climate between England and the Continent. There are no deep elective affinities between the 
spirit of empiricism, which is still dominant in England, and German Idealism. A fermenting agent is 
lacking in the philosophical metabolism, which could mediate between the two mentalities—as 
pragmatism does, for example, in America. I believe I can detect this estrangement in basic 
philosophical convictions. For example, I observe a certain incomprehension in the way in which 
English social scientists write about my concerns. In their case the ontology of empiricism has 
become second nature‟. (Habermas, 1985:79) 
25
 This alienating aspect of language (symbolic alienation) was developed by Lacan (2006). See 
Jameson (1988) for an elaboration of Lacan‟s concept. 
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founders as a radical re-conceptualisation of scientific reason. Reflexivity will be 
discussed in more detail in relation to Critical Theory in chapter three, while the 
importance of the concept of negativity will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Before that, in order to provide a more comprehensive account of the relationship 
between Hegel‟ critique of reason and Critical Theory, we must turn our attention to 
one of the founding works of Critical Theory; The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
 
Up until the publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1944, the Frankfurt 
School‟s notion of „critique‟ was still grounded in Karl Marx‟s theory of history. 
However, with this work, written under the influence mainly of Adorno, the 
Frankfurt School drew on Hegel‟s critique of the Enlightenment. The dialectic of 
Enlightenment referred to what Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) regarded as the 
paradox of the late eighteenth century concept of reason. Instead of Enlightened 
reason bringing emancipation, it was revealed instead to bring about new forms of 
domination (Rose, 1978). The book‟s key theme was that „the Enlightenment has 
extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness‟ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1979: 4); however, in this work, the Hegelian conception of „self-consciousness‟ or 
„reflexivity‟ appeared in the form of a Nietzschean „irony‟. In this book Horkheimer 
and Adorno (1979) used an „ironic inversion‟ - „Myth is already enlightenment; and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology‟ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979: xvi), - to 
expose ambivalences in the ideals and tenets of the Enlightenment project. 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1979: xvi) both acknowledged Nietszche‟s influence on 
the work in the introduction. Adorno in particular was influenced by Nietszche‟s 
use of irony as a means of immanent critique: 
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„Nietzsche belongs to that tradition of bourgeois thinkers who since the 
Renaissance have revolted against the untruth of society and cynically 
played its reality [deren Wahrheit] as an „ideal‟ against its ideal, and by the 
critical power of the confrontation have helped that other truth [i.e. its 
ideal] which they mock most fiercely as the untruth.‟ Adorno (1976, cited in 
Rose 1978: 21) 
 
However, it was not only Nietzsche‟s use of irony that influenced Adorno but his 
fragmentary and epigrammatic writing style. Nietzsche, like Hegel, developed a 
negative and oppositional philosophy and was, according to Horkheimer and 
Adorno (1979), one of the few philosophers apart from Hegel to recognise the 
dialectic of Enlightenment. Unlike Hegel, Nietzsche was opposed to philosophical 
systems and wrote in an epigrammatic, allegorical and ironic style to avoid the 
systematic explication of his ideas (see Rose, 1978). It was from Nietzsche‟s 
influence that the metaphor „constellation‟ comes.       
 
The term „Constellation‟, as a means of organising a collection of interrelated 
fragments of writing, however, was originally coined by Benjamin (1973)
26
 who 
used it as a method of interrupting the narrative flow of his writings. Benjamin 
wished to emphasise discontinuity in history and the fragmentation of modernity‟s 
consciousness (Löwy, 2005). Adorno‟s use of the term, however, had more 
philosophical intentions and drew more directly from Nietzsche, as he notes: 
 
„from my theorem that there are no philosophical first principles, it follows 
that one cannot construct a continuous argument with the usual stages, but 
one must assemble the whole from a series of partial complexes […] whose 
constellation not [logical] sequence produces the idea.‟ Adorno (1976, cited 
in Rose, 1978: 13)  
                                                 
26
 See Löwy (2005: 4), „The expression “philosophy of history” may be misleading here. There is no 
philosophical system in Benjamin‟s writings: all his thinking takes the form of essays or fragments, 
if not indeed of quotation pure and simple – the passages wrenched from their context being made to 
serve his own approach. Any attempt at systematising this mode of “thinking poetically” (Hannah 
Arendt: 1973) is, then, problematical and uncertain.‟ 
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Jay (1984:15) writes, that for Adorno, the metaphor of „constellation‟ denoted a 
„juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction 
to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle‟. When 
investigating cultural and social phenomena, Adorno drew on the metaphor in order 
to capture the subtle relationships between and among their component elements. 
Adorno‟s approach, according to Jay (1984:15), grew out of his refusal to: 
 
„subordinate arguments and observations in a hierarchically entailed 
manner, grew out of an unwillingness to privilege one element of the 
constellation over another. The result was not a relativistic chaos of 
unrelated factors, but a dialectical model of negations that simultaneously 
constructed and deconstructed patterns of a fluid reality‟ (Jay, 1984:15). 
 
The central reason that such a model was adopted however was not merely related 
to style, but because the authors were aware of the theoretical limitations of applied 
social science.  In justifying the unusual stylistic aspect of the work, Horkheimer 
and Adorno (1979: xi) write: 
 
„Even though we had known for many years that the great discoveries of 
applied science are paid for with an increasing diminution of theoretical 
awareness, we still thought that in regard to scientific activity our 
contribution could be restricted to the criticism or extension of specialist 
axioms. Thematically, at any rate, we were to keep to the traditional 
disciplines: to sociology, psychology, and epistemology […] However, the 
fragments united in this volume show that we are forced to abandon this 
conviction.‟ 
 
 The Dialectic of Enlightenment was not then a systematic work of philosophy, but a 
series of essays and fragments arranged around themes and antinomies based on the 
history of the subject and the domination of nature. The following section provides 
a summary of its main ideas and relates them to Hegel‟s philosophy of the subject. 
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The key argument of the Dialectic of Enlightenment is that the traditional opposition 
of the Enlightenment – the opposition between tradition and reason – instead of 
disenchanting the world of myth and superstition, merely suppressed them.  
 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Up until the end of the nineteenth century enlightened thinking had generally 
always been understood as a force opposing myth. Enlightened thinking countered 
the authority of tradition with the coercive force of reason. The opposing force of 
reason broke the spell of custom and superstition and thereby allowed humanity to 
escape from the enchantment of mythical thinking (Habermas, 1982). The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment challenged this opposition and uncovered a dark and hidden bond 
between myth and enlightenment, „The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of 
knowledge for fancy‟ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979: 3). However, the myths 
which were victim to the Enlightenment were also its own products.  Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1979) argued that dissolution of myths had been accompanied by 
fragmentation and loss of meaning. As a result of this loss the Enlightenment 
domination of nature had brought about greater existential insecurity.  
 
„Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything 
unknown. That determines the course of demythologisation of enlightenment 
[……] Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical. The pure immanence of 
positivism, its ultimate product, is no more than a so to speak universal 
taboo. Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of 
outsideness is the very source of fear. (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979: 16) 
 
A rationalised modern world only seemed to be demystified; scientific knowledge 
by distancing itself ever further from its pre-scientific origins did not rescue 
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humanity from fear, but made it hostage to „the curse of demonic objectification and 
fatal isolation‟. (Habermas 1982: 16). The process of Enlightenment resulted in the 
technocratic domination of an objectified external nature under the shadow of which 
returned unseen, the „old gods ascended from their graves‟27. These old gods 
anticipated earlier by Max Weber, returned in the form of „impersonal forces to 
resume their eternal struggle with one another‟. (Habermas 1982: 16). 
 
„We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of 
its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As everybody 
sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of 
man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly 
genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly not „science‟, holds sway over these 
gods and their struggles……Many old gods ascend from their graves; they 
are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive 
to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle 
with one another‟ (Weber, in Gerth and Mills, 1967: 148-149) 
 
Thus, via the processes which Weber first outlined in 1922, humanity has become 
further removed from its origins through the process of Enlightenment, yet has not 
managed to free itself from its mythical origins. Not only was external nature 
objectified and dominated by modern rationalisation so, too, was the modern 
subject. It was this „radical break with scientific reason‟ and the domination of the 
modern subject, that brought Critical Theory into „proximity with crime, madness 
and the deviant imagination‟ (Pearson 1977: 90). 
 
                                                 
27
 Similar themes of the domination of nature and the role of instrumental reason are to be found in 
Schiller‟s (1795/2004: 40) On the Aesthetic Education of Man: „Man himself grew to be only a 
fragment; with the monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he never 
develops the harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature he becomes 
merely the imprint of his occupation, of his science‟. See Taylor (1985) for an account of the 
influence of this text onFoucault‟s theory of disciplinary power. 
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In the chapter „Odysseus: Myth and Enlightenment‟ Adorno and Horkheimer, 
explore the themes of ritual and identity formation and uncover the self-deception 
involved in Enlightenment project.  
„The idea that people develop their identity by learning to control external 
nature at the price of repressing their inner nature contains an element of 
deception insofar as people attempt to redeem themselves from the curse of 
the vengeful powers through the offering of symbolically enhanced 
substitutes‟ (Habermas 1982: 15).  
 
Whereas „pre-enlightened‟ society understood that „symbolic communication with 
the deity through sacrifice is not actual‟ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979: 50) 
modern society in rejecting the pre-Enlightenment forms of ritual merely internalise 
ritual‟s mythical core; the fear of vengeful external powers.  
 
In The Dialectic of Enlightenment the Frankfurt School and Foucault‟s analysis of 
power are very close
28
. Honneth (1995: 127) argues that both share the notion that  
 
„the overriding process of rationalisation perfects the technical means of 
social domination under the cloak of moral emancipation and thus produces 
the modern, forcefully unified individual. The increase of domination and 
the formation of identity are two sides of the one process of instrumental 
rationalisation‟.  
 
The „reality‟ behind the ongoing process of rationalisation, what Foucault would 
call the „dark side‟ and the Frankfurt School the „underground history‟ of European 
modernisation, is revealed in the „history of suffering, barely hidden by the juridical 
                                                 
28
 See Foucault (1996: 353) on his relation to the Frankfurt School: „If I had known the Frankfurt 
School at the right time, I would have been spared a lot of work. Some nonsense, I wouldn‟t have 
expressed and taken many detours as I sought not to be led astray when the Frankfurt School had 
already opened the ways.‟ 
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superstructure and marked by the progressive disciplining and subjection of living 
subjectivity‟ (Honneth 1995: 127). 
 
The importance of ritual for the collective consciousness and social cohesion in 
modern societies is an important theme. This internalisation of myth points to an 
ambivalence of a type of consciousness for which both rationalisation and myth are 
entwined.  In his book Modernity and Ambivalence, Bauman (1993: 17) attempted 
„to wrap historical and sociological flesh around the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
skeleton‟ He argued that existence is modern in as far as it is influenced and 
controlled by planning, management and engineering. Ambivalence was a side-
product of rationalisation and was created through the administrative process of 
classification. By its very nature classifying involves inclusion and exclusion. 
Bauman contends that modern rationalised society is motivated towards the 
reduction of ambivalence
29
. How this is achieved is a managerial problem, that is, it 
is a problem of the correct administration and application of the appropriate 
technology. The key task that modernity has set itself is the task of order. For 
Bauman part of that order is achieved through the „ritual offering of symbolically 
enhanced substitutes‟ and can be traced through the social construction of the 
„stranger‟. The construction of the „Other‟ in relation to the production of 
subjectivity will be discussed later in this chapter and in chapter two. Before that we 
will look at the notion of myth as second nature. 
 
Language and Second Nature 
                                                 
29 The „struggle for order is not a fight of one definition against another, one way of articulating 
reality against a competitive proposal. It is a fight against ambiguity, of semantic precision against 
ambivalence, of transparency against obscurity, clarity against fuzziness‟ (Bauman, 1998: 6).  
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For Hegel a central aspect of modernity was a continuous restructuring of the ethical 
order of social life. As mentioned before, ethical life was based on Hegel‟s view 
that Reason unfolds within history by recreating universal „ethical‟ institutions and, 
by taking these institutions into account, individuals are able to design their lives 
according to socially acknowledged aims and thus to experience life as meaningful 
(Honneth 2000). The cultural life embodied in such institutions should not be 
imposed on the citizens of a state, but must be reflexively accepted as an expression 
of the popular will. Hegel developed his notion of „ethical life‟ through a critique of 
an abstract and universal morality that he saw as being removed from the motives or 
inclinations of moral actors. For Hegel, the limitations of such an abstract form of 
morality must be made good at an institutional level where ethical norms become 
embodied via law to provide social life with a „political body‟. These previously 
abstract laws then become a „second nature‟, intersubjectively shared and 
normatively binding for subjects (Habermas, 2006). 
 
„The conception of ethical life rests on the insight that the human mind (der 
menschliche Geist) is not merely subjective but also has both a constructive 
and a social character, because it can only exist in the symbolic 
objectifications of a second nature […] The human mind encounters itself 
only indirectly, through symbolically mediated relations to the world; it does 
not exist „in the head‟ but in the totality of publicly accessible and 
intersubjectively comprehensible symbolic expressions and practices‟. 
(Habermas, 2006: 59-60) 
 
The medium of human subjectivity in the world was language. Subjects are not 
prior to, but a function of, forms of life and systems of language; they do not 
„constitute the world but are themselves elements of a linguistically disclosed 
world‟ (Rose, 1981). Rose (2004:158), in an essay on Julia Kristeva, writes that 
language „fails us, both because of what it cannot speak and because the entry into 
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language is a type of forced passage in itself‟. It is a forced passage for the simple 
reason that we do not choose our language, but rather, it is something we are born 
into. The symbolic world pre-exists us and because of this our conceptual horizons 
are determined by the habitual manners and consciousness of what Williams (1980) 
calls an „immediate community of interests‟ and Hegel, Sittlichkeit, ethical life. It is 
the „name-giving power‟ of language, according to Hegel, through which we 
internalise the world and recognise ourselves as a subject with interiority. 
 
„This is language, as the name-giving power. The power of imagination 
provides only the empty form; [it is] the designative power positing the form 
as internal. Language, on the other hand, posits the internal as being 
(seyendes). This, then, is the true being of spirit as that of spirit as such. It is 
there as the unity of two free Selves [i.e., imagination and language] and 
[as] an entity (Daseyn) that is adequate to its concept. (Hegel, cited in 
Rauch 1983: 2)‟ 
 
What Hegel terms objective spirit, the external cultural forms of second nature, 
becomes inner experience and is reflexively externalised again as language. It is this 
dialectical process that allows the universe to be „open to human knowledge and 
that the structure of the universe is ultimately rational‟ (Avineri, 1974: 118). It is 
this dialectical process that Hegel defines as historical reflexivity, „the rose in the 
cross of the present‟.  
 
„To recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to 
enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the 
actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom there 
has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend‟ (Hegel, 1967: 
12) 
 
Although the universe is „open to human knowledge‟ we must reconcile ourselves 
to the actual, „philosophy as its own time apprehended in thought‟; it cannot 
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transcend its own time. However, in the same work Hegel articulates a darker aspect 
of second nature as frozen history. Because mind „can only exist in the symbolic 
objectifications of a second nature‟ (Habermas, 2006:60) the owl of Minerva that 
„first takes flight with twilight closing in‟ is „out of time‟. Knowledge here appears 
on the scene too late. This metaphor can be read here as meaning that we never live 
entirely in the present, that the true significance of events is only evident once these 
events have passed. Although Hegel believed that his own philosophy could indeed 
apprehend the world, the „Owl of Minerva‟ passage also indicates that the moment 
of reconciliation occurs only when that historical epoch reaches its demise
30
. When 
understanding arrives it appears in the „shape of a life grown old‟ (Hegel, 1967: 13), 
frozen in time.  
 
This darker distinction between nature and second nature is vital to critical theory. 
As a concept, second nature is closely related both to Marx‟s theory of alienation 
(the mis-recognition of relations between people as relations between things) and 
Weber‟s notion of objectification (Versachlichung). It was developed firstly by 
Lukács (1971) to describe the process of reification (Verdinglichung): the 
petrifaction of living processes into dead things that in turn are perceived as natural, 
as second nature.  
 
This second nature is not dumb, sensuous and yet senseless like the first: it is 
a complex of senses – meanings – which has become rigid and strange, and 
which no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel-house of long-dead 
interiorities………the modern sentimental attitude to nature, is only a 
projection of man‟s experience of his self-made environment as a prison 
instead of a parental home. (Lukács, 1971a: 64) 
                                                 
30
 It is clear from the Preface in the Philosophy of Right that Hegel considered the actual Prussian 
State to be in demise. This would contradict those scholars who consider Hegel to be its apologist. 
Kaufmann (1951) suggests that Hegel, at the time of writing the Philosophy of Right, was looking 
toward the emerging American model of democracy as the future model for European States.  
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The awakening of interiority so important for Hegel‟s historical reflexivity is now 
gone. Second nature understood in these terms refers to our habitual mode of 
thinking; it homogenises the social world and makes what is different appear the 
same. Second nature is therefore ideological. It is a reflection of a world of objects 
frozen in their „monotonously self same being‟. In binding us to what is „given‟, it 
blinds us to the truth that „what is, is more than it is‟ (Eagleton, 1991:126).  
 
Like Hegel, Critical Theory argues that the limits of our thought are not related 
primarily to the internal limits and constraints of the individual but are determined 
by the limits of the self-understanding (reflection) of society and its institutions as a 
whole. Therefore the mutilation and distortions of second nature reflected in 
language relate not only to „ordinary language‟ and to the individual but to the 
language of specialised social practises (religious, legal, political, scientific etc), 
what Freud referred to as the „mental assets of civilization‟.31 This is the world of 
„projective formations and objective appearances‟ which although real represents 
the unconscious processes of social forms (Habermas, 1971: 279). The theme of 
„unconscious‟ aspects of social institutions will be returned to in chapter four. The 
following section will deal with how the pathological aspect of second nature can be 
overcome by its negation. 
 
Negative Thinking 
If second nature refers to our paradigmatic mode of thinking, a reflection of a world 
of objects frozen in their „monotonously self same being‟ (Eagleton, 1991: 126); 
                                                 
31
 This also includes the language of the social sciences, and in particular, the field of social 
interaction that Habermas (1995) refers to as the therapeutocracy; that is, the socially scientifically 
trained bureaucratic network of welfare organisations. 
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then the purpose of a critical theory must be to negate that world. Critical Theory is 
characterised by what came to be termed by Adorno and later by Marcuse as 
negative thinking.  
 
„Hegel‟s philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reaction termed it, a 
negative philosophy. It is originally motivated by the conviction that the 
given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index to truth are in 
reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established in their 
destruction. (Marcuse, 1954: 26-27)  
 
Adamson (2005:4) argued that Hegel‟s thought can be understood as a „perpetual 
motion machine‟, an „internally agitated mechanism‟ brought to life by the 
consciousness of its own demise. Negativity must be made to work in order for 
scientific knowledge to penetrate beyond externalities „to the inner core of the 
object to be known‟ (Avineri, 1974: 123). For Hegel, therefore, the ground of 
knowledge is always in flux and unstable. This negation of the appearance of the 
world was summarised neatly by Bloch (1987, xvii) in the anti-positivist epigram 
„that which is cannot be true‟32. 
 
What Hegel termed as „tarrying with the negative‟ (Hegel, 1977) was an attack on 
empiricism
33
 and the forms of positivism existent at the time of his writings. The 
positivist notion that all social questions of significance could be answered by 
formal or empirical methods was an historically important and liberating idea that 
                                                 
32
 See Adorno (1994:30), „Hegel‟s philosophy is indeed essentially negative: critique. In extending 
the transcendental philosophy of the „Critique of Pure Reason‟ through the thesis of reason‟s identity 
with what exists and making it a critique of what exists, a critique of any and every positivity, Hegel 
denounced the world, ……he denounced it as a web of guilt [Schuldzusammenhang] in which, as 
Mephistopheles says in Faust, everything that exists deserves to perish‟. 
33
 This relates to Hegel‟s critique of Natural Law theories which presupposed the individual to be the 
primary mode of being. Hegel labelled such approaches „empirical‟ as they started out from a 
„fictitious or anthropological characterisation of human nature and then, on the basis of this and with 
the help of further assumptions, propose a rational organisation of collective life within society‟ 
(Honneth, 1996:12). 
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had its origins in the Enlightenment. The empirical and experimental sciences were 
a catalyst for a significant growth of human knowledge throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Empirical science was a key force against superstition and 
prejudice as well as a standard with which to separate opinion from empirically 
grounded knowledge. However the doctrines of empiricism also claimed that all 
questions which cannot be formulated into the tenets of scientific discourse were 
meaningless, or, were seen to be raising pseudo-problems incapable of rational 
solution (Bernstein 1976:60). According to Hegel the main weakness of the 
empiricists‟ method was in their attempt to separate social reality into discrete units 
of observation divorced from their social and historical context. Defining social 
institutions by such methods merely drew empirical characteristics from the 
historical arrangements bearing their names. In other words they began from an 
arbitrary appearance rather than the „actuality‟ of such institutions. Hegel argued 
that merely drawing up a list of empirical functions not only fails to teach us 
anything about the nature of institutions but also naturalises those institutions. 
Negative thinking was an attack on such naturalisation and a means of avoiding an 
affirmative stance towards actually existing institutions in order to conceptualise 
them as „contingent products of power, history and human action‟ (see Calhoun, 
2005:357). 
 
The logical principle of negation is contradiction and it was this that gave the 
thinking of Hegel and the Frankfurt School its dynamism and provided it with the 
fuel for critical reflection. However, while Hegel conceptualised negativity as a 
singular moment within a larger dialectical process of synthesis and change, in other 
words, the negative is put to work as a necessary force in order for history to 
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progress; Critical Theory saw no possibility of reconciliation with the existing state 
of affairs. Critical Theory made negativity the hallmark of dialectical thought 
against Hegel‟s system as a whole, for them „Hegel had been wrong: reason and 
reality did not coincide‟ (Buck-Morss, 1979: 63). It is perhaps this casting aside of 
the outward form of Hegel‟s system, while retaining its negative core, that connects 
Critical Theory with Derrida‟s deconstruction. Both are characterised by the refusal 
to reconcile theory with the present state of existence. 
 
The salvaging of negativity from the shell of Hegel‟s system was not merely an 
adaptation by the Frankfurt School but was a consequence of Hegel‟s system itself. 
Derrida
34
 (1978) argues that there is an excess in Hegel‟s text that is contrary to his 
own intentions and threatens his system from within. By allowing negativity to 
occupy such a privileged space, Hegel opens up his own system to degeneration
35
 
(Adamson, 2005). In this way Hegel‟s thought is still left open and has not found a 
resting place at the terminus of history. As Elliott (2008: 33) wrote with regard to 
the re-emergence of „end of history‟ discourses in contemporary social theory. „In 
defiance of Hegel‟s instruction, the Owl of Minerva took wing at dawn and spelt out 
the signs of end times […] with dusk yet to fall, it is clear that, in more ways than 
one, this sense of an ending was only the beginning.‟ Hegel‟s thought and that of 
Critical Theory has not yet ossified, the following section will argue for the 
                                                 
34
 „Hegel […] blinded himself to that which he had laid bare under the rubric of negativity […] This 
is why „he did not know to what extent he was right.‟ And was wrong for being right, for having 
triumphed over the negative […] Hegel saw this without seeing it, showed it while concealing it. 
Thus he must be followed to the end, without reserve, to the point of agreeing with him against 
himself and of wresting his discovery from the too conscientious interpretation he gave of it‟ 
(Derrida 1978: 328) 
35
 See Žižek,( 2000 : 95) „In this sense, the mature Hegelian „reconciliation‟ remains utterly 
ambiguous: it designates the reconciliation of a split (the healing of a wound of the social body), as 
well as a reconciliation with this split as the necessary price of individual freedom.‟ 
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continued relevance of ethical life as a concept for describing the relationship 
between crime, indeterminacy and the constitution of subjects. 
 
III 
 
Indeterminacy and Subjectivity  
Habermas (2001) argues that Hegel‟s conception of modernity, what Habermas 
called a theory of the „pathology of modernity‟, and which was later developed in 
the social theories of Marx, Weber, Lukács and the Frankfurt School, was central to 
the classical conception of modernity. For Hegel, as society becomes more complex 
it comes to rely on new reflexive institutions in order that social actions will be 
rational and take a foreseeable course of events. However, if these new forms of 
social reflexivity are hindered by the interests of civil society and „universal 
egoism‟, then it is not reason that guides social action but indeterminacy. For Hegel, 
human action remains perpetually caught in dialectic where the discrepancy 
between intention and consequence is never eliminated due to the perpetual struggle 
between the embryonic forms of ethical life and the constraining social/institutional 
structure of society
36
. Indeterminacy is described by Benhabib (1986:88) when she 
writes: 
…Hegel criticizes this indeterminacy of action in order to show the 
antinomies of moral consciousness […] [i]n acting a human agent seeks to 
embody her or his purpose in the world, but the act which embodies this 
purpose becomes a link in a chain of other acts and assumes a life of its 
own. The consequences of our actions are like waves in water: Once the 
stone is cast, concentric waves unfold from it; upon reaching the shore these 
waves break, but in human affairs, upon reaching the shore our actions may 
                                                 
36
 As such Hegel „recognizes that human life is spent partly in bondage, and only partly in freedom‟ 
(Flechtheim, 1947: 299). 
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boomerang and return to their original point with increased intensity. 
(Benhabib 1986:88).  
 
The original action has become „the prey of external forces which attach to it 
something totally different from what it is explicitly and drive it into alien and 
distant consequences‟ (Hegel, 1967: 80, cited in Benhabib, 1986: 367) This 
discrepancy between intention and consequence where people were prevented from 
living their lives according to rational aims was due to the inability of society to 
properly express the rational potential already inherent in its institutions, practices, 
and everyday routines (Honneth, 2004). Indeterminacy, a concept which came to 
prominence in a mode of thought influenced by an organic worldview, has retained 
its significance in an era where „system‟ has replaced the „organic‟. As Luhmann 
(1993: vii) notes, „[a]s society increasingly becomes concerned with the regulation 
of social action and management of complexity, it develops an extreme sensitivity to 
deviance from the norm and unanticipated harm and dangers‟. A central concept 
for understanding modernity in the new developments in social theory mentioned 
earlier is risk; for Hegel, the central concept for the diagnosis of the pathologies of 
his own time was indeterminacy.  
 
The reification of risk as a category in recent social theory as a means of minimising 
unanticipated harms and dangers and its definitional role in the conceptualisation of 
modernity is very different to how risk was conceived in the work of Hegel and 
Weber. For Hegel (1977) the development of the subject was a life and death 
struggle to achieve freedom. Freedom demands risk taking.
37
 Sahni (2001) from a 
                                                 
37
 Hegel speaks of risk (in the terms of a wager) as being necessary in order to live a full and self –
conscious life. In the section on the master and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit, he argues that 
it is necessary to risk one‟s life to avoid non-productive death (abstract negativity), or, what he called 
earlier in the Jena manuscripts „the night of the world‟; the pathological immersion of the self in 
second nature (see Derrida, 1978). 
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rather different perspective argues that in Weber‟s38 writing there is an emphasis on 
a „will to act‟ that is strongly influenced by German idealism, most notably by 
Goethe‟s vision of active asceticism. The motivational power of conviction and 
emphasis on the importance of decisive action outlined in Weber‟s (1921/1948) 
article Politics as a Vocation  would be at odds with the current concerns with risk 
in the social sciences. This theme will be discussed further in chapter four. Before 
that and before we move on to the discussion on the relationship of crime to 
indeterminacy we must first look at Hegel‟s understanding of the subject and its 
relation to indeterminacy in more detail. 
 
According to Honneth (2000: 36), Hegel was aware that the modern age was 
characterised by a loss of meaning. He was convinced that the two abstract models 
of freedom characteristic to modern society: „abstract right‟ and „morality‟, had not 
only become influential powers within that society, but had already led to 
distortions in the „practical self-relations of subjects‟. This, according to Hegel, was 
due to them being applied improperly and transgressing their legitimate limits. This 
observation brings him to refer on a number of occasions in the Philosophy of Right 
to pathological conditions and phenomena which he attempts to articulate through 
concepts such as „solitude‟, „emptiness‟ and „labouring under a burden‟; concepts 
which taken together, suggested that the age was „suffering from indeterminacy‟.  
Indeterminacy, for Hegel, however, was also linked not just to a time but also to the 
nature of the subject. 
 
                                                 
38
 The „risk society‟ might then be seen as a refuge for Weber‟s „last men‟, those „specialists without 
spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never 
before achieved‟ (Weber, 2001, 124) 
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The Subject as it is used in Critical Theory, modern continental philosophy and 
psycho-analysis had its origins in Hegel.  
 
„Introduced in Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit, this subject‟s desire is 
structured by philosophical aims: it wants to know itself, but wants to find 
within the confines of this self the entirety of the external world […] not 
merely to incorporate the world but to externalize and enhance the border of 
its very self (Butler, 1999: xix).‟ 
 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sought to describe the process by which the 
subject is constituted by, in his words, „the mediation of its self-othering with itself‟ 
(Hegel, 1977: 10). The Hegelian subject expands in the course of its journey by 
internalizing the world that it desires, and incorporating what it at first confronts as 
other to itself. The subject‟s desire then, is to be conscious of itself,39 and to locate 
within itself the external world. The end point to this journey is self-awareness of 
the subject as substance; for the subject to experience the world as a confirmation of 
that subject‟s imaginary sense of being in the world40. The subject for Hegel was 
„pure simple negativity‟, a function of the social structure that only experienced 
itself as a unity by purposively negating the very diversity it itself had produced 
(Butler, 1999). This is what Hegel termed the negation of the negation. This 
construction of the subject was at odds with the autonomous unitary subject that 
was the basis of the liberal theory of the social contract. The critique of reason for 
Hegel was a critique of the sovereign rational subject - atomistic and autonomous, 
                                                 
39
 see Laplanche (1999: 101) „The use of the word „consciousness‟ by Hegel, in expressions such as 
„unhappy consciousness‟, „pious consciousness‟ or even that of Freud himself in „consciousness of 
guilt‟ (Schuldbewusstsein), brings us closer to what is in question. With the word „con-sciousness‟, 
one should let etymology play its part (cum-scire) – it is a „knowledge‟ of oneself in every human 
being, of one‟s surroundings and one‟s fate which is relatively organised, coherent (co-haerens).‟ 
40
 Bourdieu (1977) uses the term habitus to theorize the internalization of objective social structures 
into the subjective, mental experience of agents. 
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disengaged and disembodied, potentially and ideally self-transparent (McCarthy, 
1991). 
 
Hegel‟s notion of the subject was challenged in many ways as a metaphysical 
construct by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud (see Ricoeur, 1974
41
) and later still by 
Foucault and Althusser. Hegel‟s rejection of the autonomous unitary subject of 
liberal thought however, was accepted and developed by all of the above mentioned 
authors. The latter two were particularly significant in following Hegel in 
emphasizing the productive force of language as a vehicle through which human 
beings internalise the world and recognise themselves as a subject with interiority. 
In both Critical Theory and psychoanalysis, the concept of recognition is essential 
to an understanding of subjectivity. In both, subjectivity refers to how individuals 
are constructed as the 'I' via the bearer of the gaze (see Rose, 2005)
42
.  
 
However, Žižek (2000: 78) outlines how Hegel, in his earlier work, repeatedly 
returns to the theme of the subject‟s failure to impose its vision on the world and to 
realize itself in the symbolic order. 
 
„Hegel insisted that subjectivity is inherently „pathological‟ (biased, limited 
to a distorting, unbalanced perspective on the Whole). Hegel‟s achievement 
was thus to combine, in an unprecedented way, the ontologically constitutive 
character of the subject‟s activity with the subject‟s irreducible pathological 
bias: when these two features are thought together, conceived as co-
                                                 
41
 On the Hegelian problem of the „archaeology of the subject‟ Ricoeur (1974: 245) writes „the 
Hegelian Phenomenology cannot be repeated today; new figures of the self and the spirit have 
appeared since Hegel, and new abysses have been hollowed beneath our feet. But the problem 
remains the same […] The task of a philosophical anthropology after Freud is to pose this problem in 
ever more rigorous terms and to resolve it in a synthesis which satisfies both Freudian economics of 
desire and the Hegelian teleology of spirit.  
42
 „the subject relies on the Other in the imaginary relation, not to constitute a full identity but in 
order to circumscribe a void‟ (Rose, 2005: 188). 
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dependent, we obtain the notion of a pathological bias constitutive of 
„reality‟ itself. 
 
This split nature of subjectivity and its misrecognition of the world, the 
„pathological‟ aspect of subjectivity, is central to our understanding of 
indeterminacy in Hegel‟s work. Although indeterminacy was the result of social 
pathology, the age „suffering from indeterminacy‟, it was also central to human 
subjectivity and becoming. It is this duel aspect of indeterminacy that, as we will 
see below, relates indeterminacy to crime.  
 
Inderminacy, Recognition and Crime 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of crime and the figure of the criminal played an 
important role in the development of Hegel‟s philosophy; for Hegel the 
community‟s representation of the criminal has political, ethical, and as we shall 
see, scientific aspects. The dialectic of crime
43
 was a means for Hegel of 
conceptualising the institutional structure of society in relation to the state, the 
emergence of the modern subject and the nature of intersubjectivity. Crime was not 
analysed as a social problem to be solved but as a central component of modernity. 
Crime, for Hegel, was both a negation
44
 (Hegel, 1976) central to a struggle for 
recognition and necessary for the achievement of ethical life (Honneth 1995).  
 
                                                 
43
 Hegel sees retribution as „the turning back of crime against itself‟. For Hegel the unbroken 
relationship between crime and its punishment is part of „the dialectical evolution of reason‟. 
(Flechtheim, 1947: 300). 
44
 Habermas (1771: 148) discusses Hegel‟s notion of crime as a negation, in the example of the 
„punishment which strikes the one who destroys the moral totality. The „criminal‟ who revokes 
[aufhebt] the moral basis, namely the complementary interchange of non compulsory communication 
and the mutual satisfaction of interests, by putting himself as individual in the place of totality, sets 
in motion the process of a destiny which strikes back at him‟. 
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As argued in the previous section, one becomes conscious of oneself as an 
individual only via the intersubjective exchanges with others. Subjectivity is 
constructed through a process of mutual recognition. Recognition from others is 
necessary to the development of a sense of self (Honneth, 1995, Fraser and 
Honneth, 2003).  Recognition is posited by Hegel as an ideal reciprocal
45
 relation 
between subjects. In this ideal relationship that is constitutive for subjectivity, each 
views the other as equal but separate from the other. However, for Hegel, what was 
dialectical in this reciprocal recognition of oneself and the other, was „not the 
unconstrained intersubjectivity itself, but the history of its suppression and 
reconstitution‟ (Habermas, 1971: 148). 
 
As we have seen earlier in the chapter, Hegel was opposed to the abstract, atomised 
subject produced by positivism and classical legal thought. Hegel argued that both 
the law and criminal acts were dependent on each other, and that therefore, criminal 
acts were actions that were tied to the conditions of those particular legal relations. 
In that sense, they stem, as discussed earlier, directly from the indeterminacy that 
flows from „abstract right‟. It was due to the indeterminacy of legal relations that 
misrecognition occurred and as a result the criminal is only negatively integrated 
into the collective life of society (Honneth, 1995). In other words the criminal was 
only partially recognised by law, he/she was not recognised as whole. In relation to 
the criminal, the suppression and distortion of unconstrained intersubjectivity is 
therefore not in relation to what the criminal has done, it is not the misrecognition of 
the crime by the other, but the abstraction of that crime to the exclusion of all other 
                                                 
45
 Fichte in his The Foundations of Natural Law (1796) originally conceived of recognition as a 
„reciprocal effect‟ [Wechselwirkung] between individuals and the law and which validated those 
legal relations (see Honneth 1995). We shall return to the theme of the legitimacy of law and 
recognition in chapter two.  
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human attributes; the reification of a singular quality into the attribute of a thing. In 
an article entitled Who Thinks Abstractly?, written around 1808,
46
 Hegel writes: 
 
„One who knows men traces the development of the criminal‟s mind: he 
finds in his history, in his education, a bad family relationship between his 
father and mother, some tremendous harshness after this human being had 
done some minor wrong, so he became embittered against the social order 
[…] and henceforth did not make it possible for him to preserve himself 
except through crime. There may be people who will say when they hear 
such things: he wants to excuse this murderer! [...] This is abstract thinking: 
to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, 
and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality. 
(Kaufmann, 1966: 116)  
 
The dialectic between recognition and misrecognition in relation to crime can be 
seen on two levels. On the first level crime can be understood with regards to the 
suppression of one side of the reciprocal relationship between the criminal and 
others. The motive for crime consists in the experience of the criminal being 
inadequately recognized in some way (Honneth, 1995). On the second level, it is in 
the social response to crime that Hegel saw the constructive and formative process 
which is the „dialectical evolution of reason‟ (Flechtheim, 1947: 300); and it is this 
process that is important for the status of crime with regards to the formation of 
ethical life.  
 
Hegel argued that criminal acts were constructive because they were able to bring to 
light conflicts that, allowed subjects to become aware, for the first time, of 
constraining relations of recognition. It was only through crime that „ethically more 
mature relations of recognition can be formed at all, relations that represent a 
precondition for the actual development of a „community of free citizens‟‟ 
                                                 
46
 See Kaufmann (1966) the exact date or place of publication is not known. It was thought by the 
editors of Hegel‟s collected work that the article was written in 1807 or 1808. 
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(Honneth, 1995: 23). Crime and its punishment then, becomes a means of educating 
an individual for society part of a lengthy process of Bildung: the self-development 
of Geist (mind)
47
(Averini, 1972, Honneth, 1995). To this extent, Hegel‟s theory of 
recognition, although in many respects very different,
48
 is an early precursor to 
Durkheim‟s (1964, Lukes and Scull (Eds), 1984) theory of punishment, as for 
Hegel, crime was also necessary for solidarity. As Honneth (1995: 24) writes: 
 
„[b]y violating first the rights and then the honour of persons, the criminal 
makes the dependence of individuals on the community a matter of common 
knowledge. To this extent, the social conflicts that shattered natural ethical 
life prepare subjects to mutually recognize one another as persons who are 
dependent on each other and yet also completely individuated‟. 
 
In terms of societal responses to crime, however, the key focus of this thesis is not 
concerned with how to establish more ethically mature relations of recognition, than 
it is to show that if society's response to crime is based on misrecognition, if the 
responses are reified or too abstract, then they may contribute to further 
indeterminacy. 
 
 
                                                 
47
 For Hegel this self-development is achieved through resistance to and the negation to what exists. 
It is a concept particular to German literature, particularly to the work of Schiller and Goethe 
(Bildungsroman). Hegel‟s work, particularly the Phenomenology of Spirit, can be read as part of this 
tradition, or, what Williams (1977) would call „structure of feeling‟. See Lukács (1969:28), „This 
conception of the last great intellectual and artistic period of bourgeois humanism has nothing to do 
with the barren and shallow apologia of capitalism which sets in later (and to some extent 
simultaneously). It is founded upon a ruthlessly truthful investigation and disclosure of all the 
contradictions of progress. There is no criticism of the present from which it will shrink. And even if 
it cannot consciously transcend the spiritual horizon of its time, yet the constantly oppressive sense 
of the contradictions of its own historical situation casts a profound shadow over the whole historical 
conception. This feeling that - contrary to the consciously philosophic and historical conception 
which proclaims unceasing and peaceful progress - one is experiencing a last brief, irretrievable 
intellectual prime of humanity manifests itself in the greatest representatives of this period in very 
different ways, in keeping with the unconscious character of this feeling. Yet for the same reason the 
emotional accent is very similar. Think of the old Goethe's theory of 'abnegation', of Hegel's 'Owl of 
Minerva' which takes flight only at dusk‟.  
48
 For Hegel, crime could not be separated from its legal aspect (Flechtheim (1947); therefore notions 
of deviance from social norms are absent from his work. Hegel‟s theory is negative and is focused on 
conflict, social change and the struggle against constraint, whereas Durkheim is concerned with how 
society maintains equilibrium with regards to solidarity. 
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Spirit is Bone: Hegel‟s Critique of Empiricism 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807 Hegel developed this argument 
in a section of the book criticising what he regarded as the pseudo-sciences of 
physiognomy and phrenology. Developed by the works of Lavater (1741-1801), 
Gall (1758-1828) and Spurzheim (1776-1832) both of these sciences gained 
prominence during the latter half of the eighteenth century in Germany, France and 
England. The discussion in the Phenomenology centred on the relationship of mind 
to the physical body, and, in particular, the relationship of mental characteristics to 
bone formation (see Hegel, 1977). Hegel raised important issues in this work such 
as the shift in interest in the early nineteenth century from the criminal act to an 
interest in the capacity of an individual to be a murderer or thief; in other words to 
the likelihood of an individual committing crimes in the future based on a presumed 
inner motive that could be uncovered by a physical attribute of the person under 
observation. 
Observation relates such and such a sensuous fact to just such a supposed 
or presumed (gemeintes) inner. It is not the murderer, the thief, that is to be 
known; it is the capacity to be a murderer, a thief (Hegel, 1977: 192)  
 
As we saw earlier in the chapter, Hegel attacked empiricism and the forms of 
positivism existent at the time of his writings. Empiricism presupposed the 
individual to be the primary mode of being, and according to Hegel, in these new 
sciences, attempted a rational explanation of human nature based on a series of 
fictitious assumptions derived from a list of observed physical attributes of an 
individual. The explanations of physiognomy and phrenology not only failed to 
teach us anything about human nature but also reified concrete human qualities 
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(attributes of Spirit) into that of a dead thing; what Hegel (1977: 540) referred to as 
the ossification of Spirit into bone. 
 
Recognising the relation of inner and outer to be contingent, observation 
ceased to look for an organ, a symbol of Spirit, and pinned down its external 
immediacy in a dead „thing‟. The reality of Spirit was thereby made into a 
thing, an inert being given the significance of Spirit. To treat Spirit as a 
merely existent, objective thing is certainly to make it into something like a 
bone. 
 
At the heart of the new sciences, Hegel argued, was a false perspective of the 
subject and its relationship to the world. Earlier we saw how by misrecognising 
itself and its relation to the external world, the subject imagines itself and the world 
as being made for one another, and how the image produced by an imaginary 
misrecognition appeared both coherent and familiar to the subject. The human 
subject not only misrecognised the external world but its own nature as subject. 
Since the social world appeared as external and transparent, the new sciences must 
now make the latter its object via observation and the false separation of the 
observer from that world. The sciences of physiognomy and phrenology wanted to 
make such a relationship into a law connecting subject (in this case the observer) 
with object (external world). The main weakness of the empiricists‟ method, 
according to Hegel, was this attempt to separate social reality into discrete units of 
observation divorced from their social and historical context. Hegel (1977: 188) 
argued that in using such methods, physiognomy and phrenology were no more 
scientific than astrology or palmistry which also wished to explain one external 
thing with another completely disconnected sign. 
 
„Physiognomy, however, would claim distinction from other spurious arts 
and unwholesome studies on the ground that in dealing with determinate 
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individuality it considers the necessary opposition of an inner and an outer, 
of character as a conscious nature and character as a definitely embodied 
organic shape, and relates these moments to one another in the way they are 
related to one another by their very conception, and hence must constitute 
the content of a law. In astrology, on the other hand, in palmistry and 
similar „sciences‟, there appears merely external element related to external 
element, anything whatsoever to an element alien to it‟  
 
Physiognomy methods were no different than the unscientific speculation of a 
person‟s character from the way he or she dresses or presents themselves to the 
world. For Hegel it makes no difference that the new sciences spoke in terms of 
capacities and propensities; the complexity and range of an individual‟s nature 
could not be captured by such capacities and propensities. To abstract a single 
attribute „murderer‟, „thief‟, or „good-hearted‟, „unspoiled‟, from no more than a 
„flat brow‟, or a „long nose‟, was to lose „the concrete indefinite characteristic 
nature of the particular individual‟. For Hegel (1977: 193), the „science‟ of 
physiognomy, was tautological. It claimed to deal with the presumed reality of 
human beings, yet merely raised to the „level of knowledge uncritical assertions of 
everyday physiognomy‟. It was without either foundation or finality; „it cannot 
manage to say what it „means‟ because it merely „means‟, and its content is merely 
what is „presumed‟ or „meant‟. 
 
The measure of the individual for Hegel (1977: 194) was not in what could be 
deduced or presumed from physical characteristics but what the individual did
49
. 
Individuality was real in the deed. What was presumed or imagined takes the form 
of „passive bodily being‟.  
 
                                                 
49
 i.e. their action in the context of their „whole‟ social being and outside the sphere of „abstract right‟ 
or the abstract observations of phrenology. 
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Hegel‟s work offers both an account of the relationship between the development of 
social institutions and changes in individual subjectivity and how this relationship 
can become pathological and constrain human freedom. The models of freedom 
particular to his time had, he thought, led to distortions in the „practical self-
relations of subjects‟ (Honneth, 2000: 36). Yet he also argued that a false 
perspective of the subject was to be found in the new positivist sciences. These new 
sciences that placed the observer as separate from the world prevented knowledge 
from breaking out of its un-reflexive relation to that world. The methodological 
separation of the observer from the world was underpinned by a language that 
assumed that every concept was equal to its object.  Reification, what Hegel referred 
to in the quote above as the ossification of Spirit into bone, was the result of an un-
reflexive knowledge, distanced via language from the social context of its own 
production.  
 
Such ossifying tendencies have been identified recently by Carlen (2008: xiv) in her 
analysis of imaginary penalties.
50
 Carlen draws on the imaginary
51
 to show how 
various political and populist ideologies on crime and security structure an image of 
penal policy and practice that naturalises the discourse of governance, and in turn 
inhibit, corrupt and diminish „any suggestions and opportunities for more open-
ended imaginative discourses on social cohesion and justice‟52. Being captive to the 
                                                 
50
 See also Burton and Carlen (1979) for an earlier criminological treatment of Lacan‟s imaginary. 
51
 Carlen (2008) also emphasises the productive aspect of the imaginary; that aspect that is related to 
the imagination and the alternative ways of becoming a society through imagining different courses 
of action and of possible social goals that we may take. 
52
 In Pat Carlen‟s edited volume Imaginary Penalties (2008) she begins her introduction with an 
excerpt from Hans Christian Andersen‟s The Emperor‟s New Clothes. This story offers an allegory 
on the power of ideology and the imaginary. It is not that individuals are duped by ideology. They 
are aware of it as ideology, i.e. in this case everybody can see the Emperor is wearing no clothes; 
however, the important thing is that despite this knowledge they act and respond to him as if he were.  
It is when the small child makes public „the truth‟ that the Emperor has no clothes that the spell of 
ideology is broken. An Hegelian interpretation of this story might argue that, it is not because the 
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naturalised discourse of governance, we are not aware of the more open-ended 
alternatives. Unger (2002) argues that blindness towards alternative possibilities not 
only excludes other possible choices but is in itself a mutilation. Recent penal policy 
and practice, particularly those relating to risk, security and community protection, 
have sought to eliminate indeterminacy and replace it with mechanical 
predictability. They have attempted to develop methods of decision-making or 
legislation for preventive detention that can close off, what Lippens (2009) calls, 
„the hole of indeterminacy‟ at the crossroads of the imagined and the real. However 
for Unger (2002), in choosing one social vision to the exclusion of all others as a 
means of avoiding indeterminacy in social life, we cast aside other aspects of our 
humanity. However, Unger (2002) also argues that we have no choice but to choose, 
and by choosing we must also reject other possible means of action. It is this forced 
choice that makes him say that although such choices are indispensable to our self-
development, they also represent a mutilation. In order not to completely cast off 
these other aspects of our humanity we must somehow find ways of learning to feel 
the movements of the limbs that we have cut off. To learn how to do that, argues 
Unger (2002), is the work of the imagination.  
 
What this work of the imagination might refer to, in relation to recent penal policy 
and practice relating to risk and community protection, is that the social response to 
crime must be open to embryonic forms of ethical and reasoned alternatives within 
social institutions. In other words to encourage, what Carlen (2008) identified as, 
                                                                                                                                         
Emperor imagines that he has clothes on when he has not, that makes him appear mad; what makes 
him appear mad is the fact that he believes himself to be an Emperor. It is the recognition of his 
subjects that give him status as an Emperor AND sustains his belief in his new clothes. A more likely 
scenario for the end of this tale is not laughter as in the original, but violence. If it is the threat of 
violence that underpins the power of legitimacy, then a far more likely ending would be that the 
crowd turn on the small boy for uttering the truth and tear him to pieces (See Zupančič, 2006 on 
Lacan‟s account on the imaginary nature of sovereignty) 
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more open-ended and imaginative policy discourses on justice and social cohesion. 
For Hegel, it was only through these struggles of recognition in relation to crime 
that ethically more mature relations of recognition could be formed (Honneth, 
1995).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by asking what relevance Hegel had to a social science thesis at 
the beginning of the 21
st
 century. It argued that although the relationship between 
modernity and rationality maintained by Hegel was no longer seen as relevant by 
contemporary social theorists, developments in recent debates concerning late 
modernity and the risk society, as we will see in chapter 4 appear to reflect a return, 
albeit not an intended one, to Hegelian themes. It has, therefore, been necessary to 
outline Hegelian concepts in order to engage with these recent debates later in the 
thesis A second reason outlined, was that Hegel‟s work was relevant to criminology 
due to the important role that the concept of crime and the figure of the criminal 
played in the development of Hegel‟s philosophy.  
 
The chapter outlined a theory of institutions drawn from Hegel‟s notion of „Ethical 
Life‟ (Sittlichkeit). It noted that while ethical life was an ideal notion of a 
community, it could also be used to as the basis of explaining its opposite, the 
pathological immersion in the symbolic order. It was argued that the usefulness of 
ethical life as a concept was that it maintained the conceptual link between 
modernity and rationality and was also a more critical concept than the positive 
English-language notion of „community‟.  Most importantly for this thesis is that 
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ethical life provided a framework to conceptualise crime and its relation to 
indeterminacy and legitimacy.  
 
The concepts outlined in the chapter, although originating in the work of Hegel, 
were interpreted, through the lens of Critical Theory. One characteristic of Critical 
Theory that was noted was the casting aside of the outward form of Hegel‟s system, 
while retaining its negative core. Another was its concentration on language and its 
role in the struggle of the subject for recognition. We saw how language for Hegel 
could also be the source of alienation as well as of knowledge. The Frankfurt 
School argued that the increase of social domination and the formation of identity 
were two sides of the single process of instrumental rationalisation and that a side 
product of this process, influenced and controlled as it is by planning, management 
and engineering, was what Bauman (1998) called the social construction of the 
„stranger‟; an aspect that we will return to in chapter four and five. 
 
We saw that for Hegel, the journey of the subject had an ethical dimension to it. 
This ethical dimension was related to his notion that subjectivity was constructed 
through a process of mutual recognition. Recognition from others is necessary to the 
development of a sense of self. However we also saw that for Hegel, what was 
dialectical in this reciprocal recognition of oneself and the other was „not the 
unconstrained intersubjectivity itself, but the history of its suppression and 
reconstitution‟ and it was in relation to the suppression of recognition that was 
important for Hegel‟s understanding of crime. Hegel argued that it was due to the 
indeterminacy of legal relations that misrecognition occurred and as a result the 
criminal is only negatively integrated into the collective life of society. We have 
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seen however that crime, for Hegel (1967) was a constructive and formative process 
and it was in how society responded to it, that not only marks the maturity of its 
social relationships, but allows its subjects to develop and grow.  
 
For Hegel the social world would be prey to indeterminacy unless its legal or cus-
tomary rules (ethical life) can be made good at an institutional level where ethical 
norms become intersubjectively shared and normatively binding for subjects 
(Habermas, 2006). In other words, drawing on Hegel‟s notion of indeterminacy not 
only helps us to understand why crime occurs but also how responses to crime, if 
they are too abstract, contribute to further indeterminacy. It is the latter emphasis 
that is the focus of this thesis. Such a scheme imagines a form of human association 
that is far removed from contemporary social institutions. The following chapter 
will draw on the concept of recognition outlined above and relate it to the 
legitimation of the institutions of law and science. In this way both chapter one and 
two will provide the theoretical background for the socio-historical account of the 
Risk Management Authority. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RECOGNITION AND THE INSTITUTION OF LEGITIMACY  
 
„We are primarily interested in „domination‟ in so far as it is combined with 
„administration‟. Every domination both expresses itself and functions 
through administration. Every administration, on the other hand, needs 
domination, because it is always necessary that some powers of command be 
in the hands of somebody. Possibly the power of command may appear in a 
rather innocent garb; the ruler may be regarded as their „servant‟ by the 
ruled, and he may even look upon himself in that way. This phenomenon 
occurs in its purist form in the so-called immediate democratic 
administration. (Weber, 1954: 330) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the concept of recognition and its relationship to legitimacy. 
The question at its heart is why is a particular social order accepted by its subjects 
as legitimate? Part I outlines the relationship between legality and legitimacy and 
begins with Weber‟s (1954) assertion that a legal system which is logically coherent 
and free from internal contradictions is necessary for the legitimation of modern 
societies. It examines questions of recognition, legal validity and their relation to 
subjectivity. In particular it focuses on Hegel‟s attempt to move beyond the legal 
subject of liberal classicism and develop, not only more dynamic conceptions of 
recognition and subjectivity, but also ones that are sociologically grounded. Part II 
deals with the principles and values that validate law in relation to procedural and 
substantive law; a change within the strategies of legitimation of modern society. 
Legitimation here is grounded both „scientifically‟ and in terms of the imperatives 
of the economy. Part III addresses the problem of legitimacy and the structuring of 
subjectivity and argues that legitimation struggles extend not only to law and to the 
economy as argued in the previous two sections but also to the knowledge claims of 
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elites. This final section looks at legitimation in relation to science and psychiatry. 
Lastly, because of the dialectical relationship between the production of subjectivity 
and the construction of political authority, the chapter argues that a legitimation 
crisis must also be understood as a crisis of identity (see Habermas, 1976).  
 
I 
 
Legitimacy and Law  
„Conduct, especially social conduct, and quite particularly a social 
relationship, can be oriented on the part of actors toward their idea 
(Vorstellung) of the existence of a legitimate order. […] [L]egitimacy can be 
ascribed to an order by virtue of positive enactment of recognised legality. 
(Weber, 1954:3-8)  
 
Domination, which Weber viewed as necessary within all social systems for the 
reason that the powers of command must „be in the hands of somebody‟, often 
appeared to those subject to it, in a masked or more „innocent‟ form. These forms, 
what Weber called the „basic legitimations of domination‟, were internalised by a 
community and were drawn from traditional, charismatic or legal forms of 
authority
53
. The „innocent garb‟ was necessary according to Weber, because power, 
or domination, was based on the legitimate use of violence. In his 1919 article 
Politics as a Vocation, Weber (Cited in Gerth and Mills, 1948: 78) writes: 
 
„Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate 
one. In the past, the most varied institutions – beginning with the sib54- have 
known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to 
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 Traditional authority rests on the „established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions‟; 
charismatic authority rests on „devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character 
of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him‟; while in 
„the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order.‟ Weber 
(1978: 215) 
54
 A sib is a name for a kin group. 
 66 
say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory‟ 
 
The arbitrary and irrational aspect of law and its relation to violence was highlighted 
by Pascal (1966: 46-47) over two hundred years earlier in his Pensées (1662) when 
he writes of the founding act of usurpation,
55
 which underlies the Constitution and 
all legal systems; that which is „law and nothing more‟. 
 
„Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is 
accepted. That is the mystic foundation of its authority. Anyone who tries to 
bring it back to its first principles destroys it. Nothing is so defective as 
those laws which correct defects. Anyone obeying them because they are just 
is obeying an imaginary justice, not the essence of law, which is completely 
self-contained: it is law and nothing more. Anyone wishing to examine the 
reason for this will find it so trivial and feeble that, unless he is used to 
contemplating the marvels of human fancy, he will be amazed that in a 
century it has acquired so much pomp and reverence.‟ 
 
Pascal writes of the imaginary justice and the „mystifying‟ power behind the 
construction of legitimacy. He argues that because the truth could only threaten the 
political order, then the people must be deceived and not allowed to see the 
inaugural violence in which law is rooted. Law must be perceived as authoritative 
and eternal (Bourdieu, 2000: 168). At the base of any legal system, therefore, is 
something which is not law, something which is pre-legal
56
.  
 
Legitimacy then is related to belief, but it is also distinct from coercion in that it 
describes the acceptance of an authority or social order without a direct threat of 
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 See also Žižek, (2002:204) „the ultimate truth about the reign of law is that of usurpation, and all 
classical politico-philosophical thought rests on the disavowal of this violent act of foundation. The 
illegitimate violence by which law sustains itself must be concealed at any price, because the 
concealment is the positive condition of the functioning of law: it functions in so far as its subjects 
are deceived, in so far as they experience the authority of law as „authentic and eternal‟ and overlook 
„the truth about usurpation‟. 
56
 Marxist jurisprudence would argue that this something which underlies the legal system is merely 
class interest (see Pashukanis, 1978) and would give a more restricted meaning to the concept of  
legality in relation to legitimacy (see Miliband, 1973).  
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violence. However as the quotes above by Weber (1954) and Pascal (1966) suggest 
the nature of that acceptance is controversial and may involve the misrecognition as 
much as the recognition of such an authority.  
 
Weber (1954) regarded the legitimacy
57
 of the political systems of modern Western 
societies as based upon the belief in the legal form of political authority: that is in 
the legality of their exercise of political power. Belief in law was distinct from 
belief in custom or charismatic authority in that it was based on the recognition of 
its rational character. 
 
The question at the heart of this chapter is the question of legitimate social order. In 
other words, why is a particular social order accepted by its subjects as legitimate? 
As we see for Weber (1954) it was legality itself that was important in establishing 
legitimacy. However, this legality legitimated something in the legal system upon 
which legality was founded but which was not law. This other at the heart of the 
legal system was, for Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1948) the threat of physical force or 
coercion
58
. The foundation of law was something that interested Hegel and his own 
understanding of the relationship of legality to legitimation. Part of that 
understanding relates to the concept of recognition. For him recognition was an 
important concept in the elaboration of his history of the life-and-death struggle of 
the subject for self-realisation. However recognition is also a key concept in liberal 
jurisprudence and is employed in this perspective as a means of understanding legal 
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 For Beetham (1991), philosophers and social scientists differ in their interpretations of legitimacy. 
What is legitimate for the philosopher is what is morally justifiable or rightful; the moral 
justifiability of power relations. Legitimacy for the social scientist is understood as belief in 
legitimacy by particular historical subjects in particular historical societies. 
58
 H.L.A. Hart‟s (1997) The Concept of Law was written as a rebuttal of the thesis that the content of 
all law was a series of orders backed by a threat.  
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validity (Hart, 1997). Before we go on to discuss recognition in detail we must look 
at the question of legality in more detail and how this relates to an understanding of 
legitimate authority. 
 
Legality and Legitimate Authority 
The establishment of a legal system which was logically coherent and free from 
internal contradictions (Weber, 1954: 11) was, alongside the discarding of all 
metaphysics
59
, the main aim of legal positivism
60
. However, the understanding that 
law is perceived as rational and internally consistent is necessary for the 
legitimation of all law. As Norrie (2001: 8) writes: 
 
„Legality (the „rule of law‟) depends upon making and applying legal rules 
in a non-arbitrary way. It depends upon a system of norms that do not 
contradict each other, that are consistent and coherent. It requires that 
judges recognise and obey already existing rules through a system of 
precedent. All these things can only happen if the „glue‟ that holds a system 
of laws together is logic or reason. Rationality is fundamental to legality‟ 
 
Norrie (2001: 10) goes on to argue, however, that although lawyers make their 
arguments based on these rational assumptions, their commitment to them is 
ambiguous. „[I]n their moments of doubt, or when pushed to a position they do not 
accept, they jettison logic or insist on its limits‟. Norrie (2001) contends that these 
limits should be understood as the historical and social limitations of law itself. In 
other words, Norrie (2001) argues that law should be understood as a contradictory 
phenomenon. Drawing on a similar theme of indeterminacy outlined in chapter one, 
                                                 
59
 For Hegel the answer lay in the opposite direction of the legal positivists, not in the eradication of 
metaphysics but in its firmer establishment: in other words, to place metaphysics in question 
(Critchley, 2001).  
60
 Legal positivists required the break from morality as, for them; there were no adequate means of 
affirming legal positivity within a universal moral theory of society (Norrie, 1993). 
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the Critical Legal Studies movement
61
 argued that the „inability of legal doctrine to 
generate logically consistent outcomes from rules and distinctions that have a clear 
formal basis‟62 (Fish, 1993: 168), make the entire legal process insidious and empty.  
 
Duff (1998) in response to Norrie‟s argument that criminal law is necessarily 
contradictory, asks the question: what does it means in practice for it to be so? He 
argues that Norrie‟s contention is pejorative in that it identifies a defect of reason in 
criminal law.  Duff (1998: 163) writes: 
 
„Contradiction is a fatal defect in an assertion or a theory that aims at truth. 
One cannot admit to the contradiction and yet insist that the assertion of the 
theory is acceptable as it stands: One might hope that further inquiry will 
remove the contradiction, by disproving one of the contradictory 
propositions; but if the contradiction cannot be eliminated, the assertion or 
theory must be rejected as fatally flawed‟. 
 
Duff (1998) argues that there are unambiguous examples of how the legal system 
could be said to be defective because it is contradictory; if for example there is a 
contradiction between what a law prohibits and what it may require an individual to 
do in relation to the same action. Such examples would express incompatibilities 
between different legal policies or principles and as such can be addressed by law 
providing appropriate resources to address such conflicts. However, according to 
Duff (1998), these are not the kind of contradiction which Norrie (1993) or critical 
theorists maintain exists in criminal law. 
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 Influenced by the twin experiences of the civil rights movement and the anti-war movements of 
the late 1960s; the Critical Legal Studies movement developed a critical stance towards the dominant 
legal ideology of modern Western society. It sought to demystify what they saw as myths at the heart 
of the mainstream legal practice. Roberto Mangabeira Unger was associated with the Critical Legal 
Studies movement for a brief period in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was the key figure 
associated with the „indeterminacy debate‟ in legal theory (see Unger, 1986) 
62
 This threat of indeterminacy is touched on also by liberal jurisprudence when Hart (1997) writes 
that there are a variety of ways in which the general obedience to the law break down and leads to 
the pathology of legal systems.  
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What makes criminal law contradictory for Norrie (1993) and critical theory is not 
merely incompatible legal doctrines and rules, but irresolvable and deep seated 
conflicts which reflect a conflict between distinct visions of human nature. Law for 
them is a system of thought that is torn by internal contradiction and „by systematic 
repression of the presence of these contradictions' (Kelman, 1987, cited in Duff, 
1998: 168) 
 
Duff (1998) suggests that if law is contradictory, then an important question for 
critical theory to answer is: how far the law can be perceived as a potential 
instrument for good?
63
 The answer to that question for critical theorists, according 
to Duff (1998), must be in the negative. We can only have hope in the law if it is not 
contradictory. Duff (1998) suggests that critical theory has missed the target when 
they argue that there are fundamental contradictions within the criminal law. The 
starting point of the enquiry, for Duff (1998: 196), lies not in the contradictions of 
law, but with „the conditions that undermine the law‟s claim to illegitimate 
authority‟64.  
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 See Thompson (1990: 264-265) on legality and legitimacy in relation to C18 law in England: „We 
reach, then, not a simple conclusion (law = class power) but a complex and contradictory one. On the 
one hand, it is true that the law did mediate existent class relations to the advantage of the rulers; not 
only is this so, but as the century advanced the law became a superb instrument by which those rulers 
were able to impose new definitions of property to their even greater advantage […] On the other 
hand, the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed again and again, 
inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers. For there is a very large difference […] between arbitrary 
extra-legal power and the rule of law.‟   
64
 See Duff (1998: 196) „That is why my argument that is at least doubtful whether the law‟s 
preconditions (preconditions that reflect values internal to the law itself) are satisfied is distinct from 
a critical theorist‟s claim that the law is internally „contradictory‟. The law might well be internally 
as principled and coherent as one could expect a human institution to be; and I argued that in dealing 
with the relevance of motives to criminal liability it is. But its legitimacy, its authority, in relation to 
some of those whom it claims to obligate might still be questioned, on the ground that its 
preconditions are not satisfied‟. 
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This question of the nature of contradiction and where such contradictions if they do 
exist lie - whether within the law itself, or, in the principles and values that validate 
such laws – have divided liberal and critical legal scholars. As Duff (1998) notes, 
the question‟s importance lies in relation to the legitimacy of law‟s authority. If law 
is contradictory, then there is little justification to obey it. It is to the question of the 
validity of the law that we now turn. 
 
Rules of Recognition and Legal Validity.  
The question of legal domination, according to Hart (1997), can only be understood 
if contextualized in terms of social obligations. Hart argues that human behaviour 
can be divided into two categories: social habits and social rules. Law is located 
within those social rules that constitute obligations. There are moral rules of 
obligation and there are rules of obligation that take the form of law. For Hart there 
is no necessary relationship between the two. 
 
Legal rules can also be divided into primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are 
ones which tell people to do things, or not to do things; secondary rules provide the 
criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation. They enable individuals to find 
out whether or not a primary rule has been broken but also specify who has the 
power to alter the law. Secondary rules are what Hart calls rules of recognition 
(Riddall, 1999). As these rules are related to authority over others, rules of 
recognition are central to questions of legitimacy in modern societies. 
 
Rules of recognition are more complex within modern legal systems where there 
may be a number of sources of law. Therefore in these situations the criteria on 
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which such rules of recognition are based can take more than one form. These may 
include „reference to an authoritative text; to legislative enactment; to customary 
practice; to general declarations of specified persons, or to past judicial decisions in 
particular cases‟ (Hart, 1997: 100). The criteria for identifying the law are numerous 
and most commonly include a written constitution, enactment by a legislature, and 
judicial precedents. Hart argues that in most cases, possible conflicts are provided 
for by ranking such criteria in order of primacy and relative subordination. To 
illustrate this, Hart gives the example of common law being subordinate to statute 
law (Hart, 1997: 101). 
 
As mentioned above, when rules of recognition are accepted they are used for the 
identification of the primary rules of obligation that take the form of law. It is the 
inter-relation of both types of rules that, according to Hart, lie at the foundations of 
modern legal systems. However, in the everyday functioning of the legal system, 
rules of recognition are seldom formulated as rules and for the most part are not 
stated as such. Their existence is shown more often in the way in which primary 
rules are identified (Riddall, 1999). In other words, what is important with regards 
to rules of recognition, as they relate to the legitimation of law, is that they are 
accepted without argument and they are internalised by those who are subject to a 
particular legal system
65
.  
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 Hart argues that rules of recognition are capable of being looked at from two points of view - from 
an internal and from an external point of view. Those internal to the system accept rules of 
recognition without reflection i.e. therefore such rules are valid unconsciously (although this does not 
mean that subjects are unaware of them). Those who are external to the system will understand the 
rules as valid with reference to a particular system of meaning, i.e. they are consciously aware that 
the rules of recognition refer to a particular system. Hart (1997:102) gives the example of a non-
British national saying; „in Britain they accept as law what the Queen in Parliament enacts‟. 
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Hart (1997) argues that there is a hierarchy of rules of recognition where one is 
dominant
66
. For Weber (1954) this dominant rule of the recognition was legality 
itself. In other words, as we have seen, the authority of law was both rational in 
character - it was the rationality inherent in law itself that secured the legitimacy of 
power implemented in legal forms - and „just‟; the law was applied equally across 
society. Weber‟s concept of law can therefore be described as positivistic67 in the 
sense that law was unambiguously what the legislator enacted as law in conformity 
with legally institutionalised procedures. 
 
„The juridical point of view, or, more precisely, that of legal 
dogmatics
68
aims at the correct meaning of propositions the content of which 
constitutes an order supposedly determinative for the conduct of a defined 
group of persons: in other words, it tries to define the facts to which this 
order applies and the way in which it bears on them. Toward this end, the 
jurist, taking for granted the empirical validity of the legal propositions, 
examines each of them and tries to determine its logically correct meaning 
in such a way that all of them can be combined in a system which is logically 
coherent, i.e., free from internal contradictions.‟ (Weber, 1954: 11) 
 
Thus the rationality of law, according to Weber, was grounded in its formal 
properties, i.e. from it being carried out transparently, in a formally legal manner 
and in accordance with its own internal logic; and did not draw its legitimating 
power from an association with morality or ethics (Habermas, 1986b)
69
. Justice 
becomes formal when: 
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 Although Hart warns that this should not be interpreted to mean that in any one legal system there 
is a supreme legislative power which is legally unlimited (Riddall, 1999). 
67
 Legal „positivism‟ in the sense attributed to Weber‟s understanding is closer to the idea behind the 
Latin positum, „which refers to the law as it is laid down or posited‟ (Wacks, 2006: 18) than to the 
definitions of positivism relevant to the social sciences. 
68
 Dogmatics refers to the „legal science of the law‟ as opposed to its philosophical, historical or 
sociological understanding (Weber, 1954). 
69
 It is important to note that legitimation through traditional and charismatic forms of authority are 
not absent from modern societies. Notions of sovereignty and custom are absent from Weber‟s 
account of law because they refer to these other forms of authority. See Weber (1978: 1146) „As 
domination congeals into a permanent structure, charisma recedes as a creative force and erupts only 
in short-lived mass emotions with unpredictable effect, during elections and similar occasions. 
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1. „the systematic perfection of a body of clearly analysed legal provisions 
brings established norms into a clear and verifiable order‟. 
2. „the abstract and general form of the law, neither tailored to particular 
contexts nor addressed to specific persons, gives the legal system a uniform 
structure.‟ 
3. „a judiciary and an administration bound by law guarantee due process and a 
reliable implementation of law‟. (Habermas, 1986: 221-222) 
 
Weber argued that it was recognition of these three formal principles, while 
guaranteeing classical liberal law, which provided legitimacy to the liberal state.  
 
The authority of law then was grounded on it being both rational in character and 
„just‟. For Weber it did not, nor should not, draw its legitimating power from an 
association with morality or ethics. However, as Hart (1997) argues, just because 
particular rules of recognition become dominant at particular times or within 
different social orders, does not mean that a single legislative authority is secure in 
its legitimacy. In terms of Weber‟s three principles, would the rationality of the 
administration of the law be enough to guarantee legality as the basis of 
domination? As we saw above primary rules are valid within a legal system because 
they comply with the rules of recognition of that system.
70
 Although the three 
principles outlined above may become under certain circumstances what Hart 
(1997) calls the „ultimate‟ rules of recognition, there is no rule of recognition to test 
                                                                                                                                         
However, charisma remains a very important element of the social structure, even though it is much 
transformed‟. 
70
 The validity of the rule does not depend on the fact that it is obeyed or not. According to Hart 
(1997) , the validity of a rule and whether it is obeyed or disobeyed are separate matters.  
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the validity of those principles themselves. A rule of recognition can therefore be 
neither valid nor invalid - it is simply accepted within the legal system as being 
appropriate for deciding what a valid primary rule of law is and what it is not 
(Riddle, 1999).  
 
Hart (1997), as noted above, makes a distinction between rules and habits. Rules are 
different from habits because rules are self-examining; they imply acceptance and 
reflective reasoning on the part of those who follow the rules. Habitual behaviour in 
contrast is performed mindlessly and involves endless repetition (Douzinas and 
Gearey, 2005). As suggested above, rules of recognition are neither valid nor 
invalid – they are accepted within the system simply as being appropriate for 
deciding what is and is not a valid primary rule of law; there is no rule of 
recognition to test the validity of secondary rules themselves. This is the ambiguity 
at the centre of Hart‟s (1997) formulation of rules of recognition. Although rules of 
recognition can be reflected on and are open to critical scrutiny, they are more often 
than not accepted without argument and internalised by those subject to a legal 
system. If there is no rule of recognition to test the validity of secondary rules and 
law is accepted merely by advocating agreed criteria of recognition, then, when 
those criteria are in conflict, law becomes open to indeterminacy (Unger, 1983). In 
this case it is the lack of fit between the primary rules and the secondary rules that 
bring us again to the unsolved question of the relationship of legitimacy and law.  
 
The concept of secondary rules of recognition is therefore problematic on two 
counts: first, they appear to rely on habit, or passive acceptance, and therefore are 
blind to broader social and political influences on legal decision making; and 
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second, related to the first point, because rules of recognition are neither valid nor 
invalid, they do not provide an answer to why a legal system is accepted.  
 
Earlier I noted that the question of contradictions within the law itself, or in the 
principles and values that validate such laws had divided liberal and critical legal 
scholars. An important dividing point has been the understanding of recognition and 
legal validity. In other words, liberal scholars argue that contradictions, if they exist, 
are the result of badly formulated law, or laws badly applied or that these 
contradictions may be the result of conditions that are external to law.  As Duff 
notes, if the law is contradictory, then there is little justification to obey or recognise 
it. In other words, in liberal theory, contradiction and recognition are both related to 
the validity of law. Critical scholars, following Hegel, would argue that 
contradiction is a fundamental aspect of law. This contradiction is not external, but 
is expressed in the dialectical relationship between the abstract universality of 
justice (which acts as a constraint to justice) and the actual social relations in which 
the law functions. Recognition, or misrecognition, is therefore not about the validity 
of the law as such,  but relates to conflicts that individuals pursue via law in order to 
have their ' identity claims ' confirmed   (see Honneth 1995, 2007). 
 
The Legal Subject 
The Enlightenment faith in the authority of reason was evident in what has now 
been designated within criminology as the Classical School. Within classicism 
„crime‟ was a concept and not simply an outcome of a particular form of human 
behaviour (Bottoms, 2000). In 1764 Beccaria published On Crimes and 
Punishment, in this work Beccaria was concerned with an exploration of the moral 
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and political justifications for punishment. This work, along with the writings of 
Bentham (1748-1832) in England, was concerned with the principles of justice and 
how crime was to be dealt with by the state. Both theorists drew on the most 
authoritative 18
th
 century theories of democratic liberalism and related them to 
issues of criminal justice. Liberal jurisprudence bases its understanding on the 
motivations of conduct of individual actors (Lilly et al, 1995). Here the individual is 
elevated above a particular individual‟s concrete existence in the world and comes 
into existence in the abstract form of the legal subject (Foucault, 1991). The 
singular most important contribution of this school was its focus on the individual 
criminal as a person capable of rationally calculating the risks and rewards they 
would receive for their actions. In liberal criminal law theory it is a common theme 
that individual responsibility is the proper basis for legitimate punishment. Norrie 
(1998: 104) argues that both the liberal understanding of criminal law theory and 
philosophy of punishment: 
„fail to locate individual responsibility where it should be located, between 
the two domains of the personal and the social. Both are structured by a 
primary antinomy between the ideal and the actual that establishes an 
artificial separation, a second antinomy, between the individual and social. 
The falsity of this dichotomy undermines the logic of retributive and 
criminal law theory and renders them incoherent and unsustainable. 
Subjectivity, as represented in liberal criminal law and retributive 
philosophy, focuses on an ideal conception of the individual to the exclusion 
of actual social and moral context in which individual agency occurs‟. 
 
In law, the legal subject stands fully autonomous at the centre of the world in full 
possession of their rights and transparent in their motives
71
. Legal recognition 
places the individual in the form of universality, in other words the subject is 
founded on the minimum commonalities of people and not on the properties that 
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 See Barthes (2000: 44) on how language erases social difference in criminal trials, „Periodically, 
some trial […] comes to remind you that the Law is always prepared to lend you a spare brain in 
order to condemn you without remorse, and that […] it depicts you as you should be, and not as you 
are‟. 
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make them unique individuals. The legal subject is an abstract category; it is 
constructed by the legal system as a universal subject beyond the particularities of 
class, gender, race or religion (Douzinas and Gearey, 2005). This reasoning 
autonomous legal subject, located within a structure of universal legal rights and 
protected by the rule of law, was a powerful mechanism of ideological legitimation 
from the eighteenth century onwards, for the very reason that it erased particularity. 
 
As we have seen in chapter one, Hegel not only opposed the abstract atomised 
individual of classical legal thought, but also the abstract categories of scientific 
positivism. Both presupposed the „being of the individual‟ to be „the primary and 
supreme thing‟ (Honneth, 1995: 12). In this context Hegel labels all those 
approaches „empirical‟ that start out with such an abstract characterization of human 
nature and which conceive of human behaviour exclusively as the isolated acts of 
solitary individuals. Both areas of thought, scientific positivism and liberal law, 
presuppose as the basis for human socialization, the existence of subjects who are 
isolated from each other. In both, a „community of human beings‟ can only be 
conceptualized on the abstract model of a „unified many‟ that is, as a cluster of 
single subjects, and thus not on the model of the ethical unity outlined by Hegel 
(Honneth, 1995: 12). Norrie (1978) writes:  
 
„The central problem for the classical retributive theory of punishment was 
that it relied upon an ideal conception of the individual in order to do two 
things: to construct a conception of the responsible moral subject, whose 
punishment was justified because of his or her prior act, and to construct a 
conception of a moral community with agreed norms that would make 
judgment, condemnation, and punishment possible. This idea of community 
was itself based upon a prior conceptualization of the responsible moral 
subject. The problem was that the ideal conception of the individual 
contrasted, and could not be reconciled, with the actuality of individual life 
in modern society‟ Norrie (1998: 107). 
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Although Hegel rejected the formal legality of classical liberal law and, as we saw 
in chapter one, argued that abstract Right led to indeterminacy, he did share some of 
the concerns about classical retributive theory. The next section will outline Hegel‟s 
theory of punishment and show how it differs in terms of his conceptualisation of 
recognition and its relation both to the responsible subject and to the moral 
community.  
 
Recognition and Retributive Justice 
Hegel (1967) considered the law to be a „realm of freedom,‟ and like Weber after 
him, he argued that the increasing rationalisation of legal structures, the codification 
of law which attempts to systematise the legal heritage of the past, was to be 
encouraged and was seen by him as a standard of historical progress (Avineri, 
1972). Hegel conceived of the relationship between crime and the criminal wholly 
in terms of its legal aspect. In this way Hegel is close to classical theorists in 
restricting the legal subject to a juridical existence. However, despite this aspect it is 
important not to mistake his theory with traditional theories of retribution
72
 
(Flechtheim, 1947). 
 
Within Hegel's philosophy of punishment there exists an unbreakable relationship 
between the criminal act and its penalty. Hegel sees in retribution „the turning back 
of crime against itself‟. In Hegel‟s interpretation, punishment becomes the 
criminal's subjective right rather than his/her legal obligation. For Hegel, in addition 
to its function of retribution, law, as it becomes invested with the capacity of 
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 Retributive punishment has historically been associated with lex talionis (an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth‟). 
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reconciliation, assumes the power of absorbing and effacing crime (Flechtheim, 
1947). 
 
Consequently, punishment ceases to be dishonourable or shameful; the criminal in 
serving his sentence, „rehabilitates himself and regains his former status in life‟73. 
Thus the penalty does not express itself as constraint or violence, but as free and 
rational self-determination on the part of the offender. (Flechtheim, 1947: 298). As 
Bloch (1987: 125) writes: 
 
„Punishment should be so little constraint that it even returns to the criminal 
his freedom by respecting his human dignity; in the restoration of law 
through punishment, justice (which as a pure nullity is nothing less than 
freedom) is once again established as part of the substantial will, and thus of 
objective freedom.‟74 
 
Punishment rests upon the free and rational consent of the criminal as a „person‟. 
However, there is a tension between Hegel‟s account of punishment, and its 
relationship to classical legal theory, and his scathing analysis of the pathologies of 
civil society explored in chapter one, which needs further exploration.  
 
We saw earlier in chapter one how ethical life was a theory of social bonds that was 
developed by Hegel to counter the abstract, atomised forms of abstract Right. We 
saw that ethical life was concrete and many-sided while penal justice, being 
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 According to Flechtheim (1947), Hegel, in his criticism of relativistic theories of punishment, 
anticipates C20 arguments about rehabilitation, particularly those that argued that forced 
rehabilitation, ruthless intimidation, and arbitrarily imposed re-education may be less compatible 
with human dignity and personal responsibility than traditional retribution.   
74
 The controversial aspect of Hegel‟s theory of retributive punishment is related to the death penalty 
and is outlined by Bloch (1987: 125) directly after the above passage: „It is a paradox, or a mockery, 
that Hegel is not embarrassed in calling the death penalty the greatest happiness of freedom: 
Beheaded, the criminal becomes human again. That is how easily Hegel‟s judicial conscience 
regarding punishment conforms to the supreme power of the existing state and social order: Hegel 
only recognises justice as penal justice, and this is found in the iron hand of the dominant order‟ 
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abstract, was associated with limitation and constraint. Retributive punishment 
under such constraints would appear not only of limited value, i.e. it is not based on 
justice grounded in an ethical community, but would also seem to be counter to 
Hegel‟s intention. In other words, if law was not grounded in ethical life, it would 
remain abstract and prone to indeterminacy. In this context Hegel's objection, both 
to monarchical absolutism as well as to majoritarian democracy, was that law in 
those conditions becomes arbitrary and opposed to reason (Hegel, 1967). However, 
Hegel did find a way of reconciling his theory of ethical life with a theory of 
retributive justice, and he did this by reinterpreting Fichte‟s theory of recognition 
(see Honneth 1995, 2007). 
 
Fichte, in his The Foundations of Natural Law (1796), originally conceived of 
recognition as a „reciprocal effect‟ [Wechselwirkung] between individuals and the 
law, which validated those legal relations between the two. He argued that subjects 
can only develop a consciousness of freedom if they recognise each other as free 
beings and appeal to one another to make use of their autonomy. Hegel removes the 
transcendental
75
 indications from Fichte‟s model and applies it directly to the 
different forms of reciprocal action among individuals. As we have seen, Hegel 
argued that ethical progress unfolds in the intersubjective struggles that individuals 
pursue in order to have their identity claims confirmed. By situating Fichte‟s model 
of recognition within a theory of conflict, Hegel not only provides a more dynamic 
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 Transcendental idealism was the name given to Kant‟s early philosophy. See Körner (1955: 93-
94):„The objects of experience are the only objects which we can know […] [y]et we are committed, 
according to Kant, to the thesis that there are things in themselves although we cannot know what 
they are […] Kant calls the things in themselves „nomena‟ […] and contrasts them with „phenomena‟ 
which are or can be objects of experience.‟ Fichte‟s early work was influenced by Kant‟s 
transcendental idealism (Beiser, 2002). 
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conception of recognition, but also makes its „negative‟ course of development76 
more concrete (see Honneth 1995, 2007). 
 
The criminal as outlined in Hegel‟s theory has a juridical existence, as does the 
classical legal subject, however Hegel‟s conceptualisation of recognition is a very 
different notion of recognition than the legal recognition of liberal law. For Hegel, 
the „general will is the will of individuals made into an object within the institutions 
of the state‟ (Avineri, 1972:102). The objectification of the individual will as it 
appears in the state – the general will - entails the recognition by the individual of 
something that appears alien and external. This external power is nothing more than 
the externalisation of the subject‟s own will. In other words, for Hegel, the system 
of law is the objectification of the subject‟s will (Averini, 1972). With regards to 
crime and its punishment, recognition was posited by Hegel as an ideal reciprocal 
relationship between subjects and the law. Laws, Hegel argues: 
 
„are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, his spirit bears 
witness to them as to his own essence, the essence in which he has a feeling 
of his selfhood, and in which he lives as in his own element which is not 
distinguished from himself. The subject is thus directly linked to the ethical 
order by a relation which is more like an identity than even the relation of 
faith or trust‟. (Hegel, 1967: 106) 
 
Hegel‟s theory contrasts with classical liberalism then in that it does not 
conceptualise the individual in the form of the autonomous legal subject described 
above, i.e. as an autonomous stable entity which, once formed, goes forth as a 
complete individual into the world. Hegel views the subject as embodied in 
institutions, by the very process of the institutionalisation of society‟s ideas, 
                                                 
76
 See discussion on negativity in chapter one of this thesis. 
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customs and morals. For Hegel recognition was a reciprocal process that took the 
form of a struggle for self-actualisation via the legal system
77
. It is reciprocal in the 
dialectical sense that the struggles for recognition were processes of self-
development for all parties, and were a reflection of broader social conflicts and 
struggles for social emancipation. For Hegel, moral and social conflicts are 
expressions of a struggle for recognition which is necessary both for the creation of 
the subject and for its socialization (see Honneth, 1996 and Douzinas and Gearey, 
2005). In this way Hegel introduces an understanding of social struggle that treats 
practical conflicts between subjects as an „ethical moment in a movement occurring 
within a collective social life‟ (Honneth, 1996: 17). This struggle is captured vividly 
by Thompson (1990: 261) in relation to eighteenth century property rights in 
England: 
 
„What was often at issue was not property, supported by law, against no-
property; it was alternative definitions of property-rights: for the landowner, 
enclosure – for the cottager, common rights; for the forest officialdom, 
„preserved grounds‟ for the deer; for the foresters, the right to take turfs. 
For as long as it remained possible, the ruled – if they could find a purse 
and a lawyer – would actually fight for their rights by means of law; 
occasionally the copyholders, resting upon the precedents of sixteenth-
century law, could actually win a case. When it ceased to be possible to 
continue the fight at law, men still felt a sense of legal wrong: the propertied 
had obtained their power by illegitimate means.‟ 
 
As the quote above illustrates, the conception of a struggle for recognition includes 
not only the site of moral conflict but also the institutional setting by which such 
struggles are settled. The subject in this case is no longer the abstract legal subject 
who draws their identity from the recognition of their status as legal agents; instead, 
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 Hegel's belief in the self-determination and self-liberation of the criminal cannot be separated 
from the importance that he attributes to trial by jury and to a parliament with public proceedings, 
institutions lacking in the Prussia of his time (Kaufmann, 1951). 
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the subject involved in this „life and death‟ struggle for recognition is a „whole 
person‟ who gains his/her identity from the intersubjective recognition of their 
„particularity‟ (Honneth, 1996: 23). In the above example, it is the particularity of 
landowner, cottager, forester etc. 
 
However, the dialectic of punishment outlined above, „the turning back of crime 
against itself‟, still appears slightly at odds with the sociological dialectic of 
intersubjective recognition and „particularity‟ described here in the civil struggle 
over property rights, in particular with regards to the legal subject and the 
reconciliation of the universal within the particular. As Norrie (1998: 107) 
argues: 
 
„this abstract conception of the individual as worthy of respect in and 
through punishment was at odds with a more „sociological‟ understanding 
of actual individual life that was repressed by the theory but that threatened 
nonetheless to disrupt it. The essential problem was the gap between the 
ideal image of the individual who stands up to be punished as a rational or 
consensual being and the empirical reality of crime and criminality as a 
social issue associated with poverty and attendant problems‟.  
 
 As we have seen, for Hegel, law was both a mechanism of civil society and a 
manifestation of reason within ethical life. However, at the edge of his theory, as 
Norrie points out, and as we have seen in chapter one, Hegel acknowledged that 
civil society presented a darker dialectic that undermined the existence of ethical 
life by exposing it to deep-seated structural conflict. Therefore, the liberation of the 
criminal through law and reconciliation with the ethical community fails if 
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recognition is denied by that community
78
 (Norrie, 1993, 1998). It is to this 
problem that we now turn, and explore the relationship of ethical life to legitimacy. 
 
Recognition, ethical life and Legitimacy 
„Modern political philosophy, from Hobbes to Kant, maintains that rational 
consent is the basis of legitimate political authority. In dismissing this 
claim…Hegel…reveals a profound ambivalence towards modernity and its 
characteristic differentiation of social life into the public, private, and 
intimate realms‟ (Benhabib, 1986: 9-10) 
 
Modern political philosophy maintains that rational consent is the basis of the 
general will (Benhabib, 1986). As we have seen, for Hegel, political authority can 
only be legitimated through reciprocal recognition within a genuine ethical unity of 
the people. However, if recognition was not universal, and according to Hegel it 
wasn‟t under the conditions of the liberal state, then the political authority of the 
state was compromised. If the rational potential of social institutions was 
constrained then they could not be legitimated by rational consent. In this state of 
affairs, the state and its institutions - which importantly include the penal system - 
becomes the physical manifestation of social contradiction. The result of this split - 
between the liberal guarantees of the constitutional state and democratic self-
determination - is not only that „moral judgements, decoupled from concrete ethical 
life, no longer immediately carry the motivational power that converts judgments 
into action‟ (Habermas, 1986: 245), but that the state loses its legitimacy.  
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 In writings on Hegel and law, this dialectical aspect is often neglected in place of a normative 
reading of Hegel. Therefore attention tends to be placed on the free reciprocal relationship between 
the offender and the law (see Flechtheim, 1947 and Bloch, 1987 above).  This is not surprising as 
Hegel himself emphasises the eventual reconciliation of contradiction, while writers such as Adorno 
and Derrida emphasis the tensions within the contradiction. 
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In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel in outlining his theory of the state, insisted that 
we should look objectively at the thing itself and not at the aura of sanctity which 
surrounds it (Fine, 1993). The ideal, the legitimating myth of the system which 
allows its subjects to perceive it as „authoritative‟ and „eternal‟, hides, in Hegel‟s 
analysis, the founding of Right on the security of private property.  
 
It is important to note that Hegel regarded property as a necessary element in the 
struggle for recognition. Possession cannot become actual until the fact of 
possession is recognised by others. It is this recognition that property rights achieve. 
A subject‟s right to possession is recognised by others on condition that the subject 
in turn recognizes the property of others. Property is secured to all through the 
operation of law. For Hegel, „property helps constitute subjectivity as 
intersubjectivity through the mediation of objectivity‟ (Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 
183). It is the fact that this form of recognition is denied to some that the question of 
legitimacy is raised.  
 
In other words Law is founded on particular rather than universal interests. In this 
state of affairs, following Hegel‟s logic, law, in the form of abstract Right, becomes 
the handmaiden of social antagonism rather than a conciliator to that antagonism 
(see Norrie, 1993, Fine, 1993)
79. At the core of Hegel‟s work, although not explicit 
and against Hegel‟s own intention in the sense that Hegel regarded the recognition 
of property as essential in modern society, there is a sense that illegitimate personal 
                                                 
79
 As we saw in chapter one, the aim of The Philosophy of Right did not „consist in teaching the state 
what it ought to be‟; but to „show how the state, the ethical universe, is to be understood‟ (Hegel, 
1967:11). Fine (1993) argues that Hegel‟s work on the philosophy of Right, exposed the „hardened 
prejudices‟ and degeneration of liberalism from its earlier defence of „absolute freedom‟ to its 
„vulgarised‟ subordination to the demands of private property. 
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domination by the community (the universal will) is a central attribute in the make 
up of the modern subject
80
. As Rose (1981: 73) writes: 
 
„Hegel argued that it was “immoral” for Kant to “universalize” any 
subjective maxim of the will which presupposes the institution of private 
property, since private property cannot, by definition, be universal, 
“property itself is directly opposed to universality; equated with it, it is 
abolished” […] Private property is a contradiction, because an individual‟s 
private or particular possession (Besitz) can only be guaranteed by the 
whole society, the universal. Property means the right to exclude others, and 
the exclusion of other individuals (particular) is made possible by the 
communal will (universal). But, if everyone has equal right to possess, to 
exclude others, then no-one can have any guaranteed possession, or, 
anyone‟s possessions belongs to everyone else.‟ 
 
However as Rose (1981) states, Hegel begins from the actuality of individual 
private property. Property as a universal notion has not been preserved and its 
private form prevails. Each private owner exists abstractly, for themselves and 
outside the community.  
 
As we have seen in chapter one, Hegel was aware that the two abstract models of 
freedom characteristic to modern society: „abstract right‟ and „morality‟, had 
already led to distortions in the „practical self-relations of subjects‟; and this led him 
to refer, in the Philosophy of Right, to the age as „suffering from indeterminacy‟ 
(Honneth, 2000: 36). Throughout his writings Hegel was concerned by those 
pathological conditions that threatened to undermine the modern ethical community. 
Hegel portrayed such a community ideally as a realm in which individual rational 
activity could flourish. He wrote that against nature human beings can claim no 
                                                 
80
 This idea is also a key feature of the writings of Roberto Mangabeira Unger (see Unger 1977 and 
1996).  
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right, but once society is established, poverty,
81
 one of the pathological results of 
misrecognition, takes the form of a „wrong done to one class by another‟. Hegel 
argued that poverty led to a loss of the sense of right and wrong, but as Norrie 
(1998: 110) notes, what was really required was a „consensual view of right and 
wrong, the possibility of universal norms in a moral community.  
 
For Hegel the struggle for recognition was necessary both for the creation of the 
subject and for its socialization. So what from the standpoint of the 21
st
 century can 
Hegel‟s notion of recognition offer our understanding of legitimation? In this 
chapter we have seen how Hegel rejected the formal legality of classical liberal law 
and provided a more sociologically grounded concept of recognition than that 
outlined by classical legal theory. However, a return to Hegel with an intention of 
reconciling the „is‟ with the „ought‟ and generating institutions entailing a 
genuine ethical unity of the people is beyond the bounds of possibility. Hegel‟s 
project collapsed in his own lifetime and regardless of its metaphysical 
sophistication and powerful influence, it was clear soon after the publication of 
the Philosophy of Right that the possibility of a grand intellectual synthesis of 
the ideal and the actual was not possible under modem social conditions 
(Norrie, 1993).  
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 „Not only caprice, however, but also contingencies, physical conditions, and factors grounded in 
external circumstances […] may reduce men to poverty. The poor still have the needs common to 
civil society, and yet since society has withdrawn from them the natural means of acquisition […] 
and broken the bond of the family […] their poverty leaves them more or less deprived of all the 
advantages of society, of the opportunity of acquiring skill or education of any kind, as well as of the 
administration of justice, the public health services, and often even the consolations of religion […] 
It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. its 
own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble‟. 
(Hegel, 1976:148-150) 
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As discussed earlier, the question of the nature of contradiction in law, and where 
such contradictions lie - whether within the law itself, or in the principles and values 
that validate such laws – have divided liberal and critical legal scholars. Critical 
theorists, drawing on Hegel, have argued that the contradictions are related to 
constraints within the social order that the law helps to obscure by providing a 
legitimating myth that allows subjects to perceive that order as just. Liberals, on the 
other hand, argue that injustice, or contradictions in the application of justice are not 
a necessary aspect of the law, but of law poorly or unjustly applied. The following 
section deals with the principles and values that validate law in relation to 
procedural and substantive law; values which in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century were external to the law but which in the twentieth century became central 
to social regulation. This shift, outlined by Habermas (1976) and Unger (1977), was 
characterised by them as a shift from liberal to post-liberal societies and signified a 
change within the strategies of legitimation of such societies. 
 
II 
 
The Rise of Purpose in Law 
 
„A society‟s law constitutes the chief bond between its culture and its 
organisation; it is the external manifestation of the embeddedness of the 
former in the latter‟. (Unger, 1977:250) 
 
The classical liberal model of formal law outlined by Weber bore little resemblance 
to the reality of the law, and the enduring influence of Weber‟s analysis is due more 
to the theoretical question of the relationship of legality and legitimacy than to how 
legal systems function in reality. Weber (1954) himself recognised in the early 
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1920‟s a shift from formal to substantive law82. For Weber, the penetration of 
substantive justice into formal law was interpreted as an example of the 
moralisation of law. The moralisation of law that Weber perceived at that time was 
an early precursor to the politicisation of law that led to the fall of the Weimar 
Republic. At that time, Weber argued that the substantive tendencies in law pointed 
towards a disquieting fusion of pre-modern conceptions of morality with legality 
that was likely to undermine political freedom (Scheuerman, 1997)
83
. The 
expansion of regulatory law that heralded the arrival of an interventionist state 
erased the classical ideal of civil law. Procedural and substantive characteristics that 
previously were external to the law began to increasingly influence legal provisions 
(Habermas, 1986, Scheuerman, 1997).  
 
What both Habermas (1976) and Unger (1977) addressed in their respective works 
was a shift from liberal to post-liberal societies. A key feature of this shift was a 
corresponding movement within the legitimation systems of such societies, from 
formal to substantive law. When both wrote their key works on the subject it was in 
the context of the interventionist requirements of the post-war welfare state where 
purposive legal reasoning was required for the control of markets and the regulation 
of everyday life. Unger (1977) writes that the immediate causes of the post-liberal 
move toward purposive legal reasoning and procedural or substantive justice are 
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 Substantive law is characterised by purposive reasoning (Habermas, 1986) i.e. it is opposite from 
formal law in that it has „substance‟. 
83
 Weber‟s work on the relationship of legality to legitimation sparked key debates during the early 
years of the Weimar Republic, most notably with the work of Carl Schmitt (1932/2004) whose 
Legality and Legitimacy was published in 1932. This work was responded to by members of the 
Frankfurt School: Kirchheimer (1932:1933/1969) and Neumann (1937/1964, 1986). Carl Schmitt‟s 
texts on legality, or, to be more precise, the suspension of legality, have recently experienced a 
revival in relation to the legislation enacted after 9/11 (reference who you are thinking of??). 
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directly connected with the inner dynamic of the welfare state. In that way the form 
of law changes as a result of the altered historical imperatives within society. 
 
According to Unger (1977: 194) justice is procedural when it „imposes conditions 
on the legitimacy of the processes by which social advantages are exchanged or 
distributed‟. In other words an external criterion is drawn upon to specify what 
would be a fair or just outcome to a judicial procedure (see also Rawls, 1973).  This 
goes against the second of Weber‟s three formal principles as the law adapts its 
reasoning to particular contexts and individuals. It therefore threatens to reduce the 
uniform structure and the generality of the legal system. Substantive justice is when 
the law „governs the actual outcome of distributive decisions or of bargains‟. This 
form is contrary to all three principles of formal law and corrupts legal generality to 
an even greater extent than procedural justice. Both forms, procedural and 
substantive, require that rules be interpreted in terms of ideals that define the 
conception of justice. In the context of the 1920‟s it was this outcome-oriented 
purposeful law, that Weber interpreted as the moralisation of justice, which came 
about when legal discourse became policy focussed and forced into making explicit 
value choices based on political incentives. Both forms are characterised by the 
predominance of an individualised administration of justice and an instrumental 
rationality over other principles of thought. The cumulative impact of the above: 
 
„is to encourage the dissolution of the rule of law, at least insofar as that 
form of legality is defined by its commitment to the generality and autonomy 
of law. To be sure, autonomy and generality could never be meant as 
completely actualised descriptions of the legal order in liberal society; they 
are no more than ideals which the liberal form of social life makes 
necessary to entertain and impossible to fully achieve. What distinguishes 
the law of the postliberal period is primarily the turning away from these 
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ideals, a change of course that, despite its apparent insignificance, indicates 
important shifts in human belief and social order. (Unger 1977: 200) 
 
These developments challenge Weber‟s original assertion that it was the formal 
rational aspect of liberal law that was central to legitimation. In the post-liberal era, 
the relationship between legality and legitimation appears to be derived from 
disembodied moral and ethical imperatives, the politicisation of justice related in 
turn to the imperatives of the economic system (Habermas, 1986).  
 
The rise of the welfare state saw the transformation of formal law into policy-
oriented legal programmes. This rise in substantive and procedural law was 
characterised by Habermas (1986) as a rise in reflexive law; a form of law directed 
by purposive reasoning. However due to the increasing complexity of the social 
system and the difficulties of the administrative system in regulating – and 
predicting - the crisis produced by the effects of goal oriented legislation, law 
begins to lose its binding character, which in turn, increases its deformalisation and 
its marginalisation. Habermas gives a number of examples of this: the assimilation 
of penal law to informal types of social control, and the substitution of private 
agreements for criminal prosecution by the state. 
 
The crisis tendencies of capitalist accumulation have not lessened and the traditional 
legitimation systems of the liberal state have changed not only as a result of the 
corporatist state but the contemporary neo-liberal state. When Habermas wrote his 
account those traditional systems were being undermined by the purposive 
(substantive) legislation of the welfare state. What Habermas‟s (1976) analysis 
highlighted was not only the ideological nature of legitimation strategies, and their 
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different levels, but also the significance of the economic system in structuring 
them. In the next section I will outline Habermas‟s argument, which marked an 
important step in developing a different conception of contemporary legitimation 
struggles. 
 
Legitimation Crisis 
Habermas (1976) sought to trace the relationship between the development of new 
institutional forms of organisation and human consciousness within the crisis 
tendencies particular to late capitalism. Following Hegel, Habermas contended that 
changes in intersubjectivity were to be understood only in light of underlying 
historical developments. The new forms of organisation that he outlined were the 
post-war corporative structures of the welfare state. Habermas argued, that the 
fundamental contradiction of capitalism was the conflict between social production 
and the private appropriation of public wealth, and for him, it was this contradiction 
that determined the boundaries and logic of crisis tendencies within the various sub-
systems of modern society. The problem that Habermas addressed was „how to 
distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately‟ (McCarthy, 
1978: 358).  
 
„With the political anonymization of class rule, the socially dominant class 
must convince itself that it no longer rules. Universalistic bourgeois 
ideologies can fulfil this task insofar as they (a) are founded „scientifically‟ 
on the critique of tradition and (b) possess the character of a model, that is, 
anticipate a state of society whose possibility need not from the start be 
denied by a dynamically growing economic society […] The achievement of 
the capitalist principle of organisation is nevertheless extraordinary. It not 
only frees the economic system, uncoupled from the political system, from 
the legitimations of the socially integrative subsystems, but enables it […] to 
make a contribution to social integration. With these achievements, the 
susceptibility of the social system to crisis certainly grows, as steering 
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problems can now become directly threatening to identity. (Habermas, 
1976: 23) 
 
As such, Habermas‟s thesis was a contemporary re-conceptualisation of Hegel‟s 
unresolved legitimation dilemma which haunted the Philosophy of Right. 
 
The question of legitimacy was central to the development of the welfare state, as 
such states no longer recognised „political domination in personal form‟ (Habermas, 
1976: 22)
84
. The post-war welfare states were characterised by two key trends: a 
progressive anonymisation of class rule and an increased social integration via the 
economy. Although this shift from the classical liberal state to a corporate one came 
about as a means to regulate the economy via state intervention, both in the 
regulation of markets and in general patterns of everyday life, it could not reduce 
periodic economic instability. At the same time as capital became increasingly 
regulated by the state, crisis tendencies of capital accumulation became more 
acute
85
 (Held and Simon 1975). Habermas (1976) outlines four types of crisis 
tendencies in late capitalist society. These four types of crisis are located within 
three basic subsystems: the economic, the political (administrative) and the socio-
cultural.  
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 See also Unger (1977) 
85
 See also Mandel (1975: 501) on the links between crisis, legitimation and ideology: „Belief in the 
omnipotence of technology is the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism. This 
ideology proclaims the ability of the existing social order gradually to eliminate all chance of crisis, 
to find a „technical‟ solution to all its contradictions, to integrate rebellious social classes and to 
avoid political explosions. The notion of „post-industrial society‟, whose social structure is supposed 
to be dominated by norms of „functional rationality‟, corresponds to the same ideological trend […] 
The existing system cannot be challenged because of its technical rationalisation; emergent problems 
can only be solved by specialist functional treatment; the masses therefore willingly assent to the 
existing social order.‟ 
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Classification of Possible Crisis Tendencies 
Point of Origin System Crisis Identity Crisis 
Economic System Economic Crisis - 
Political System Rationality Crisis Legitimation Crisis 
Socio-Cultural System - Motivation Crisis 
Fig. 1 source: Habermas (1976: 45) 
 
Central to Habermas‟s theory of social evolution is the proposition that human 
beings evolve through two distinct but interrelated domains, each with a 
corresponding mode of knowledge. The first is via the forces of production (the 
appropriation of outer nature), characterised by technical knowledge; the second is 
via the normative structures of social interaction (the appropriation of inner nature), 
characterised by practical and moral knowledge. These domains Habermas (1987) 
later differentiated by referring to them as system and lifeworld. Each of these 
domains, the system and the intersubjective realm, has its own logic of development 
that cannot be reduced to the other. Production processes identifiable with the 
system are governed by rules of instrumental and strategic action which correspond 
to the increasing growth in scientific and technical knowledge, while socialisation 
processes, particular to the intersubjective realm, proceed according to the norms 
and rules of communicative interaction (Held and Simon, 1976). These two 
domains are each associated with two crisis tendencies. System crises consisted of 
economic crises and crises of rationality. Lifeworld crises were crises of 
legitimation and motivation. Habermas argued that a legitimation crisis was a crisis 
of identity. Early critical theory appropriated the medium of analytical social 
psychology as a way of defending the assumption that dominant patterns of 
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socialisation transmit the functional imperatives of state and economy from the 
level of institutions to the level of personality structures.  
 
The subsystem from Fig.1 with which we are concerned with here therefore, is the 
administrative/political system. Using the language of systems analysis, Habermas 
describes each subsystem as having inputs and outputs.  In order to function 
properly the administrative/political system „requires an input of mass loyalty that is 
as diffuse as possible.‟ The „output consists in sovereignly executed administrative 
decisions‟ (Habermas, 1976: 46). Output crises occur when the administrative 
system fails to accomplish the requirements demanded from the economic system 
and takes on the form of a rationality crisis. Input crises occur when the system fails 
to maintain the required level of mass loyalty in order to keep functioning; these 
take on the form of a legitimation crisis.  
 
„A rationality deficit in public administration means that the state apparatus 
cannot, under given boundary conditions, adequately steer the economic 
system. A legitimation deficit means that it is not possible by administrative 
means to maintain or establish effective normative structures to the extent 
required‟ (Habermas, 1976: 47). 
 
As mentioned above, Habermas (1976) argued that ideology can fulfil the task of 
legitimation to the extent that it is both grounded „scientifically‟ and can also 
provide a narrative in which the current condition of society does not contradict 
how that society performs economically. In other words the ideology must be based 
on a discourse that is both rational and equitable. What connects these two 
administrative forms is the idea of impartiality. It is to legitimacy and its relation to 
science that we turn to now in the following section. 
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III 
 
From Legality to the Legitimation of Science 
 
 „Take any civil law as an example: it states that a given category of citizens 
must perform a specific kind of action. Legitimation is the process by which 
a legislator is authorized to promulgate such a law as a norm. Now take the 
example of a scientific statement: it is subject to the rule that a statement 
must fulfil a given set of conditions in order to be accepted as scientific. In 
this case, legitimation is the process by which a „legislator‟ dealing with 
scientific discourse is authorised to prescribe the stated conditions (in 
general, conditions of internal consistency and experimental verification) 
determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for 
consideration by the scientific community‟. (Lyotard, 1984: 8) 
 
So far this chapter has looked at recognition in relation to legitimation and the law, 
and as such has dealt with recognition with regards to questions of legality. It also 
provided an overview of Habermas‟s attempt to broaden the relationship of 
recognition and institutional legitimacy to the crisis tendencies of the economic 
system.  In chapter one I argued that Hegel‟s critique of the atomised subject also 
related to his critique of science in the form of positivism. The following section 
will develop the themes of recognition and legitimation in relation to science, in 
particular to psychiatry. In doing so it will prepare the ground for chapter five in 
relation to criminological approaches based on the principle of risk management and 
the „criminology of the „dangerous other‟‟ Garland (2001).  
 
As we have seen, Hegel‟s account of the growth of the subject and its integration 
within a social order would appear to be contradictory in that the constitution of 
subjectivity could be interpreted as both liberating and oppressive; the subject 
dominated by a power external to it. The intimate relationship between the 
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embededness of subjectivity and the problem of legitimacy is highlighted by 
Melossi (2008: 25) when he writes: 
 
„This is the process of subjectivation: the constitution of subjects. The main 
instruments of social organization and control – whether they are managed 
by „the State‟ or by „private institutions‟ – have as their ultimate goal the 
creation of subjects constituted in such a way that they should be able to see 
the supreme rationality of those instruments and institutions. Beyond 
philosophical, political, and legal mythologies, the construction of political 
power on the one hand and of the subjects of/to that power on the other is 
the outcome of complementary processes within which the function of 
economic, political, and intellectual elites is crucial.‟  
 
Melossi outlines the function of power to produce subjects in such a way that they 
perceive institutions and their instruments as rational, and therefore legitimate, 
regardless of whether or not they conform to justifiable criteria of legitimacy. The 
quote above underlines this function well by focusing on the ideological nature of 
legitimation - the ultimate goal of state institutions is to maintain belief in their 
supreme rationality – and that the problem of legitimacy is broader than the 
boundaries of the law or the penal system. As Habermas (1976) outlined above, the 
problem of legitimacy and the structuring of subjectivity extend to the economy, the 
political institutions of the state and in the knowledge claims of elites. It is to these 
relationships between legitimacy and the recognition of the knowledge claims of 
elites that we now turn. The following section will examine the relationship 
between law and psychiatry. 
 
Law and Psychiatry 
 
„It is strange that rationalism authorised this confusion between punishment 
and remedies, this quasi-identity between the act of punishment and the act 
that cures. It supposes a certain treatment at the junction of medicine and 
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morality that was both an anticipation of the torments of eternal damnation 
and an attempt to bring the patient back to health. The key element is the 
ruse in medical reasoning that does good while inflicting pain.‟ Foucault 
(2006 :86) 
 
Earlier in this chapter we saw that the existence of a legal system which was 
logically coherent and free from internal contradictions was central to the 
legitimation of modern western societies. Law was perceived as a universal form of 
social mediation based on the recognition of its rational character (Weber, 1954: 
11). We saw also that the creation of the autonomous legal subject, located within a 
realm of universal legal rights, was a dominant mechanism of ideological 
legitimation from the eighteenth century onwards (see Thompson, 1990, Norrie, 
2001). However this conception of the free modern individual of classicism was to 
come under fire during the nineteenth century.  
 
Faith in the authority of reason was evident in the conceptualisation that individual 
actors were beings capable of rationally calculating the risks and rewards they 
would receive for their actions. It was this notion of free will that made individual 
responsibility the proper basis for legitimate punishment in liberal criminal law 
(Norrie, 1998). However, the notion, outlined earlier, that „crime‟ was a concept and 
not the outcome of a particular form of human behaviour (Bottoms, 2000) was 
challenged by the rise of both psychiatry and criminology, which sought to classify 
crimes in accordance with typologies of criminal behaviour at odds with theories of 
rational choice. Medical experts began to focus on such approaches in revolutionary 
France; and it was these new discourses based on notions of irrationality and 
insanity that began to challenge classicism‟s authority in criminal courts. These new 
conceptualisations had contradictory effects in the punishment of those considered 
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dangerous to society. The liberal concept of the autonomous and rational legal 
subject based on political theory, established a barrier beyond which legal 
responsibility could not go. That is, it could not be applied to those who were not 
perceived as rational (Norrie, 2001, Foucault, 1975, 2000, 2006). As Foucault 
(2000: 182) writes: 
 
„At a time when the new psychiatry was being established, and when the 
principles of penal reform were being applied nearly everywhere in Europe 
and in North America, the great and monstrous murder, without reason, 
without preliminaries, the sudden eruption of the unnatural in nature, was 
the singular and paradoxical form taken by criminal insanity or 
pathological crime […] Nineteenth-century psychiatry invented an entirely 
fictitious entity, a crime that is insanity, a crime that is nothing but insanity, 
an insanity that is nothing but a crime‟. 
 
The relationship between law and psychiatry can only be understood in light of the 
political, social and economic and scientific background of the time. The new 
discourses discussed above did not appear in a vacuum. As we have seen in chapter 
one, what Hegel (1977) termed „the pseudo-sciences‟ of physiognomy and 
phrenology developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, criminology in the form of Lombroso‟s (1835-
1909) atavistic theories of crime and the Italian Positivist School had established 
themselves as authorities on criminal behaviour. Here the influence of the natural 
sciences, in particular Darwin‟s theory of evolution, encouraged criminologists to 
study human behaviour as biologically determined rather than through free will. 
Punishment had become scientific and was being recast as social engineering (Lilly 
et al, 1995).  
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These shifts in knowledge were accompanied also by increased rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation within the penal system. The increased power of the modern 
nation state meant that punishment was regulated and administered by central 
government agencies, which in turn lead to the growth in the scale of the penal 
infrastructure. Modernization of the penal system also led to increasing 
professionalism and standardization within the institutions of punishment. Since the 
1790‟s punishment had become increasingly rational in the eighteenth century 
meaning of that term, i.e. based on a normative social contract theory. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, the rationality of punishment had taken on a different 
meaning; here it meant that penalties be administered in a rule governed, routine 
and impassive fashion (Garland 1991). The rule governed and scientific 
administration of punishment was reflected in the development of rule governed and 
scientific explanations of crime. It is within this context that the conflict between 
psychiatrists and lawyers must be understood. 
 
It was Pinel (1745 – 1826) who first formulated a science of mental illness; 
reproducing the eighteenth century classificatory methods of general medicine. His 
methods, based on observation, were drawn from English empiricism and conflicted 
greatly, not only with the existing physiological approaches to mental illness but 
with the law as well (Castel, 1988).  In France, this struggle between classicism and 
the new science of psychiatry was to last from 1790 to 1838 when legislation was 
passed which altered the relations between the medical and the penal in a manner 
which still resonates to this day. The purpose of this legislation was the 
institutionalisation of the conditions of committal to special institutions. Committal 
by judicial warrant provided the condition for rapid confinement, it was as effective 
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as penal restraint, had equal authority, but it had an additional power in that it could 
be applied before a crime had taken place. Judicial inspection in the France of this 
period became an effective means for identifying states of potential danger (Castel, 
1975).  
 
The positivist development of classificatory schemes, explanations of criminal 
behaviour as being determined by individual pathology all lay the foundations for 
the development of a scientific penology based on therapy and the management of 
risk. 
 
„The insane person, who surfaced as a problem in the rupture caused by the 
Revolution, will at the end of the process come under the aegis of a complete 
statute for the insane. He will have become completely a medical matter, 
that is to say wholly defined as a social person and human type by the 
authority that had gained for itself a monopoly in assuming legitimate 
responsibility for him.‟ (Castel, 1988) 
 
In terms of this new legitimacy, what was significant in the rise of psychiatry as a 
profession was the authority that it sought to acquire over a particular category of 
person. This struggle took place on two fronts. On one, it was the struggle against 
the general medical profession as a whole in the development of a specialist area 
under its own professional authority (Foucault, 2006); on the other, psychiatry 
sought to claim authority over certain categories of accused before the courts, an 
authority based on their special relationship to the mad (Foucault, 1975, 2000). As 
Norrie (2001: 177) writes: 
 
„Society charged these early practitioners of psychiatry with certain control 
responsibilities in relation to the insane, and these were institutionalised 
within a legal framework […] The early psychiatrists were thus given a 
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certain measure of social legitimacy and a professional standing that they 
were keen to defend and develop. At the same time the potential for 
boundary dispute between law and psychiatry was established. Both insane 
and non-insane people could break the law, but the law would wish to 
exclude the insane from punishment on the basis of their irrationality, 
sending them as a consequence to the asylum rather than the prison. The 
psychiatrists in the asylum, on the other hand, were committed to accepting 
the insane, but expected and sought to be accorded a certain status in the 
courtroom as experts upon the nature of the problem they were uniquely 
positioned to study, and expected to contain.‟   
  
The legitimacy that society accorded psychiatry was the legitimacy of the scientific 
expert.  Like law, the legitimacy of the scientific expert is based in the rationality of 
the discipline and in the formal properties of its methods i.e. from it being carried 
out transparently, in a formally scientific manner and in accordance with its own 
internal logic; and like law does not draw its legitimating power from an association 
with morality (see Weber in (Gerth and Mills, 1948)). 
 
Earlier in this chapter we looked at procedural and substantive law and the influence 
of the economy and science on legal provisions in the twentieth century. We looked 
at the rise of the welfare state and how it influenced the transformation of formal 
law into policy oriented legal programs and how these programmes in turn 
influenced new institutional forms of organisation and human consciousness. The 
question of legitimacy was central to the development of the welfare state in relation 
to these new institutional forms and psychiatry, in particular, during the rise of the 
welfare state, enjoyed a substantial measure of legitimacy. In relation to that shift 
Norrie (2001) points out that it is important to be aware that in addition to the 
conflict between law and psychiatry, there are also important areas of compromise 
and cooperation. On a practical level, both professions participate in a relatively 
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strategic alliance and share power in circumstances where both benefit from a 
degree of legitimacy.  
 
We have seen in this chapter that in terms of legality, the creation of the 
autonomous legal subject, with universal legal rights, was important for the 
legitimation of liberal societies. The legitimating power of this form of subjectivity 
came from how it erased the particularities of class, gender, race or religion 
(Douzinas and Gearey, 2005). Legal discourses based on such a notion of 
subjectivity therefore decontextualise social actions and individualise social 
conduct. In that way, Norrie (2001: 189) notes that there is a theoretical congruence 
between law and psychiatry. 
 
„Theoretically, psychiatry, like law, decontextualises social agency, in its 
case by locating the problem of insanity in the constitution of the individual. 
Medical discourse hides the social significance of madness by betraying it in 
terms of individual mental illness‟.  
 
This individualisation also ignores the complexities of all the categories of crime 
under its remit and not only that which comes under the heading of insanity. In 
other words, many cases in which psychiatrists are involved do not involve issues of 
mental illness or insanity, but deal with the grey areas on the border of such 
categories. The relevance of this becomes clear when we „consider the ways in 
which psychiatry has operated to ameliorate, and thereby to cover up for both the 
law and society own responsibility for the mad criminal‟ (Norrie, 2001: 189). 
 
We saw above that Melossi (2008) argued that the function of power was to produce 
subjects in such a way that they perceived the social order as rational and therefore 
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legitimate, regardless of whether or not they conform to justifiable criteria of 
legitimacy. He further argued that the ultimate goal of state institutions was to 
maintain belief in their supreme rationality. In the previous section we saw how 
Habermas‟s work highlighted how ideology can fulfil the task of legitimation to the 
extent that it is both grounded „scientifically‟ and can also provide a narrative 
conducive to how that society performs economically. In Part 3 we have seen how 
the legitimacy that society accorded psychiatry was the legitimacy of the scientific 
expert. Psychiatry developed as only one of a number of scientific disciplines, 
including psychology, psychoanalysis and criminology, which have taken the 
pathological subject as the object of their study. Their significance in relation to 
legitimation, however, is not only a question of knowledge, but also one of power. 
As Bernstein (1995: 40) writes: 
 
„Science and technology extend the reach of human freedom by extending 
human possibilities for coping with the environment when applied to nature 
or to those problems of a social life which call for technological resolution; 
they come to occlude human freedom, however, when they are accepted as 
the only legitimate models for reflecting on „practical‟ questions. The 
scientization of politics is precisely the repression of those modes of 
reflection and interaction which distinguish human social intercourse from 
our intercourse with the natural world: „Technocratic consciousness reflects 
not the sundering of an ethical situation but the repression of „ethics‟ as 
such as a category of life.‟ 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter took as its focus the relationship between recognition and legitimacy, a 
relationship which in chapter one, through an analysis of Hegel, I identified as key 
to understanding how the social order responds to crime. In particular, it set out to 
address the question why is a particular social order accepted by its subjects as 
legitimate? It outlined the relationship between legality and legitimacy and 
 106 
examined the concepts of recognition, legal validity and their relation to subjectivity 
through a discussion of Hegel‟s theory of punishment.  
 
Habermas (1976)
86
, as we have seen, argues that a belief in science is based in the 
certainty that the existing social order has the competence to eliminate crisis and to 
find a „technical‟ solution to all its contradictions. The acceptance of an authority or 
social order is based as much on technical rationalisation and expertise as it is on 
the legality of its system of law. In Part two, it was argued that the two forms were 
becoming less distinct. It argued that the problem of legitimacy and the structuring 
of subjectivity extended beyond the reaches of law and of the economy to scientific 
knowledge. It is against this backdrop that the legitimacy of the scientific expert, 
whether in the forms of psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis or criminology, has 
developed.  
 
Chapter one argued that Hegel‟s work offered an account of the relationship 
between the development of social institutions and changes in individual 
subjectivity. He argued that a false perspective of the subject was to be found not 
only in the constructions of law but also in the new positivist sciences. In both cases 
the construction of subjectivity was based on the decontextualisation of social 
actions and an individualised understanding of social conduct. This, Norrie (2001) 
argues, allows both law and social sciences such as psychiatry, to erase society‟s 
responsibility towards particular crimes and social disorder. It is this particularly 
modern context that brings us back to Hegel‟s notion of misrecognition. 
 
                                                 
86
 See also Mandel (1975) 
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One group of crimes where such expertise is drawn upon is that group which lie on 
the borderline of the sane/insane category. Crimes often most frequently associated 
with this grey and indistinct border are those crimes of violence associated with a 
sexual element. Criminologists such as Simon (1998: 456) have argued that such 
crimes, at one time „the most obvious example of crime as disease,‟ have been 
retranslated in recent criminal justice discourses from having an underlying 
psychopathological basis to one where it is treated as a crime of „moral depravity‟ 
or „evil‟; categories absent from legal or medical discourses. Garland (2001: 184) 
has called this emerging criminological discourse, the „criminology of the 
dangerous other‟. Such a re-conceptualisation is significant in legal terms as such 
offenders, if they do not have a mental illness that can be treated, become ineligible 
for forms of preventive detention. This category of crime and its relation to the new 
social imaginaries of risk will be returned to in chapters four and five. The aim of 
this chapter has been to ground the emergence of the „dangerous other‟ in a 
conceptual framework concerned with the relationship between recognition and the 
legitimacy of the scientific expert. In doing so, it provides a basis for the discussion 
on the Risk Management Authority in chapter five. Before going on to look at the 
case study of this authority, in the next chapter I outline the methodological basis of 
the thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REFLEXIVITY, INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE 
 
„Behind such notions of demystification and of the “critical” stand the 
unexamined models of Freudian psycho-analysis and of a confidence in the 
power of self-consciousness and reflexivity generally to transform, modify, 
or even “cure” the ideological tendencies and positions which have thereby 
been brought up into the light of consciousness. This confidence is at the 
least unseasonable in an atmosphere where nobody believes in the active 
capabilities of individual consciousness any more, and where the very 
ideologues of “critical theory”- the Frankfurt School – have left behind 
them, in works like Negative Dialectics, testaments of despair about the 
possibility for „critical theory‟ in our time to do any more than to keep the 
negative and the critical (that is, critical theory itself) alive in the mind. 
(Jameson, 2007: 133) 
 
Introduction 
In the introduction to the thesis, it was stated that this work is influenced by Hegel 
on two levels, the theoretical and the methodological. While chapter one and two 
discussed the theoretical influence of Hegel; chapter three will discuss the 
methodological. It asks what methods are appropriate for the general approach 
outlined earlier in chapter one and two and outlines the two methodological strands 
of the thesis: 
 
1. Meta-critique87 – the critique of reason – is a self-reflexive principle and its 
importance for us as a method lies in its ability to submit our relationship to 
rationality to critique
88
. 
                                                 
87
 The term meta-critique (Metakritik) was first coined by Johann George Hamann (1730-88) (see 
Beiser, 1987: 9) „Hamann attacked the main premise behind Kant‟s belief in the autonomy of 
reason‟, he opposed the reification „of reason through its abstraction from language, culture and 
experience‟. He stressed the social and historical dimension of reason and argued that the instrument 
and criterion of reason is language. His critique of Kant was developed most fully by Hegel. 
 109 
 
2. A socio-historical account of the emergence of the Risk Management 
Authority set up under recommendation of the MacLean Committee in 2000 
reconstructed through discourse analysis of a range of policy documents 
from the mid 1990‟s to 2000s. The discourse analysis is developed in 
chapters five. 
 
The chapter falls into two parts. Part I elucidates the theoretical background to the 
metacritique outlined above. As a means of critiquing the new discourses of 
modernity that were briefly outlined in chapter one and which will be explored in 
chapter four, the metaphor used to ground the meta-critique is that of 
psychoanalysis. What the metaphor of psychoanalysis allows for here is to view 
history as a narrative category. The model of the case study has been drawn from 
the concept casus of André Jolles‟ (1930) who developed the model as a means of 
explaining  historical trends by means of a representative-image or narrative (Frow, 
2003). Part II discusses the research design for the thesis and the methods used: 
discourse analysis. It also outlines how the case study relates to the themes 
developed in the earlier chapters on risk, recognition and legitimacy.  
 
I 
 
Part one of this chapter examines the beginning stages of an intellectual inquiry. It 
outlines issues concerning epistemology and reflexivity in relation to particular 
                                                                                                                                         
88
 The critique of reason was instigated by Kant as an investigation into the condition and limitation 
of human knowledge. Kant attempted to elucidate a third category of scientific knowledge that was 
differentiated from either empirical or analytical statements; the two categories of knowledge 
asserted by Hume as the basis of scientific judgement (Körner, 1955). 
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scientific traditions. Through this discussion of reflexivity the chapter introduces 
two meanings of critique, the first referring to the conditions of possible knowledge 
and the second referring to an investigation of a system of humanly produced 
constraints. The latter definition relates to the Hegelian approach which „interprets‟ 
the individual person or institution, by viewing them as a manifestation or as a 
document of a developing social totality. „Interpretation‟ within this tradition 
understands meaning as having historical and social presuppositions that are 
beyond, yet cannot be separated from, individual human interaction. Such an 
approach provides a socio-historical framework that acknowledges the 
embeddedness of subjectivity in social institutions and places institutional 
development within the particular historical settings from which they emerge. Part 
one introduces Critical Theory as a form of immanent critique and discusses the 
applicability of psychoanalysis as a model for such a critique.  
 
Epistemological Beginnings 
The central and formative question behind Edward Said‟s book Beginnings: 
Intention and Method, is, what is a beginning? In this work, Said (1995) draws 
together a wide range of theoretical and methodological problems which originate at 
the beginning of an intellectual project. These problems, questions and conditions 
that are often easily ignored or taken for granted at the start of a scholarly 
investigation or enquiry were felt by him to be of tremendous importance both 
practically and theoretically. They related to questions of epistemology and personal 
reflexivity and touched on complex issues of history, place, and the degrees of 
autonomy and constraint related to an intellectual endeavour. At the heart of Said‟s 
discussion of beginnings and the nature of individual reflexivity is the relation of an 
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author to a particular discipline and historical tradition. As individual subjects we 
never confront a body of work immediately and free from preconceptions. The 
works that embody any intellectual discipline exist within inherited institutional 
traditions and are therefore apprehended only through the accumulated layers of 
previous interpretations and methodological habits developed by these traditions. In 
relation to a work of social theory, the idea of embeddedness within an inherited 
tradition of thought would suggest an approach in which our object of study is less 
the world itself than the interpretations through which we attempt to engage with 
and understand it (Jameson, 1989: 9). It is this reflexive engagement with the 
concepts of our own understanding that the term meta-critique refers to. 
 
The problem of beginning for Said was not only a matter of scientific method but 
also one of self-definition: where one begins will also mark a point of departure. 
The choice of where to begin therefore not only determines to some extent what will 
follow in a piece of work, but immediately establishes relationships – both of 
continuity or antagonism - with works already in existence. These relationships are 
not entirely related to the free or individual choice of the researcher. In this sense, 
the researcher‟s epistemological standpoint is produced by the tradition s/he works 
within rather than the result of individual reflexivity. It may be because of this that 
the relationships of antagonism, that make themselves felt as contradictions or 
antinomies within the research process are less theorised within the discipline than 
those aspects of continuity and tradition. This relates also to consideration of 
methods; the development of social scientific method is intimately bound up with 
specific epistemological understandings of the social world and reflects also these 
antagonisms and continuity of tradition. In terms of continuity, this chapter will deal 
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firstly with the methodological influence of Hegel and the Frankfurt School on the 
thesis and will outline its genealogy within social theory before going on to 
introduce psychoanalysis as a model for immanent critique. 
 
Two Meanings of Critique 
The distinction between the two meanings of critique was alluded to in chapter one 
in the discussion of Hegel‟s critique of empiricism and the problems in attempting 
to define social institutions from their empirical characteristics alone. Hegel 
opposed making an objectivised (non-historical) reality the starting point of 
scientific endeavour. Such an approach, Hegel argued, failed to teach us anything 
about the nature of institutions. His theory of social institutions began from the 
present tendencies of the social process itself. Although Kant was not included by 
Hegel as an empiricist, it is the work of both authors that provides social science 
with its two meanings of critique. 
 
In 1787, Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason attempted to set out the range of 
subjective conditions that made natural science possible and to trace the limitations 
of human knowledge. Two key aspects of Kant‟s project concerned the way 
concepts relate to objects and with the demonstration of „objective validity‟. 
Critique here refers then to the conditions of possible knowledge (Connerton, 1976). 
Rose (1981) argues that within sociology the thought of both Durkheim and Weber, 
in spite of their major differences, rests on this Kantian framework. In other words, 
both Durkheim and Weber‟s sociology89 are based on a transcendental account that 
                                                 
89
 Both Durkheim and Weber were educated and worked within neo-Kantian circles. Weber‟s 
connections with the Heidelberg neo-Kantians especially Rickert, are well known (Radkau, 2009). 
Durkheim was closely associated with the leading French representatives of German neo-Kantianism 
and was taught by Emile Boutriox at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, 1879-1882. Many of the 
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„presupposes the actuality or existence of its object and seeks to discover the 
conditions of its possibility‟ (Rose, 1981: 1). It is this framework, according to 
Rose, that allows the very notion of sociology as a science as well as reproduces 
sociology‟s central antinomy: the artificial distinction between the individual and 
society. 
 
However the term „critique‟ also has a second meaning; this second meaning has its 
root in Hegel and refers to an investigation of a system of humanly produced 
constraints. These constraints are distorting pressures which subjects submit to in 
the process of self-formation. Connerton (1976) refers to the first type of critique as 
„reconstruction‟ and to the second type of critique as „criticism‟. He outlines three 
important differences between criticism and reconstruction: 
 
Fig2: Critique and Reconstruction 
Critique 1 (Reconstruction) Critique 2 (Criticism) 
Undertakes to understand anonymous 
systems of rules which can be followed by 
any subject, provided s/he has the requisite 
competences. 
Critique focuses on the historically 
particular, it examines the shaping of an 
individual‟s identity or the identity of a 
group (entails the explicit reference to a 
subject). 
 
Is based on data which are considered to be 
objective. 
„Objectivity‟ is called into question; 
criticism supposes that there is a degree of 
inbuilt deformity in the social world which 
masquerades as reality. 
 
Clarifies what is considered to be „correct‟ 
knowledge; the knowledge we must acquire 
if we are to operate rules competently. Aims 
to broaden the range and sophistication of 
theoretical knowledge.  
 
Criticism initiates a process of self reflection 
on the domination of past constraints. Aims 
to reveal false or distorted conscience. 
Critique entails a concept of emancipation. 
                                                                                                                                         
subsequent radical challenges to the sociology of Durkheim and Weber were motivated by the desire 
to break out of the constrictions of the neo- Kantian paradigm. Both Phenomenology and the work of 
the Frankfurt School can be viewed in this light (Rose, 1981). 
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Hegel‟s notion of „Ethical life‟ portrays two important aspects of his 
conceptualisation of critique: the first is the historical aspect of knowledge; the 
second is an implicit theory of human inter-subjectivity. Hegel‟s critique of reason 
is a critique of Kant‟s sovereign rational subject and its relationship to its object - 
autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent. Hegel‟s epistemology did not 
presuppose the actuality of its object (society) and therefore of the autonomous 
subject. For Hegel subjectivity, as we saw in chapter one, was social as well as 
individual. Hegel therefore opposed the Kantian subject/object split and argued that 
scientific knowledge should not accept uncritically external appearances, instead it 
should derive its knowledge from the inner rationale and inherent relationships and 
contradictions which hold society together (Avineri, 1974). This does not mean, 
however, that society can only exist in thought; scientific knowledge is not divorced 
from the world but seeks reason in actuality. In other words, human rationality is 
external to the individual and its history is formed by the constraints imposed by 
each of its successive historical forms. Hegel countered the limitations of an 
empiricist approach by arguing that scientific knowledge is historical: rationality 
itself was a historical category. This „impure‟ reason with its unavoidable 
entanglement in history, tradition, society and power is the opposite of Kant‟s 
framework, (Rose, 1981).  
 
„Ethical Life‟ encapsulates this historical aspect of reason and relates it to human 
subjectivity by showing how it is produced through institutionalised interaction. 
Subjects of knowledge are embodied and practically engaged with the world yet 
their self-formation as subjects is constrained by their relationship to inherited 
institutional traditions and the interpretations of the world associated with them. 
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Critique, as Hegel understood it, aimed to uncover these false or distorted products 
of historical reason. Critique in this sense entails a concept of emancipation 
(Connerton, 1976). The uncovering of distorted products of historical reason 
requires an understanding of reflexivity which is historical. The remaining sections 
of part one will outline the various meanings of reflexivity in the social science and 
argue the case for psychoanalysis as a model for immanent critique. 
 
Reflexivity and the Limitations of the Interpretative Act.  
The most common definition of reflexivity
90
 is drawn from interpretative and 
feminist sociology and refers to the ability of a researcher to be aware of his or her 
own contribution and that of the researched, to the construction of meanings within 
the research process; of how their values and beliefs influence and shape the 
research process (see Oakley, 1998; Hammersley, 1992). This definition was 
influenced by Weber, who, as we have seen, drew from the Kantian framework. The 
emphasis in this definition is on individual action as the basic unit of sociological 
interpretation. 
 
Interpretative sociology considers the individual (Einzelindividuum) and his 
action as the basic unit……...  In this approach, the individual is also the 
upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful conduct… In general, for 
sociology, such concepts as „state,‟ „association,‟ „feudalism,‟ and the like, 
designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence it is the task of 
sociology to reduce these concepts to „understandable‟ action, that is, 
without exception, to the actions of participating individual men. (Weber, in 
Gerth and Mills, 1948: 10) 
 
                                                 
90
 Despite an increasing reference to the term „reflexivity‟ in the literature of contemporary social 
science, many social scientists argue that there is a problem concerning a general explanation of what 
„reflexivity‟ actually means. As Wacquant has outlined with regards to competing claims to 
„reflexivity‟, „the label is vague to the point of near vacuity‟ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1996:36).  
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However, the interpretative definition of reflexivity is problematic as such an 
approach does not acknowledge the influence of the broader social structure and 
tends to translate institutional structure into a collection of individualised actions 
oriented to subjectively-meaningful ends. In other words, social reality is produced 
by actors and no determining influence outside of that reality is recognized (Rose 
1981). 
 
The subjective emphasis of interpretative approaches is blind to the structural 
determinants of human behaviour and reproduces an illusion of free and 
unconstrained action. By making meaning their principal concern such approaches 
reproduce an illusion of individual subjectivity, an unconditioned ego which 
„determines‟ its own boundaries and thereby denies its own relation to reality (Rose, 
1981).  
 
It is commonly assumed that experience of and familiarity with the area of research 
is beneficial when researching particular aspects of the social world (Terdiman, 
1987) and that the problems and matters of relevance relating to a particular field 
should be more accessible the greater the level of awareness and empathy the 
researcher has of it. This point of view - still based on the separation of the observer 
from the object of enquiry - over-states the conscious agency of the researcher. 
Drawing from the second notion of critique, it could be argued that the closer 
proximity to the everyday culture and experiences of the object of study, the more 
opaque may be the real problems. Living or working so closely to the field might 
mean that the professional assumptions and the „common sense‟ knowledge of the 
field remain unquestioned. In other words, it ignores the reflexive institutional 
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shaping of an individual researcher‟s identity within the research process91. The 
suppression of structure results in interpretations which not only affirm the 
dominant social representations and discourses but makes it impossible to recognize 
the actual relations which determine these representations (see Rose, 1981). 
 
An opposite problem is found in structural approaches based on the Kantian 
framework. These approaches impose abstract principles on social reality and 
sanction the dominant by resolving social contradictions within their classificatory 
systems. The individual is presented within these systems, if at all, as merely the 
opposite pole of an abstract determining force. The categories of functionalism, 
systems theory and structuralism are presented as independent of and prior to 
subjective meanings and actions (see Bernstein, 1979).  
 
The emphasis within sociology of a Kantian framework stands opposed to the role 
of philosophical understanding derived from the work of Hegel. This chapter argues 
that it is the latter approach that offers to rectify the one-sidedness of individualised 
reflexivity. This approach „interprets‟ the individual person or institution, by 
viewing them as a manifestation or as a document of a developing social totality. 
„Interpretation‟ within this tradition92 means understanding the relationship of the 
comprehensive whole to its parts. In so doing, it attempts to include the historical 
and cultural contexts within its analysis by contending that the apprehension of 
meaning itself has historical and social presuppositions that are beyond, yet cannot 
be separated from, individual human interaction. As we have seen, individual 
                                                 
91
 Reflexivity for Hegel as well as the Frankfurt school was regarded as an aspect of domination as 
well as a means to emancipation (see Hegel (1977) and Žižek (2000) . 
92
 In sociology the most significant figures in this tradition include Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt 
school. 
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subjects in no way simply create or merely belong to history and culture; history 
and culture are processes in which individual subjects are irretrievably caught
93
. It is 
this latter approach that offers a promise of historical reflexivity
94
, in that it provides 
a framework that acknowledges the embeddedness of subjectivity in social 
institutions and places institutional development within the particular historical 
settings from which they emerge.  
 
Reflexivity, Language and Doxa 
We saw in chapter one that Hegel‟s concept of „Ethical Life‟ was based on an 
understanding of rationality being embodied in social institutions. He showed that 
subjects of knowledge were embodied and practically engaged with the world 
through institutionalised interaction. This aspect of Hegel‟s work was retained in 
the twentieth century when philosophy moved away from concerns with human 
consciousness to language. For Hegel, language was the medium of human 
subjectivity in the world. The symbolic world pre-exists us and because of this our 
conceptual horizons are determined by the habitual manners and consciousness of a 
second nature. Within the form of language itself there is a constraining pressure to 
frame thought within a dominant structure of meaning. The framing and 
communication of thought takes place within definite limits. In this way the Kantian 
model and its focus on „correct‟ knowledge, the knowledge we must acquire if we 
are to operate rules competently, can also be critical in its focus on the limitations of 
language and can lead to a greater sophistication of our theoretical knowledge 
(Connerton, 1976). This critical Kantianism can be found in the work of both 
                                                 
93
 See Rose (1998) for a discussion of Freud‟s similar perspective on the coercive aspects of culture. 
94
 Hegel famous formulation of historical reflexivity was the recognition of „reason as the rose in the 
cross of the present‟ (Hegel, 1976: 12). 
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Habermas
95
 and Bourdieu. Bourdieu outlines the reflexive function of theory in 
exposing ideology or „doxa‟. He warns of a double bind within which every 
sociologist is inescapably caught by the fact that the tools or methods bequeathed by 
sociology, „the official trappings of scientific discourse‟ (Bourdieu, 1996:248), may 
lead the researcher in merely replacing lay common sense with sociological 
common sense.  
 
„Thence the peculiar antinomy of the pedagogy of research: it must transmit 
both tested instruments of construction of reality (problematics, concepts, 
techniques, methods) and a formidable critical disposition, an inclination to 
question ruthlessly those instruments‟ (Bourdieu, 1996:249) 
 
For Bourdieu, to be reflexive is not only to guard against those forms of thought 
outside of science, the metaphysical questions which Kant wanted to delineate; but 
also to guard oneself against the dominant „truths‟ laid down by science itself. 
Reflexivity is the critical reflection on what Bourdieu would designate as two forms 
of societal misrecognition; the naturalisation of arbitrariness (common sense) which 
he terms doxa, and those dominant scientific „truths‟ that he terms orthodoxy96. This 
critical disposition to question both common sense and also the instruments of 
science itself is what Bourdieu regards as „reflexivity‟.  
 
 
                                                 
95
 The importance of both Hegel and Kant to Habermas‟ discourse ethics and his intellectual project 
as a whole is outlined in the following passage: Hegel‟s „concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is an 
implicit criticism of two kinds of one-sidedness, one the mirror image of the other. Hegel opposes 
the abstract universality of justice manifesting itself in the individualist approaches of the modern 
age, in rational natural right theory and in Kantian moral philosophy. No less vigorous is his 
opposition to the concrete particularism of the common good that pervades Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas. The ethics of discourse picks up this basic Hegelian aspiration to redeem it with Kantian 
means‟ (Habermas, 1990: 201). In other words, Habermas seeks to reformulate Kantian ethics by 
„grounding moral norms in communication‟ (Habermas, 1990: 195).  
96
 Orthodoxy differs from doxa in that it implies the possibility of different or antagonistic points of 
view but suppresses them through the representation of scientific authority (Bourdieu, 1977). 
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Reflexivity and Immanent Critique 
As shown above, Hegel‟s development of critique sought to oppose making reality 
into a criterion but rather to „produce‟ a conceptual framework that allows us to 
grasp its complexity as a whole. This form of critique, where the rational potential 
of institutions was compared to distortions in actuality was developed further by the 
Frankfurt School. Horkheimer argued in his programme of research that the only 
means we have of grounding critique was immanently.  
 
„relating social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set 
forth as their standards and ideals…. If subjected to such an analysis, the 
social agencies most representative of the present pattern of society will 
disclose a pervasive discrepancy between what they actually are and the 
values they accept‟ (Horkheimer  1978: 265) 
 
Horkheimer argued that traditional theory did not recognise its own historical 
context. It was cut off (pure) from the social processes of production. Like Bourdieu 
later, Horkheimer argued that modern science was unreflexive (unconscious of its 
own constitutive context). Horkheimer attempts to explain the self-
misunderstanding of traditional theory in terms of an interpretative framework, 
derived from Hegel‟s critical philosophy. Critical theory, or immanent critique, 
views criticism as a reflective form of rationality that is inseparable from the 
historical process itself. However, as Honneth (1993) argued, there was a 
sociological deficit at the heart of Horkheimer‟s programme. Critical Theory 
„formulated in this way, lacked a „critique of everyday life‟; a theory that can 
interpret social action. Although both Hegel‟s and Marx‟s critical theory 
incorporated an institutional framework of society and contained an implicit 
conception of symbolic interaction, they were still too narrowly defined to meet the 
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criterion of a critical social science
97
. To address this deficit the Frankfurt School 
turned to psycho-analysis
98
. 
 
Psychoanalysis as Method 
The Hegelian interpretation of critique suggests that interpretation and explanation 
of historical constructs require concepts specifically developed for that purpose. The 
understanding of subjects of knowledge as embodied and constrained by their 
relationship to inherited or distorted products of historical reason was developed 
and further elaborated by concepts developed from a new procedure of critical 
reflection during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: psychoanalysis. 
Critique is here grounded in the experience of a release from hidden sources of 
repression by means of critical insight in relation to past experience.  
 
Habermas (1971) underlines these inherited constraints when, as discussed in 
chapter two, he shows how the definite and acceptable limits within which social 
communications are framed are internalised and established in the interior of 
subjects themselves.  For Habermas the grammar of ordinary language governs not 
only the understanding and interpretation of symbols but also the knitting together 
of language and interaction. In most cases he argues, there is a „fit‟, however 
imperfect, between linguistic elements and social interaction in the lifeworld. In 
some cases however, a language game can disintegrate to the point where there is no 
                                                 
97
 A „critical‟ social science was one that was both negative (see chapter one) and that relied on the 
„possibility of viewing history with reason as its guiding thread‟ (Honneth, 2009: 20) 
98
 As outlined in chapter one Hegel‟s influence on psycho-analysis was profound and as such the 
Frankfurt School‟s attempt to combine Freud with Marx is not so strange as it would first appear. For 
Hegel, who influenced both authors, there was an appreciation that at the most elementary forms of 
human life there is a non-reflexive absorption in a closed social order (see discussion in chapter one 
on second nature). In other words, human beings are not fully transparent to themselves. 
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agreement between the demands of these two elements. When this happens the 
ability of an individual to maintain mutual understanding with his or her role or 
community is not restricted directly, but indirectly, through the intrusion of 
symptoms; that is the appearance of a mutilation or distortion within „the text of 
everyday habitual language games‟ (Habermas, 1971: 238). 
 
These symptoms which appear within communication as distortions do not 
necessarily produce incomprehension. For Habermas (1976) incomprehensibility 
results from the incoherent organisation of speech itself. A clear example that he 
gives of this is the pathological speech disturbances recounted by Freud in his 
observation of psychotic patients. However, the more significant examples of 
systematically distorted communication are those which are found in speech which 
is not noticeably pathological. This is what we come across in the instance of 
pseudo-communication, where the speakers are not aware of any communicative 
disturbance. According to Habermas (1971:226) the systematically distorted 
communication that is inherent in habitual everyday language games are „ignored 
and glossed over, rationalised through secondary elaboration‟ and on the whole, 
perceived as natural
99
.  
 
The problem that we are faced with then is how do we recognise or identify these 
distortions. As „long as we communicate in a natural language there is a sense in 
which we can never be neutral observers, simply because we are always 
participants‟ (Habermas, 1976: 348). In other words, if communication can only 
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 See Adorno (1973:262) „What everybody takes to be intelligible is in fact not intelligible at all […] 
the uncanny is uncanny only because it is secretly all too familiar, which is why it is repressed‟ 
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take place through language then how can we stand apart from that language and 
interpret it from outside the cultural constraints from which it develops?  
 
The relationship an historian has to the past allows a certain detachment with regard 
to the understanding of the development of social practices. However, the problem 
we face in this work is: what method will allow a similar detachment with regards 
to the present? Habermas‟ answer was to look to psychoanalysis and to reinterpret 
its critical dimension as a means for uncovering communicative distortion in 
everyday language games. The resort to psychoanalysis as a means of interpreting 
the present, however, raises another set of problems and questions. How legitimate 
is it to apply the concepts developed from therapeutic work with individual subjects 
to society and its institutions? I will attempt to answer this by drawing on the 
concepts of „second nature‟ and the „embodied subject‟ outlined in chapter one, and 
explore the relationship of language to social structure and the applicability of 
psychoanalytic categories to social phenomena.  
 
The Subject and Second Nature 
In chapters one and two we saw that changes in intersubjectivity were related to 
underlying historical developments. We saw how the conception of „ethical life‟ 
was based on Hegel‟s insight that subjectivity referred not only to an individual 
human mind, but also to its social character. This social character of thought was 
defined by Hegel, and later on by the Frankfurt School, as second nature, a mode of 
thinking that homogenised the social world and made what was different appear the 
same. Second nature was an important concept for both Hegel and the Frankfurt 
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school in understanding social pathology and indeterminacy in relation to the 
human subject.  
 
The Frankfurt School, drawing from Hegel‟s critical philosophy, argued that the 
constraints of our thought were not related primarily to the internal limits or 
pathology of the individual but were determined by the limits of the self-
understanding (reflection) of society and its institutions. The distortions reflected in 
language represent the unconscious processes of social forms (Habermas, 1971) not 
the pathologies of individuals. The concept of second nature as developed by the 
Frankfurt School is therefore a useful concept to explore both the relationship of 
language to social structure and the applicability of psychoanalytic categories to 
social phenomena.  
 
Psychoanalysis as a Model for Interpretation 
Originally the Frankfurt School developed the notion of second nature as a concept 
which attempted both to resolve the problem of biological determinism in Freudian 
psychoanalysis – in other words to argue that the unconscious was social as well as 
individual - and to defend Freud‟s original insights against the neo-Freudian 
revisionists.
100
 It was conceived as a way to historicise the unconscious (Adorno, 
1967/68, Marcuse, 1998) and to avoid what they considered as an overly simplistic 
confidence found in the work of Reich, Adler and Fromm, in the capacity of human 
beings to change. 
 
                                                 
100
 For a detailed discussion see the Epilogue from Marcuse (1998) 
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Although Reich, Adler and Fromm attempted to historicise Freudian psychoanalysis 
by emphasising the influence of society on the individual, their emphasis on the 
„total personality‟ and its unproblematic integration within that society was 
considered to be no more than ideology by the Frankfurt school. For the latter, the 
„individual, before it can determine itself, is determined by the relations in which it 
is enmeshed‟ (Jacoby, 1977: 34). 
„While they [the neo-Freudians] unceasingly talk of the influence of society 
on the individual, they forget that not only the individual, but the category of 
individuality is a product of society. Instead of first extracting the individual 
from the social process so as then to describe the influence which forms it, 
an analytic psychology is to reveal in the innermost mechanism of the 
individual the decisive social forces.‟101 (Adorno, cited in Jacoby, 1977: 34) 
 
So, in stark contrast to the neo-Freudians who saw society (history) as external to 
the individual, as something outside which influenced individual behaviour; the 
Frankfurt School saw the category of individuality as itself being a product of 
society. As argued earlier in the chapter: it is not possible to adopt an external 
viewpoint, i.e. a viewpoint outwith history or language. In second nature, history 
and nature are one: there can be no philosophical „first‟ or fundamental ground, in 
mind or in nature, to which we can refer to for authority (Bernstein, 2004). 
Consequently, for the Frankfurt School, psychoanalysis was primarily a means of 
discovering the historical dynamics of society within the individual
102
. Although the 
Frankfurt school could not accept Freud‟s biological materialism as it stood, they 
argued that „his apparent disregard of social values‟, that is his „biologism‟, took his 
theories beyond ideology (Jacoby, 1977:29). That the factors that define the 
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 Adorno drew also on Durkheim‟s notion of the constraining nature of social facts in his 
understanding of second nature. Society faces the individual as a coercive force (see Rose 1978). 
102
 Foucault argues  that we do not have access to the present or the immediate, except through what 
he terms archaeology, a mode of historical and epistemological inquiry concerned with the 
emergence and transformation of discursive formations, i.e. it is only through „frozen‟ language that 
we can access the present. 
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individual may appear purely biological in origin (first/pure nature) represented an 
important critical insight. 
Freud‟s basic „biologistic‟ concepts reach beyond the ideology and its 
reflexes: his refusal to treat reified society as a „developing network of 
interpersonal experiences and behaviour‟ and an alienated individual as a 
„total personality‟ corresponds to the reality and contains its true notion. 
(Marcuse, 1998:254) 
 
The insight that the Frankfurt School drew from Freud‟s „biologistic‟ concepts was 
that what appeared as „biology‟ was in fact history congealed within the subject as 
second nature. „It is a history so long unliberated – history so long monotonously 
oppressive – that it congeals. Second nature is not simply nature or history; but 
frozen history that surfaces as nature‟ (Jacoby, 1977: 31). Psychoanalysis, by 
viewing history as a narrative category – a „charnel-house of long-dead interiorities‟ 
– allows a conceptualisation of the historically particular as it relates to the shaping 
of an individual‟s identity or the identity of a group. It provides an historical 
approach, based on a model of self-reflection, on the sedimented cultural and social 
forms of the present.  
 
„History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to 
individual as well as collective praxis, which its „ruses‟ turn into grisly and 
ironic reversals of their overt intention.‟ (Jameson, 1986). 
 
As mentioned above, the Frankfurt School drew on psychoanalysis as a means to 
overcome the sociological deficit at the heart of Horkheimer‟s original programme 
and to formulate a theory of intersubjectivity that would allow them to interpret 
social action in light of what they saw as the repressive constraints of modernity 
(see Marcuse, 2002). The Frankfurt school argued that psychoanalysis should not be 
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limited only to individual psychology and therapeutic treatment
103
, but should be 
considered as an historicised mode of thought more tightly bound to the social than 
the critics of Freud had originally thought.
104
 Žižek (1994) elaborates further: it is 
not only that the focus of psychoanalysis should reside in the social, it is that the 
field of socially held beliefs and social practices is something which the individual 
is forced to relate to yet experience as an objectified and external order. It is not a 
question of two separate levels, the individual and the social, but how the external 
and impersonal socio-symbolic order of institutional practices and beliefs are 
structured if the subject is to maintain their normal functioning. The model of 
psychoanalysis developed by the Frankfurt school therefore attempted to overcome 
what Rose (1981) called the artificial distinction between the individual and society. 
 
So far, then, this section has argued that for the Frankfurt School psychoanalysis 
provides an historical model to understand the cultural and social forms of the 
present. The Frankfurt School were attracted to this model,in part, because its access 
to such cultural forms was through contradiction. A central idea at the heart of 
critical theory is that contradiction can be used as an index of theoretical truth. The 
importance of psychoanalysis for them was that it exposed such contradictions 
rather than repressed them. The following section provides an account of this 
interpretive focus on contradiction. 
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 Both Adorno (1967) and Marcuse (1998) were critical of psycho-analysis as a therapeutic 
treatment as it sought to locate what were social pathologies within the individual psyche. It was this 
issue over psycho-analysis as a therapy that lead to their split with Fromm (see Jacoby, 1975) 
104
 see LaCapra (1994) for a similar argument on the relationship between history and psychoanalysis 
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Contradiction as an Index of Theoretical Truth 
„No concept in which a whole process is summarised semiotically can be 
defined; only that which has no history is definable‟ Nietzsche (cited in 
Adorno, 2002: 29) 
 
As mentioned above, at the heart of critical theory is the notion that contradiction 
can be used as an index of theoretical truth. Social theory should not aim at 
resolving or abolishing contradiction by way of conceptual clarification, but 
alternatively, be conceived as an immediate index of an antagonism that pertains to 
social reality itself. The importance of Freud for the Frankfurt school was that he 
exposed such contradictions and rejected a pretended harmony where the thing itself 
was contradictory.  
 
In their arguments with the revisionists, the early Frankfurt School drew heavily on 
Freud‟s theory but considered psychoanalytic treatment itself to be no more than a 
technique of social adaptation.  For Adorno and Marcuse, what the revisionists 
might consider as therapeutic „success‟ meant no more than the normalisation of the 
patient and her adaptation to the „normal‟ functioning of existing society. For them, 
the therapeutic role of psychoanalysis inhibited its potential as a critique of 
civilization.  
 
The social hermeneutics developed from the Frankfurt School model of 
psychoanalysis, i.e. the interpretation of a social and historical unconscious, reveals 
the ideological deceptiveness of all hermeneutics that limits interpretation to the 
conscious intention of the original author/speaker and ignores the errors and 
distortions of the interpreted text or language game. „What hermeneutics cannot 
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admit is that it is not sufficient to repair the mutilations and restore the „original‟ 
text to its integrity, since mutilations have meaning as such‟ (Žižek, 1994: 23). 
 
This section of the chapter has outlined the methodological aspects of the thesis that 
were influenced by Hegel, in particular the notion of meta-critique. It has discussed 
issues of epistemology and personal reflexivity in relationship to aspects of 
continuity and antagonism with existing institutional disciplines and historical 
tradition, and, in so doing, it has outlined two meanings of critique within social 
science, one drawn from Kant, concerned with the way concepts relate to objects 
and with the demonstration of „objective validity‟, and the second, the historical 
critique drawn from Hegel. Via a discussion of the history of these two forms of 
critique the chapter has proposed a model of interpretation based on psychoanalysis. 
This model, originally intended by the Frankfurt School as a means to overcome the 
sociological deficit at the heart of their original programme, differs from the model 
developed by individual psychology and therapeutic treatment. This historicised 
model developed by the Frankfurt school attempted to overcome the distinction 
between the individual and society. What this model provides the thesis with is a 
metaphor that allows us to question not only policy responses that appears on the 
surface to be coherent and ordered, but also the theoretical or conceptual 
frameworks that facilitate such surface appearances and deny the possibility of a 
repressed history in the first place. In doing so, the Risk Management Authority is 
positioned as, to extend the psychoanalytical metaphor, a symptom of broader social 
and cultural shifts. Part two of this chapter, outlines the case study approach which 
will enable us to 'read' the emergence of the RMA in a way which recognises this 
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embedding in broader socio-historical context and, which will allow us bring to the 
surface its repressed history. 
 
II 
 
This chapter began with the problem of beginning a work of social inquiry. It 
related the notion of beginning to a range of theoretical and methodological 
problems which, in their turn, link to questions of epistemology and reflexivity. It 
raised issues of tradition, history, and the constraints of language and followed on 
from chapters one and two in the development of the idea of the embeddedness of 
human subjectivity in social institutions. It also attempted to outline an appropriate 
model, in this case the Frankfurt‟s school‟s particular understanding of 
psychoanalysis, which could address such an epistemological viewpoint in social 
research. In line with the themes of inherited traditions of thought outlined in the 
previous two chapters, it was argued that the object of this study was less the world 
itself, than the interpretations through which we comprehend it. It was this reflexive 
engagement with the concepts of our own understanding that the term meta-critique 
referred to. Part one of this chapter therefore was concerned with outlining the 
problem of meta-critique, part two, outlined below, is a discussion of the research 
design. 
 
The Case Study 
Bryman (2007) argues that a case study is not a method but a structure that guides 
the execution of a research method. It is a means for a researcher to explore a 
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specific case as the focus of interest in its own right. Yin (1994:13) provides a 
further definition of a case study as „an empirical inquiry that: 
 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident‟ 
 
What is central here in the choice of a case study as a research design is its focus on 
contextual conditions. Yin (1994) also argues that a case study enquiry benefits 
from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis
105
. In this sense, the case study as developed within social scientific 
research is not merely a means of data collection but an all-embracing research 
strategy (Yin, 1994). 
 
The case study approach was chosen in this case therefore because the empirical 
focus of the thesis is on the contextual conditions of the emergence of a specific 
institution where the boundaries between the institution and its social context are 
not clearly evident. This choice of research design therefore reflects the priority 
given in this research project to the following dimensions: 
 
 Understanding the meaning of the emergence of a particular institutional 
form at a particular social and historical context. 
 To elucidate the conditions for the possibility of this emergence  
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 However as we will see later, this theoretical aspect of case studies relates more to the 
development and testing of middle range theories as opposed to broader social theoretical 
considerations. 
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Reliability and Validity: 
Bryman (2007) and Yin (1994) both raise the issues of reliability and validity in 
relation to case study research. They ask how the case study addresses questions 
related to design criteria such as: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability. These issues depend however on how far these are 
appropriate concepts for the evaluation of each particular case study research. The 
appropriateness of such concepts relates to the broader epistemological and 
ontological questions discussed earlier in this chapter.  
 
construct validity – relates to subjective judgements in the selection of data. As a 
means of increasing construct validity Yin (1994) argues that multiple sources of 
evidence can be drawn from to encourage convergent lines of enquiry. 
internal validity – this relates only to case studies that attempt to provide a causal 
explanation to a particular event. 
external validity - standard criticisms of the case study is that findings deriving from 
it cannot be generalised. Therefore many discussions on case study design have 
focussed on concerns of external validity or generalizability of case study research. 
Bryman (2007) argues that it is not the purpose of a case study to generalise to other 
cases or to populations beyond the specific case in question. 
reliability – case study research also has met criticism regarding reliability of the 
findings, again this is related to the specific or singular nature of the case in 
question. Questions of reliability however relate also to the case study‟s relation to 
theory. As mentioned above a case study enquiry benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis, 
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however the above issues on reliability and validity depend on a particular 
naturalistic construction of sociological theory (see Bernstein 1976). Bryman (2007) 
argues that it is entirely legitimate to choose a case study design in order to generate 
a theoretical analysis. The critical question is not whether the research findings can 
be generalised but how well the findings generate theory
106
. 
 
Types of Case 
 
Yin (2003) distinguishes five different types of case study: 
 
 The longitudinal case – a case may be chosen because it affords the 
opportunity to be investigated at two or more junctures. 
 
 The revelatory case. The basis for the revelatory case exists when an 
investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon 
previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. 
 
 The critical case-. Here the researcher has a well developed theory, and the 
case is chosen on the grounds that it will allow a better understanding of the 
circumstances in which the hypothesis will and will not hold.  
 
 The extreme or unique case. Here the case holds an intrinsic interest that 
makes it essentially unique. 
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 See also Giddens‟ (1984) critique of Merton 
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 The representative or typical case. Bryman (2007) calls this the exemplifying 
case. This form of case study attempts to capture the contextual background 
of an everyday or commonplace set of circumstances. This form of a case 
study may be chosen because it is seen to exemplify or be typical of a 
particular state of affairs and may provide a suitable vehicle for certain kinds 
of research questions to be answered.  
 
A sixth type of case is what has been called, following André Jolles‟ (1930) 
definition of casus: the case as form. This is an Hegelian
107
 approach that was 
developed by Jameson (1998) from Jolles (1930) and Lukács (1971). Here the casus 
is read as a „structure of typicality, a crystallisation of historical trends‟ (Frow, 
2003: 71). The historical typicality of the case involves the identification of a 
particular institutional or cultural set of circumstances (the case) in terms of a 
specific chronological code (a temporal „field of interpretation‟). This gives rise to 
the „historical situation‟. The casus or case in this sense is a narrative or 
representative-image which can work to „crystallize‟ and explain specific cultural, 
national or global states of affairs (Frow, 2003: 70).  
 
This thesis adopts this sixth category of case study. This has similarities with the 
critical model and the exemplifying case, i.e. the critical model requirement on 
theory development would allow the research design to accommodate critical 
theory, and the exemplifying case study model would have situated the RMA as 
typifying or exemplifying an institution representative of contemporary shifts in the 
organisation of society. The sixth category, the case as form, however, allows a 
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 The Hegelian influence is from Hegel‟s historico-philosophical approach to aesthetic forms. See 
Lukács (1971b). 
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structure for a form of immanent critique as outlined earlier by Horkheimer (1978: 
265) where social institutions and activities are related to the „values they 
themselves set forth as their standards and ideals‟ 
 
Casus as a form of immanent critique is hinted at in Jolles‟ (1930) definition, where 
he sees the characteristic structure of the casus as the „problematisation of the 
normative scheme it instantiates‟ (Frow, 2003: 69). Casus is not the same form of 
typicality as the example, in that its purpose is to give rise to a set of questions 
rather than supply confirmation or backing to a particular set of statements. As 
Jameson (1998: 120) notes: 
 
„it seems clear that the problem of casus deploys and exacerbates a 
fundamental philosophical problem: the relationship between the universal 
and the particular: is this fact an instance of that larger classificatory 
concept, does this act fall under this particular category, what is the status 
of the existential uniqueness of a given action and its special claim to our 
sympathy, and so on? 
 
Casus thereby mediates between the contingency of its occasion and the generality 
of „field of interpretation‟. As such, it is always a matter of both particularity and 
generality (Frow, 2003). However, it is the relationship between the universal and 
the particular that brings casus within the realm of critical theory. It was argued in 
chapter two that the function of power was to produce subjects in such a way that 
they perceived the social order as legitimate and that ideology fulfils such a task by 
masking the particular under abstract universals.  In the case of Jolles‟ (1930) casus 
these abstractions are brought to the surface and made „self-conscious‟ as it were: 
 
„In the casus itself the form derives from a standard for the evaluations of 
various types of conduct, but in its fulfilment there is also immanent a 
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question as to the value of the norm in question. The existence, validity and 
extension of various norms is to be weighed, but this very appraisal itself 
includes the question: according to what measurement or what norm is the 
evaluation to be performed? (Jolles, 1930, cited in Jameson, 1998: 121) 
 
It is the examination of the contradictions between the particular and the universal; 
the social institutions and their values, standards and ideals, that allows this model 
of case study to be a frame work of meta-critique as it deals not directly with the 
world as such but with „the interpretations through which we attempt to engage with 
and understand it‟ (Jameson, 1989: 9). 
 
The definition of casus as a form of interpretation is emphasised by Jolles‟ (1930) 
retention of the Latin casus. The Latin form provides an etymological link to both 
its legal and medical origins,. In both, the „case‟ involves the movement between 
two poles: in the first, legal „case‟ there is a dialectic between the law - or the 
„sedimented history‟ of precedent cases which have become law - and the 
exceptional circumstances of the particular subject before the law. The psycho-
analytic case history narrates the complexity and partial impenetrability of the 
patient or client against the abstract scientific principles of the psyche (Frow, 2003, 
Jameson 1998). Both fields have their sedimented histories of which the judgement, 
in the first, and the symptom, in the second, are the by products.    
 
The model of the case study adopted for this thesis juxtaposes two different levels 
of analysis. The first outlines the field of interpretation (in this case contemporary 
social science discourses around risk). By drawing on the argument developed in 
chapters one and two and drawing on the metaphor of psychoanalysis, chapter four 
aims to critique the above field of interpretation and uncover what has been 
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repressed in these discourses. The second level of analysis of the case study is a 
discourse analysis of the Risk Management Authority (RMA) and will form chapter 
five of the thesis. The aim of that chapter will be to trace the Risk Management 
Authority‟s emergence by investigating „official discourse‟ (Burton & Carlen, 
1979), i.e. the legislative and policy documents related to the criminal justice 
system in Scotland. In doing so, it seeks to give an empirical ground to the theory of 
modernity and social change developed in the earlier chapters of the thesis.  
 
The historical typicality of the case involves the identification of a particular 
institutional or cultural set of circumstances (in this case the emergence of the 
RMA) in terms of the field of interpretation outlined earlier. The following section 
provides an account of discourse analysis, the method chosen for chapter five. 
 
Research Method: Discourse Analysis 
 
„what have to be analysed are paradigmatically rational practices, and they 
cannot be adequately understood in isolation from the socio-historical 
contexts in which they emerge and function‟ (McCarthy, 1991: 50). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical focus of the thesis is on the conditions of 
emergence of a specific institution and its relationship to its social and historical 
context. In terms of method the question now arises as to how it is possible to 
reconcile a broad historical narrative on modernity with an empirical investigation 
of a local state of affairs (the Scottish penal system). What method will allow us to 
capture the rational practices of institutions and the transformations that they 
generate with a snapshot taken at a very specific moment and place?  
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The method chosen for the empirical component of the case study will be discourse 
analysis. Here the examination of documents was chosen over the traditional case 
study methods of observation or the conducting of interviews. Alvesson (2002) 
argues however that the term „discourse analysis‟ has recently become too broad 
and diffuse to be meaningful. Many researchers use the term as though it has a clear 
and agreed meaning. It is therefore important to outline what it means in the context 
of this thesis.   
 
„Discourse in discourse analysis means something partly different from 
discourse as the term used by Foucault, and many other popular uses of 
„discourse‟ mean something different again […]Discourse is a highly 
fashionable word that is used in a variety of ways. In DA the task is to study 
discourse as texts and talk in social practices. The focus is not on language 
as an abstract entity, such as a lexicon and set of grammatical rules (in 
linguistics), a system of differences (in structuralism) or a set of rules for 
transforming statements (in Foucauldian geneaologies). Instead it is on the 
medium of interaction: analysis of discourse becomes an analysis of what 
people do with language in specific social settings‟ Alvesson (2002: 68) 
 
Alvesson‟s account of what „discourse‟ is in discourse analysis is then opposed to 
the type of discourse analysis traditionally associated with the work of Michel 
Foucault. Discourse analysis in this thesis relates to a study of language use in 
particular social settings. However, it is useful to consider the Foucauldian notion of 
discourse in more detail, as there are aspects of his understanding that are important 
to retain, particularly that aspect of discourse that is productive of institutional 
forms. It is still possible to study the use of language while retaining the productive 
notion. From chapters one to three of this case study, it has been clear that the 
productive and constraining power of language is not restricted to the work of 
Foucault. 
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Like Hegel and the Frankfurt School‟s understanding of language and second 
nature, Foucault‟s (2002) understanding of discourse refers to a group of statements 
which structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we act on the basis of that 
thinking. In other words discourse is a particular knowledge about the world which 
shapes how the world is understood and how things are done in it. For Foucault 
(2002) this makes discourse much more than language as such. It is possible to 
speak of forms of discourse, the forms of knowledge it produces and the 
professional institutions and social spaces which it occupies. 
 
„the term discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong to 
a single system of formation; thus I shall be able to speak of clinical 
discourse, economic discourse, the discourse of natural history, psychiatric 
discourse‟ (Foucault 2002: 121) 
 
For Foucault (2002), discourse also produces subjects; our sense of self is produced 
through discourse. In this Foucault differs from Hegel and the Frankfurt School‟s 
understanding of subjectivity. For Foucault, there is a sense that the subject does not 
exist prior to discourse. For Hegel and the Frankfurt school there exists an 
embryonic subject before its encounter with language. For both Foucault and the 
Frankfurt School however, discourse is a relation of power, and it is this 
relationship to power that makes discourse productive. Power produces knowledge; 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations (Foucault, 2002). 
 
Both Foucault and the Frankfurt School were particularly concerned with the 
emergence of institutions and technologies that are structured through specific, even 
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if complex and contested discourses. The relationship of discourse, knowledge and 
power to the emergence of institutions, new modes of knowledge and the 
construction of individual subjectivity would make critical discourse analysis the 
obvious choice of method. However, as mentioned earlier, in order to historicise 
and make problematic the concepts and assumptions surrounding our understanding 
of contemporary accounts of modernity, the case study has adopted a more Hegelian 
framework for analysis; one that has focused not only on the contradictions of 
official discourse and the emergence of new modes of knowledge, but on the socio 
historical background of that emergence. For discourse analysis the important 
aspect of the case as form, outlined above, is the mediation between the two levels. 
 
Mediation and Intertextuality 
What connects Hegel with Critical Theory is the notion that „no partial aspect of 
social life and no isolated phenomenon may be comprehended unless it is related to 
the historical whole, to the social structure conceived as a global entity‟ (Connerton, 
1976:12). The concept which allows us to theorise and comprehend the relationship 
between the partial and the whole is mediation. This refers to the establishment of 
symbolic identities between various levels of the social structure and allows the 
possibility of adapting analysis and findings from one level to another. Mediation is 
the classical dialectical term for the establishment of relationships between the 
formal aspects of a cultural or scientific work and its social ground (Jameson, 
1989).  
 
Mediation in that way is close to intertextuality, a concept drawn from critical 
discourse analysis, which refers to the diversity of forms through which a discourse 
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can be articulated (Bryman, 2007). It draws attention to the notion of discourse as 
existing beyond the level of any particular discursive event on which the analysis is 
focused. Bryman (2007) argues that the notion of intertextuality enables a 
researcher to focus on the social and historical context in which discourse is 
embedded. However it is important also to note that each of these levels, has their 
own logic of development that cannot be reduced to the other (Habermas 1976). The 
details of how the texts were selected and the content of the analysis will be 
discussed in chapter five. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter began with the problem of beginning. It dealt with a range of 
epistemological and methodological issues and outlined the historicised model of 
psychoanalysis developed by the Frankfurt school, as a metaphor that attempts to 
retrieve what has been repressed in the interpretations of modernity as well as 
endeavour to eliminate the distinction between the individual and society. While 
part one of this chapter was concerned with outlining the problem of meta-critique, 
part two was a discussion of the research design. It looked at issues of reliability and 
validity in relation to case study research and how the appropriateness of such 
concepts relate to the broader epistemological and ontological questions discussed 
earlier in the chapter. The rationale for choosing a case study design was that it was 
a model that allowed for the generation of theoretical analysis. It looked at the 
different types of case study and argued that the socio-historical casus of André 
Jolles (1930), who developed the model as a means of relating particular narratives 
to broader historical trends, was best suited to the aims of this thesis. It allows the 
research design to accommodate an immanent form of critique as a means of 
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understanding the meaning of the emergence of the RMA at a particular social and 
historical context and to elucidate the conditions for the possibility of this 
emergence. The case study, therefore, occurs on two levels and takes place across 
two chapters. 
 
Critical discourse analysis was chosen as the most appropriate method to collect 
data for chapter five due to its focus on the contradictions of official discourse and 
the emergence of new modes of knowledge, the regulation of subjectivity and the 
development of legitimation strategies. The discourse analysis will be presented in 
chapter five. Before that the critique of new discourses of modernity will be carried 
out in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES: RISK, MODERNITY AND THE 
CRIMINOLOGY OF THE ‘OTHER’ 
 
„until [the twentieth century] mankind is divided in two - those who defended the 
status quo and those who sought to change it. Then the acceleration of History took 
effect: whereas in the past man had lived continuously in the same setting, in a 
society that changed only very slowly, now the moment arrived when he suddenly 
began to feel history moving beneath his feet, like a rolling sidewalk: the status quo 
was in motion! All at once, being comfortable with the status quo was the same 
thing as being comfortable with history on the move! Which meant that a person 
could be both progressive and conformist, conservative and rebel, at the same 
time!‟ (Kundera, 2007: 55-56) 
 
Introduction 
In chapter one the relevance of Hegel was highlighted in relation to recent 
developments in social theory. It was posited that while not explicitly drawing on 
Hegel, there appeared to be return to Hegelian themes in work dealing with the 
reflexivity of modernity (Beck 1992, Giddens, 1990), theories of the self and self-
identity (Giddens, 1991 Taylor, 1992), as well as a return to the Lacanian Hegel in 
criminological work dealing with the „imaginary‟ (Carlen, 2008, Taylor, 2004).  
 
In the quotation at the beginning of chapter one Habermas (1987: 4) writes that 
„Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity‟. He 
argued that we had to return to his work if we wanted to understand the internal 
relationship between modernity and rationality. For Habermas, the Hegelian 
tradition was necessary to judge whether the claims of those who base their analysis 
of modernity on other premises are legitimate. As Critchely (2001: 68) points out 
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such an appeal to an earlier tradition is not necessarily a conservative return to the 
past
108
: 
„the appeal to tradition need not at all be traditional, insofar as what the 
notion of tradition is attempting to recover is something that is missing, 
forgotten, or repressed in contemporary life. As such, the appeal to tradition 
need not be some conservative acquiescence in the face of the past, but can 
rather take the form of a critical confrontation with the history of philosophy 
and history as such.   
 
The following chapter will examine the conceptualisations of modernity in recent 
social theory and will seek to uncover what has been erased or repressed within the 
contemporary retranslation of the concepts of reflexivity, self identity and 
modernization.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the reason that the thesis adopted the notion 
of ethical life was to emphasise the historical aspect of knowledge and that 
institutional change relates to broader social and historical change. The importance 
of the concept of modernity to this change is that it provides society with a temporal 
and spatial identity. In other words, it provides a narrative that allows people to 
understand the social world (Taylor, 2004).  This chapter‟s importance to the case 
study then, is that it situates the case, the Risk Management Authority, within a 
particular historical conjuncture, through exploring recent sociological narratives of 
the risk society.  
 
This chapter argues that the classical approach to modernity attempted to preserve 
an internal relationship between modernity, history and rationality and that this 
historical aspect of the concept of modernity is still important for our understanding 
                                                 
108
 Critchely (2001) argues that this critical concept of tradition was what Heidegger called 
Destruktion (de-structuring) and Derrida, after him, déconstruction.  
 
 145 
of social change. It will examine the conceptualisations of modernity in recent 
social theory and, building on the ideas of retrieval developed in chapter three, will 
seek to uncover what has been erased or repressed within the contemporary 
retranslation of the concepts of reflexivity, self-identity and modernization.  
 
Part I examines the new theories and asks whether their retranslation has taken them 
beyond the eighteenth and early nineteenth century debates concerning the authority 
of reason. In Part II it is argued that Giddens‟ work has been central to the recent re-
conceptualisations of modernity and one important aspect has been his 
reinterpretation of indeterminacy through the theme of unintended consequences. 
Through an analysis of structuration theory, and relatedly an exploration of how 
Giddens‟ critical theory relates to that of the Frankfurt school, the chapter makes 
clear that not only does Giddens‟ later work on modernity draw from this earlier 
work on modernity, but it also adapts terminology relating to the „classical‟ 
understanding of modernity. Although Giddens rejects this earlier understanding of 
modernity and considers its legacy „exhausted‟, he nevertheless is left in the 
situation of reinterpreting this tradition through his conceptualisations of reflexivity, 
modernisation and historical change. Part III will examine the preoccupation in the 
„risk society‟ theses with maintaining security and eliminating ambiguity in relation 
to the „other‟ as the figure of fear and the scapegoat. This section is important in 
providing the context of the Risk Management Authority. The chapter ends by 
examining how society‟s increasing concern with risk influenced the regulation of 
crime and punishment; particularly in relation to the new penology. 
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I 
 
Modernity Old and New  
Taylor (2004) writes that the central problem of modern social theory is the problem 
of modernity itself. The task of social theory for Taylor was an understanding of 
that historical combination of new practices and institutional forms, new ways of 
living and new forms of social pathology. He suggests that we can throw light on 
both the original and the contemporary issues about modernity if we can come to a 
clear definition of the self-understanding
109
 that has been constitutive of it. 
Modernity in this way, Taylor argues, is inseparable from a certain kind of social 
imaginary
110
. 
 
„By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the 
intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social 
reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people 
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things 
go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally 
met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations‟ (Taylor, 2004:23). 
 
Taylor (2004) argues that there are important differences between the social 
imaginary - the way people imagine their social surroundings - and social theory. 
The social imaginary is not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in the 
images and narratives people use to understand their world. What is particularly 
                                                 
109
 Taylor (1992) in Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, describes the historical 
journey of the self and uses the terms self-knowledge and self-exploration to mean not only the 
development of the individual in society, but also in relation to the social and cultural self-
understanding of modern subjects. Self-understanding relates to the reflexive experience of 
modernity in the development of that subject, and hence the importance of the social imaginary. See 
Taylor (1985) for an account of self-understanding in relation to the work of Foucault. 
110
 Taylor‟s (2004) notion of the imaginary is closer to the more common understanding of 
imagination and should not be mistaken with the Lacanian imaginary, which relates to the 
misrecognition by the self of the world and its relation to others.  
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interesting about the social imaginary according to Taylor (2004) is that whereas 
social theory is often in the possession of a small minority, the social imaginary is 
shared by society as a whole. It is this common understanding which makes possible 
common practices as well as a widely shared sense of legitimacy. 
 
This interpretation of the social imaginary is close to Giddens‟ (1984) 
understanding of how social actors reflexively „constitute‟ social reality. However, 
for Giddens (1984), social theory does have a practical and historical relationship 
with this common understanding outlined by Taylor. For Giddens (1984) social 
theory contributes to the constitution of the social imaginary, through the adoption 
of its concepts and language by social actors in their day to day life. Giddens calls 
this process the „double hermeneutic‟, and it is this adoption of social theory‟s 
concepts by the lifeworld that guarantees its relevance. 
 
The ideological aspect of the imaginary however is not ignored by Giddens (1984), 
and he acknowledges that social science itself has an ideological effect that may 
reify social reality and shape the nature of social life itself. Importantly, as Giddens 
(1979, 1982) indicates in relation to the work of Marx, a socio-historical approach 
to social theory in itself does not necessarily avoid theory succumbing to ideology. 
This points to the dual nature of knowledge; on the one hand it is a scientific 
discourse that can ground social research, on the other it is ideology (Lemert, 1994).  
 
The following section will examine the new theories of modernity in relation to 
reflexivity and compare them to Hegel‟s understanding of the origin of the problem 
of modernity, i.e.  the crisis of the authority of reason. 
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From the early 1990‟s there has been a return to notions of modernity in an attempt 
to describe our relationship to the present, where the concept of reflexivity, identity 
and the social embeddedness of individuals in relation to institutions are central 
themes (Beck,1992;Giddens 1990, 1991). Giddens‟s work in particular has been 
concerned with the interrelationship of society, knowledge and individual identity. 
As Elliot (2003: 48) notes, Giddens‟s approach to modernity involves considerable 
terminological innovation: „embedding and disembedding mechanisms,‟ „symbolic 
tokens,‟ „expert systems,‟ „the dialectic of trust and risk,‟ and most importantly to 
our discussion here, „reflexivity‟. However, the form of reflexivity that these new 
theories of modernity identify is not based on an internal relationship between 
history and rationality - the themes of old modernity which were explored in chapter 
one - but on our relationship to modernity mediated via abstract systems
111
 through 
notions of trust and risk. In this recent work risk technologies are seen as having a 
much broader impact on social life than that of a precautionary principle
112
 of harm 
reduction; here risk is seen as a key concept for a reflexive understanding of society. 
 
These new theories of modernity have appeared in a period of reappraisal in the 
West. They emerged at a time just after the fall of the Berlin wall, a time when 
modernity was again, after 40 years of the Cold War, opening up before Western 
society. Not only did these theories offer an analysis of a new set of circumstances 
                                                 
111
 Abstract systems are institutional domains of technical and social knowledge, they include 
systems of expertise of all kinds, from local forms of knowledge to science, technology, and mass 
communications.  
112
 See O‟ Malley (2004: 3) „The precautionary principle involves governmental proscription of 
certain practices – such as genetic modification of foods – even though no conclusive scientific 
evidence yet corroborates the claim that the process is harmful‟. 
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and their global significance, but claimed to counter what had been a dominant 
theoretical discourse at that time: postmodernism.  
 
„Today, in the late twentieth century, it is argued by many, we stand at the 
opening of a new era, to which the social sciences must respond and which 
is taking us beyond modernity itself. A dazzling variety of terms has been 
suggested to refer to this transition, a few of which refer positively to the 
emergence of a new type of social system (such as the „information society‟ 
or the „consumer society‟) but most of which suggest rather that a preceding 
state of affairs is drawing to a close („post-modernity,‟ „post-modernism,‟ 
„post-industrial society,‟ „post-capitalism,‟ and so forth) (Giddens, 1990:1).  
 
Giddens (1990) argues that while many of these „post‟ theories concentrate on 
institutional transformations – for example the shift from manufacture economies to 
information economies - the most common controversies relate to epistemology. 
Post-modernity in these debates is characterised by a rejection of attempts to ground 
epistemology and a critique of Enlightenment discourses of human progress („grand 
narratives‟ of history)113. Giddens (1990: 2) traces the origin of the disorientation 
expressed in these theories to a sense of being „caught up in a universe of events we 
do not fully understand‟ and which are beyond our control. In order to understand 
how this has come about he argues that it is not enough merely to invent new names 
such as post-modernity, but to investigate the nature of modernity itself. 
 
                                                 
113
Beiser (1999) argues that the crisis of modernity as the crisis of the authority of reason (knowledge 
as scientific, the legitimacy of science) was first posed by Freidrich Heinrich Jacobi‟s (1743-1819) 
critique of Spinoza and Kant. According to Beiser (1999), this work was  is in fact the origin of the 
the „postmodern‟ problematic. The „post-modern predicament‟ then, really began in 1786. See also 
Beiser (1987: 9-10) on Jacobi: „The faith in the autonomy of reason came under fire […] by F.H. 
Jacobi in his Briefe über Spinoza. While Hamann and Herder insisted that we cannot abstract reason 
from society and history, Jacobi stressed that we cannot separate it from desire and instinct […] 
Reason is not a disinterested power of contemplation, then, but an instrument of the will, which uses 
it to control and dominate the environment. Reason is under the influence of the will to such a degree 
[…] that even its standards of truth and falsity are dictated by it. What is true or false becomes what 
is successful or unsuccessful in achieving the ends in life. Not shirking any relativistic implications, 
Jacobi then insinuated that these ends could differ from one culture to another‟. 
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„Rather than entering a period of post-modernity, we are moving into one in 
which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalised and 
universalised than before. Beyond modernity, I shall claim, we can perceive 
the contours of a new and different order, which is „post-modern‟; but this is 
quite distinct from what is at the moment called by many „post-modernity‟ 
(Giddens, 1990:2). 
 
This new discourse of modernity opposed the disorganisation and pessimism of 
post-modern theories with a theory of modernity based on a unified and more 
optimistic account of Western society, subjectivity
114
 and reflexivity. 
 
Modernity and Reflexivity 
As we have seen, the re-emergence of modernity as a concept has also been 
accompanied by an increasing reliance by many social theorists on the notion of risk 
to explain our present relationship to the modern world. In fact, as noted above, risk 
has been put forward by many social theorists (Beck 1992; Giddens, 1990, 1991) as 
a principle concept for a reflexive understanding of society. It has been suggested 
that the reflexivity of risk calculations is related to modernity in the sense that these 
risk calculations are the result of increasing complexity within the social system and 
the distribution of resources in western society. In his book Risk Society, Beck 
(1992: 19) argued that „in advanced modernity the social production of wealth is 
systematically accompanied by the social production of risks‟. This process, or 
rather the shift in consciousness that has brought it about, is described by Beck as 
the process of „reflexive modernisation‟. Risk, therefore, is defined in Beck‟s work 
                                                 
114
 Anderson (1998) argues that post-modernism first emerged from the distant periphery rather than 
in the cultural centre of Europe or the United States. See also Bernstein (2006: 80) on Derrida and 
his relation to Algerian war, „Derrida came from a petit-bourgeois Jewish family which was partially 
assimilated. He was and was not a Jew. He was and was not an Algerian. As an Algerian Jew he was 
and was not a Frenchman. By his own testimony his primary experience was a „feeling of non-
belonging‟ – of „otherness‟. This periphery/centre aspect of modernity may also explain Giddens‟s 
much closer association of  notions of identity to an individual self than appears in „post-modern‟ 
writers such as Butler (see Lemert, 1994) 
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as a systematic way of dealing with the hazards and insecurities produced by 
modernism itself.
115
  
 
„Modernization is becoming reflexive; it is becoming its own theme. 
Questions of development and employment of technologies (in the realms of 
nature, society and the personality) are being eclipsed by questions of the 
political and economic „management‟ of the risks of actually or potentially 
utilized technologies – discovering, administering, acknowledging, avoiding 
or concealing such hazards with respect to specially defined horizons of 
reference. The promise of security grows with the risks and destruction and 
must be reaffirmed over and over again to an alert and critical public 
through cosmetic or real interventions in the techno-economic 
development.‟ 
 
In opposition to the „classical‟ understanding of modernity, Beck (1996: 28) argues 
that we are between two modernities: simple modernization, what was previously 
referred to as industrial society and advanced modernity.  
 
„In view of these two stages and their sequence, the concept of „reflexive 
modernisation‟ may be introduced. This precisely does not mean reflection 
(as the adjective „reflexive‟ seems to suggest), but above all self-
confrontation. The transition from the industrial to the risk epoch of 
modernity occurs unintentionally, unseen, compulsively, in the course of a 
dynamic of modernisation which has made itself autonomous, on the pattern 
of latent side effects. One can almost say that the constellations of risk 
society are created because the self evident truths of industrial society (the 
consensus on progress, the abstraction from ecological consequences and 
hazards) dominate the thinking and behaviour of human beings and 
institutions. Risk society is not an option which could be chosen or rejected 
in the course of political debate. It arises through the automatic operation of 
autonomous modernization processes which are blind and deaf to 
consequences and dangers. In total, and latently, these produce hazards 
which call into question – indeed abolish – the basis of industrial society‟ 
 
This „new‟ modernity brings with it a set of hazards and dangers that make the 
precautionary principle no longer valid. The second modernity involves living with 
                                                 
115
 Beck‟s (1992) contends that we no longer only live within societies defined by conflicts over the 
scarcity of resources and the constraints associated with pre and early modernity. The problems that 
have come to the fore in recent times are those resulting from technology and economic development 
itself. 
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contingency; living in a more complex less controllable world. The notion of 
reflexive modernisation indicates that social change is accompanied not only by an 
increase in uncertainty, but in an increase in self-monitoring. Reflexivity, according 
to Giddens, should be conceived as a continuous process of individual and 
collective „self-monitoring‟.  
 
„The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices 
are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information 
about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character […] 
only in the era of modernity is the revision of convention radicalised to 
apply (in principle) to all aspects of human life, including technological 
intervention into the material world […] What is characteristic of modernity 
is not an embracing of the new for its own sake, but the presumption of 
wholesale reflexivity – which of course includes reflection upon the nature 
of reflection itself.‟ (Giddens, 1990: 38-39).  
 
Although Beck and Giddens use the concept of reflexivity slightly differently, both 
argue that late modernity can be characterised by its being more reflexive than 
„simple modernity‟. This assertion about the nature of reflexivity in modernity 
raises a problem: in what ways does it make sense to speak of modernity versus 
reflexive modernity? Modernity by definition must be reflexive. „Classical‟ theorists 
of modernity saw reflexivity in the context of an historical self-understanding of 
society; they therefore saw modern society as opposed to traditional societies. The 
citizens of modernity lived in historical time which had a past, present and future. 
As we have seen in chapter one the „reflection upon the nature of reflection itself‟ is 
not new and is central to the critique of reason by Hegel. What has been repressed in 
the new theories of modernity is that modernity was always a reflexive concept. 
One of the key arguments of this thesis is that this is why Hegel is important, as he 
returns us to the origin of the problem. The recent crises of modernity, which can be 
traced through the debates on the limitation of knowledge, the status of scientific 
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knowledge, the legitimacy of science, etc, are the same themes as the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century debates surrounding the crisis of the authority of reason 
(see Beiser, 1999). 
 
Although Hegel is never cited in the works of both Giddens and Beck, many of their 
key concerns, and the concepts on which their theories rest, can be traced back to 
the „classical‟ understanding of modernity: the distinction between modernity and 
tradition; the reflexive aspect of modernity in both the attempt at a socio-historical 
account of the present and the „reflection on the nature of reflection itself.‟  
 
Another key area where the influence of Hegel is felt in the new theories of 
modernity is the inversion of his notion of the „cunning of reason.116‟ In the new 
theories the „cunning of reason‟ is reconceptualised as the „unintended 
consequences‟ of human agency; a concept brought to prominence by Giddens 
(1984) through his critique of functionalism in the 1980‟s and developed by Beck 
(1992) in his discussion of the „boomerang effect‟ in relation to the distribution and 
growth of risks. It is this conceptualisation which chimes with Hegel‟s notion of 
indeterminacy that was explored in chapter one. The concept of „unintended 
consequences‟ first appeared at a central moment in the development of Giddens 
structuration theory. It will be useful to look at this theory in more depth as it allows 
us to see the continuity and relationship between Giddens‟ earlier work and his later 
writings on modernity as well as highlighting more clearly the similarities and 
differences between Giddens and the classical tradition. 
 
                                                 
116
 What Hegel called the „cunning of reason‟ (List der Vernunft), put simply, „reason uses the self-
interest of individuals to realize its ends‟ (Beiser, 2005: 267) 
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II 
 
Giddens and Structuration Theory 
In what follows it is argued that although Giddens (1984) is not unaware of the 
pathological aspects of unintended consequences, his general interpretation of the 
concept in his work is positive. This positive interpretation of unintended 
consequences takes us away not only from the negative conceptualisation of Hegel 
and the Frankfurt School, but from a concept of critique, in other words, of 
grounding social theory in an emancipatory or ethical interest. In this section, then, 
we look at both the theme of unintended consequences in Giddens‟ work on 
structuration and, related to this, his understanding of critique. In The Constitution 
of Society, Giddens (1984: 287) writes that „structuration theory is intrinsically 
incomplete if not linked to a conception of social science as critical theory‟. In this 
work he attempted to find a way to steer between the dualism of objectivism and 
subjectivism in social theory: „structuration theory is based on the premise that this 
dualism has to be reconceptualised as a duality – the duality of structure‟ (Giddens, 
1984: xx-xxi).  
 
„Structure, as recursively organised sets of rules and resources, is out of 
time and space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory 
traces, and is marked by an „absence of subject‟. The social systems in 
which structure is recursively implicated, on the contrary, comprise the 
situated activities of human agents, reproduced across time and space. 
Analysing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in 
which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated 
actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action 
contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction. Crucial to the idea of 
structuration is the theorem of the duality of structure […] The constitution 
of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, 
a dualism, but represents a duality. According to the notion of duality of 
structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and 
outcome of the practices they recursively organise. Structure is not external 
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to individuals […] Structure is not to be equated with constraint but it is 
always both constraining and enabling. This of course, does not prevent the 
structured properties of social systems from stretching away, in time and 
space, beyond the control of individual actors. Nor does it compromise the 
possibility that actors‟ own theories of the social systems which they help to 
constitute and reconstitute in their activities may reify those systems. The 
reification of social relations, or the discursive „naturalisation‟ of the 
historically contingent circumstances and products of human action, is one 
of the main dimensions of ideology in social life.‟ (Giddens, 1984: 25-26) 
 
Social structures are sets of rules and resources, at once both constraining and 
enabling human actions and forming both the medium and the outcome of practices 
of a social system. Society is thus „constituted‟ by actors reflexively monitoring 
their own conduct as they reproduce or transform the rules and resources available 
to them.  
 
Although Giddens tends to emphasise agency over structure in his work, in terms of 
actors‟ ability to be knowledgeable and to control their lives, the last section of the 
above quotation indicates that he is not unaware that structures are not simply rules 
and resources for actors to employ – i.e. they may also be stretched away beyond 
the control of individual actors and become a reified force that shapes the nature and 
aims of actions themselves. This introduction of reification, unconscious action and 
ideology brings Giddens close to Critical Theory. 
 
In 1982 just before the publication of The Constitution of Society, Giddens gave an 
interview to Josef Bleicher and Mike Featherstone (Bleicher and Featherstone, 
1982) for Historical Materialism Today. In this interview Giddens gives an account 
of his relationship to the Frankfurt School and his position in relation to modernity 
as the project of Enlightenment. Here Giddens argues that in contrast to the 
instrumentalism of orthodox sociology, social science is inherently critical, it is not 
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an optional extra to be added on. Social science is critical because those working in 
social science must adopt a critical relation to their subject matter. Social theory is 
historical and has practical implications, whether potential or actual, for the society 
it investigates. For Giddens it would appear that it is both its historical and its 
practical dimension that makes theory inherently critical
117
. Social theory therefore 
must be considered not only as part of a social scientific discourse but as a more 
generalised form of discourse, a structure of meaning or „existential truth‟ 
(Alexander, 1995) beyond the „internal critique‟ of the scientific community itself.  
 
„We cannot be content with the „technological‟ version of critique proposed 
by the orthodox consensus, a view deriving from a natural science model. 
The technological view of critique supposes that the „internal critique‟ of 
social science – the critical assessment which those working in the social 
sciences make of each other‟s views – uncomplicatedly generates an 
„external critique‟ of lay beliefs that can be the basis of practical social 
intervention. But, given the significance of the „double hermeneutic‟, matters 
are much more complex. The formulation of critical theory is not an option; 
theories and findings in the social sciences are likely to have practical (and 
political) consequences regardless of whether or not the sociological 
observer or policy-maker decides that they can be „applied‟ to a given 
practical issue.‟ (Giddens, 1984: xxxv) 
 
He argues that this is important in relation to claims by those theorists such as 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School that Critical Theory must be grounded in 
relation to a notion of an emancipatory interest. Giddens (Bleicher and 
Featherstone, 1982: 65) opposes this notion of an emancipatory interest as outlined 
by Habermas in his (1971) theory of knowledge-constitutive interests
118
 and avoids 
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 Giddens does not make clear why the practical consequences of a theory make it critical. See 
Bernstein (1986) on Giddens blurring between practical and critical in relation to the double 
hermeneutic 
118
 See Habermas‟s Knowledge and Human Interests (cited in McCarthy, 1978:93) „Compared with 
the technical and practical interests in knowledge, which are both grounded in deeply-rooted 
(invariant?) structures of action and experience – that is in the constituent elements of social systems 
– the emancipatory interest in knowledge has a derivative status. It guarantees the connection 
between theoretical knowledge and an „object domain‟ of practical life which comes into existence 
as a result of systematically distorted communication and thinly legitimated repression. 
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what he sees as „nebulous‟ and abstract discussions on what a „good‟ or „just‟ 
society should be. He claims that Habermas‟s notion has very little content if the 
term emancipatory is removed from it. Habermas‟s notion, according to Giddens, 
can be understood in relation to his continuing faith in the Enlightenment project of 
modernity, which in turn Giddens rejects as too generalised an approach to be of 
much help to social science today.  
 
„I think that one of the main tasks of social analysis is to try to analyse this 
disjuncture in modern history: that is how it is that we live in a world which 
is just so extraordinarily different to the world anybody else has ever lived 
in before the last two hundred, three hundred or so years. That‟s part, I 
suppose, of what one might call the facts of modernity and I think that‟s still 
absolutely fundamental to social analysis. I‟m not in favour of continuing 
the traditional analysis of such phenomena, for a lot of sociology and 
politics emerged out of the nineteenth century in which there was a 
particular series of changes going on in Western Europe: principally the 
change over from a rural to an urban society and from an agrarian to an 
industrialised one. The context of change is now very different in the 
twentieth century, different both sociologically and politically and therefore 
in this respect I think there is a sort of exhaustion of the ideas that came 
from the nineteenth century […] I don‟t really hold out much hope of 
defending modernity if it means defending enlightenment in a classical 
sense. (Giddens in Bleicher and Featherstone, 1982:69) 
 
Giddens, then, argues that to move forward and understand the present we need new 
concepts to deal with changed circumstances. As we saw, Giddens‟ approach to 
modernity not only draws from his earlier work but also adapts terminology relating 
to the „classical‟ understanding of modernity as the project of Enlightenment. If it 
was important to make such a clean break with the legacy of the past, then why rely 
on the conceptual forms of that past? Why provide the outward forms of older 
concepts with new content? Moretti (1996: 20) argues that evolution in the arts or 
sciences „does not normally proceed by inventing new themes or new methods out of 
the blue, but precisely by discovering a new function for those that already exist‟. In 
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this sense both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990; 1991) could be seen as following 
the evolutionary path of the social sciences where old forms are adapted to fit new 
conditions. Retranslating old forms to capture new social transformations is 
problematic, however, as it carries with it the danger of conceptual confusion and 
ideological contradiction, when faced with the original content of those forms. No 
more so, than when Giddens (1991) in The Consequences of Modernity while 
outlining his problematic of modernity, fails to note that the plurality of 
heterogeneous claims to knowledge, the status of scientific knowledge and the 
discontinuities of history are all central problems of the Enlightenment (see Beiser, 
1999). Not only have these problems not been „solved‟, but they originate in the 
eighteenth century. In other words they are even older than the explanations that 
Giddens earlier had claimed we could move beyond. 
 
Giddens‟s preferred approach is to link the critical/practical momentum of social 
science to a more substantive analysis of contemporary societies. The critical edge 
in social theory comes from the dual practical functions of its products. Social 
theory can be „used as an instrument of power to support existing states of affairs or 
it can be used in principle to change them‟ (Giddens in Bleicher and Featherstone, 
1982:65). Theory, then, for Giddens, although inherently critical, is also „interest 
free
119‟ in relation to those who might apply it. The same theory can be adopted to 
justify the maintenance of the status quo or support radical change depending not on 
whose interests it is used but in relation to the „facts‟120. Giddens argues that the 
                                                 
119
 Habermas (1971) outlines a theory of what he calls „cognitive interests‟ (Erkenntnisinteressen), 
Habermas argues that every form of scientific enquiry is related to a particular „cognitive interest‟. 
The natural and social sciences have a technical cognitive interest. The critical sciences, such as 
psych-analysis and Critical Theory have an emancipatory cognitive interest. 
120
 It is important to stress here that Giddens is not advocating either an orthodox or  a „weaker‟ form 
of sociological positivism here. „There are certain senses often attributed to „theory‟ in the social 
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rationale for deciding the value of one theory over another is in how well it fits with 
the facts of the matter. A dialogue between theory and fact is the basis of the 
possibility of doing any kind of sociological or political analysis. There are neither a 
multiplicity of equally effective explanations of the world, nor is there only one 
central paradigm that everyone must accept. The problem with the Frankfurt 
School, according to Giddens, is that they rely on the mistaken belief that they must 
work from a more secure foundation than the above state of affairs will admit and 
that without this foundation it is impossible to do anything until you have achieved 
it. Giddens does not believe that this foundation exists, „either in respect of the facts 
or in respect of moral critique on the part of the theorist or the analyst‟ (Giddens in 
Bleicher and Featherstone, 1982: 74). 
 
„I reject the programme of grounding critical theory because I want to set 
up the idea of two houses, neither of which is a safe house, the factual house 
and the moral critical house, that you can move between. (Giddens in 
Bleicher and Featherstone, 1982:74) 
 
Giddens argues that in wanting to develop a critical theory in the terms of the 
Frankfurt School, social theorists ignore the critical motivation inherent in all social 
analysis due to the practical and historical relation in which it stands to its subject 
matter. However, although Giddens finds the idea of grounding critical theory both 
intellectually anachronistic, in terms of philosophically grounded theories of the 
                                                                                                                                         
sciences from which I want to maintain some considerable distance. One conception used to be 
popular among some of those associated with the orthodox consensus […] that the only sort of 
„theory‟ worthy of the name is that expressible as a set of deductively related laws or generalisations 
[…] there is [also] a weaker version of it which still commands a very large following […] This is 
the idea that the „theory‟ in social theory must consist essentially of generalisations if it is to have 
explanatory content. According to such a standpoint, much of what passes for „social theory‟ consists 
of conceptual schemes rather than (as should be the case) „explanatory propositions‟ of a 
generalising type.‟ (Giddens, 1984: xviii) 
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„good‟ and „justice‟, and unnecessary, he seems to avoid any discussion relating to 
the problems that such a project wishes to confront.  
 
Giddens‟ idea of two houses, neither of which are safe, ignores rather than resolves 
the either/or which Bernstein (1986: 248) claims has marked out the conceptual 
space for our understanding of social science as a critique. Bernstein claims that 
social scientists „must‟ either acknowledge that the norms to which we appeal in 
making critical social judgements cannot be rationally justified or acknowledge that 
they are based in rational „foundations‟. We do not have to endorse a vulgarised 
form of foundationalism to appreciate the importance and legitimacy of such 
questions. Giddens‟ refusal to ground critical theory and therefore not deal with 
human interest appears to leave open the question of who it is that are in the position 
of making use of social knowledge and for what reasons.  
 
For Giddens the relation in which social theory stands to its subject matter is via 
structuration and the nature of human beings as agents. As outlined earlier he writes 
that structuration theory is incomplete if not applied to a conception of social 
science as critical theory.  In this way it would appear to be the practical 
knowledgability of social agents and the relation of that knowledge via structures to 
unintended consequences in human history that is the critical key that allows 
Giddens the freedom to move between the factual house and the moral critical 
house. 
 
„I want to develop an approach centred around the idea of structuration that 
allows adequate recognition of the fact that we are human agents and to be 
an agent is already to be a phenomenon that is not just something open to 
analysis, it already implies a certain position about what people are like. I 
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want to recognise that without relapsing into what I see as the 
subjectification of traditional interpretive sociologies and I want to try and 
link this with an awareness of the persuasive significance of unintended 
consequences in human history via structures. (Giddens in Bleicher and 
Featherstone, 1982:75) 
 
Giddens argues that social theory must allow the adequate recognition not only of 
the fact that we are human agents, but that to be an agent already implies an 
understanding about what people are like. We have seen that social systems are 
„grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules 
and resources in the diversity of action contexts, [and] are produced and reproduced 
in interaction‟ (Giddens, 1984: 25). The pre-scientific primacy of knowledge 
produced and reproduced in interaction is drawn from phenomenology
121
. However 
Giddens while recognising the intersubjective dependency of human agents does not 
wish to relapse into what he sees as the subjectification of traditional interpretive 
sociologies. In order to do this he places the reproduction of social relations and 
practices at the level of social system rather than a conceptualisation of lifeword as 
such. Although in his work he attempted to find a way to steer between the dualism 
of objectivism and subjectivism in social theory, in his attempt to avoid relapsing 
into the subjectification of interpretive sociologies he appears to overstate the 
objectivism side of the dualism.  
 
As we have seen, structure is understood by Giddens as organised sets of rules and 
resources outside of time and space. It is marked by the „absence of subject‟. Yet at 
                                                 
121
 The notion of the pregiveness, or ontological primacy of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) in relation to 
the activity of science is found in Husserl (1970:130)  „If we have made our contrast with all 
necessary care, then we have two different things: life-world and objective-scientific world, though 
of course [they are] related to each other. The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is 
„grounded‟ in the self-evidence of the lifeworld. The latter is pregiven to the scientific worker, or the 
working community, as ground; yet, as they build on this, what is built is something new, something 
different. If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists 
are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of the life-world which always 
exists for us, ever pregiven‟. 
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the same time although without subjectivity „structure is not external to individuals‟. 
If structure is without subject and beyond time and space, yet somehow internal to 
the individual agent, then an overly objectivist position towards society (society as 
system) is set up, recreating the subject object dualism his theory sought to 
overcome. At the same time as reducing the subjectivist element of his theory 
Giddens, in opposing the objectivism of both functionalism and structuralism
122
, 
also places significant account on individual human agency (there can logically be 
no collective subject in Giddens‟ work) and reduces any significant determinism of 
structure (or at least a more enabling conception of social constraint). Where Weber 
granted the question of value priority over questions of validity and made values the 
basis of a theory of validity, and where Durkheim granted the question of validity 
priority over questions of value, and made validity the basis of a theory of morals 
(Rose, 1981), it may be argued that Giddens granted the question of structure 
priority over subjectivity and made structure the basis of a theory of human agency 
(see Lash, 1993, Rustin, 1999, Callinicos, 1999) 
 
Giddens is dismissive of evolutionary theories in general and argues that the theme 
of unintended consequences is an important element in resisting the presumption 
that history develops in the line of a readily discernable pattern, or that it can be 
designed according to a programme of how society should be. The unintended 
consequences of human activities are a positive outcome of human activities in the 
sense that they disrupt any attempt to impose a rigid structure on society. As such, 
he counters both the work of Weber and the Frankfurt School in their analysis of the 
                                                 
122
 See Giddens (1984: 207-221) on the opposition between structuralism and methodological 
individualism. Although Giddens argues that „Structural sociology and methodological individualism 
are not alternatives, such that to reject one is to accept the other‟, his work often veers towards the 
latter in its focus on individual human agency. 
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increasing rationalisation and reification of society with a view of a multiplicity of 
spaces where there is a pull towards counter-moments of de-rationalisation as much 
as moments of rationalisation. 
 
Giddens attempts to re-balance the original dualism between objectivism and 
subjectivism by acknowledging a certain indeterminacy within the structured 
properties of social systems that may at times stretch beyond the control of 
individual actors. It would seem for him that in order to compensate for both the 
removal of the subjectivist aspects of interpretative sociology from structuration 
theory and at the same time an over-emphasis on the agency of the knowledgeable 
actor,
123
 he must provide a more coherent account of unintended consequences in 
human history than has previously been given in social theory.  
 
History without a subject? 
Social theories are historically situated; they do not develop in a social vacuum. 
Both Hegel‟s work and Critical Theory were born at specific historical conjunctures 
that had a profound influence on their themes and development.  The founding texts 
of Critical Theory reflect a dark historical moment in the twentieth century 
dominated by both Stalinism and Fascism. The works‟ resistance to a totalising 
theoretical discourse was consistent with a refusal of a totalitarian social reality. The 
later work of Habermas was profoundly sensitive both to the social upheavals of the 
late 1960‟s and to the repressive and McCarthyist atmosphere of the Federal 
Republic in the early and mid 1970‟s124 (Jameson, 1988).  However, theory also 
                                                 
123
 The concept of unintended consequences „necessarily weakens the status he claims for the 
„knowledgeable actor‟ (Anderson, 1990:54). 
124
 See Cobler (1976) and Brauns and Kramer (1976) for accounts of the repression of intellectuals in 
West Germany and the Berufsverbote (professional proscription) 
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outlives its own time. Giddens, (1986) using the example of the continuing 
relevance of seventeenth-century theories of the state for understanding the concept 
and reality of state sovereignty, argues that the reason why social theories retain 
their relevance long after the conditions that helped produce them are gone is 
because these theories contributed to the making of the social world we live in 
today. This is what Giddens calls the double hermeneutic, the two way constituting 
relationship between theory (or lay concepts) and reality. Theory can also become 
reified into second nature and become ideology. What is important to highlight here 
in this discussion is the historically situated nature of theory, its dual nature as 
theory and ideology and its contribution as social imaginary in the constitution of 
the social world.  
 
The emphasis on individual human agency and the minimisation of the determinism 
of structure is particularly significant when theorising historical change and in 
conceptualising modernity in the terms of structuration theory. In the interview with 
Bleicher and Featherstone (1982:69) Giddens, contrary to many classical theories of 
modernity, not surprisingly rejects any notion of a Hegelian subject of history or 
privileged agent of social change as found in orthodox Marxist accounts. He is also 
critical of any presumption that significant social change can only come about 
through collective social action. Although he does not wish to minimise the 
importance of social movements, he argues that it is necessary, and just as 
important, for social science to examine the various divisions and conflicts within 
dominant social groups, and seek to influence them in the matters of policy. For 
Giddens there is a plurality of contemporary „cutting edges of change‟ from which it 
is possible to see positive social change developing. 
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„I have a lot of sympathy with the idea that history is still a fairly open 
project in the sense in which there are a multiplicity of unintended 
consequences of human activities that resist the possibility of a programmed 
society.‟ (Giddens in Bleicher and Featherstone, 1982:67). 
 
 New Wine in Old Bottles 
As mentioned earlier from the early 1990‟s there has been a return to the concept of 
modernity as a means of describing our relationship to the present and that Giddens‟ 
work has been central to this re-conceptualisation. Part two of this chapter has 
sought to show, through Giddens‟s structuration theory, that the theme of 
unintended consequences links his theory of structuration and his later writings on 
modernity. It has also aimed to show how Giddens‟ notion of critique fails to 
address issues of power or ethics.  
 
The chapter makes clear that Giddens‟ approach to modernity, not only draws from 
his earlier work but also adapts terminology relating to the „classical‟ understanding 
of modernity as the project of Enlightenment. Although Giddens rejects this earlier 
understanding of modernity and considers its legacy „exhausted‟ both sociologically 
and politically, he nevertheless is left in the situation of reinterpreting this tradition 
in his conceptualisations of reflexivity and historical change.  
 
As we have seen, in his rejection of the classical understanding of modernity, 
Giddens dismisses the normative aspects of that conceptualisation; the debates 
concerning „ethical life‟ and its relationship to social theory, and in particular, 
whether norms can or cannot be based in rational „foundations‟ are seen as relics 
from different historical circumstances. However, this refusal to deal with questions 
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of interest has serious drawbacks when conceptualising issues of legitimacy and the 
liberal state, in particular the classical Weberian definition of the state as „the 
monopoly of the means of legitimate violence‟ (Weber, 1954). This is a question at 
the forefront of contemporary debates on the modern state.
125
 Lastly Giddens‟ 
refusal to deal with questions of interest is also problematic in relationship to his 
repudiation of all evolutionary theories of history. As Rustin (1999) notes: 
 
„The rejection of a historical teleology, or of a commitment to a definite line 
of social development […] has its own consequences for ethical issues. 
When human progress, emancipation, or rationalization were, so to speak, 
„built into‟ the sociological script, then relevance-for-values also appeared 
to be given. But if there is assumed to be no linear historical narrative, but, 
instead, a variety of possible evolutionary paths is to be studied, then by 
what criterion does one choose to investigate one of these pathways rather 
than another?‟ (Rustin, 1999: 116) 
 
What, in Giddens‟ framework provides the basis for judging whether the outcomes 
of unintended consequences are positive or negative?  
 
Although Giddens would reject the notion of a Hegelian subject of history or 
Marx‟s secularised equivalent in the guise of the proletariat, as archaic concepts that 
are not relevant to the present, he tacitly reinstates a hidden subject in the shape of 
„unintended consequences‟. This hidden teleology, dressed up in the concepts of 
radicalised modernity, individualised choice and reflexivity, masks the specific 
political and moral agendas it generates
126
 (Anderson, 1990, Rustin, 1999)  
                                                 
125
 See Agamben (2005) 
126
 See also Žižek (2000:339) „although our acts can have unforeseen and unintended consequences, 
the notion still persists that they are co-ordinated by the infamous „invisible hand of the market‟, the 
basic premises of free-market ideology: each of us pursues his/her particular interests, and the 
ultimate result of this clash and interaction of the multiplicity of individual acts and conflicting 
intentions is global welfare. In this notion of the „cunning of Reason‟ the big Other survives as the 
social substance in which we all participate by our acts, as the mysterious spectral agency that 
somehow re-establishes the balance‟. 
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This latent functionalism at the heart of structuration theory brings Giddens‟ work 
closer to Durkheim‟s than to that of Weber‟s or Marx, and can be subjected to the 
same criticisms.   
 
Unger (1976) argued that there was a persistent tendency in Durkheim‟s thought to 
focus on the problems of moral consciousness at the expense of questions of power 
and the relative autonomy of the world of technical instrumental relations. 
According to Unger (1976), a theory of community that does not contain a theory of 
domination will mislead, just as a politics of community that are not oriented to the 
problem of domination will corrupt. Unger (1976) argued that Durkheim was 
notable for his vision of human fraternity, but that his vision was limited by his 
failure to deal adequately with power. The danger was a social theory that 
threatened to degenerate into an apologetic science. In Giddens‟ case, the over-
emphasis on unintended consequences and the focus on a generalised individual 
agency and its mediation with the social structure pushes to the background 
questions of power and the relative autonomy of institutional structure. The same 
danger outlined by Unger (1976) in relation to Durkheim also applies to Giddens; 
that is, the danger of an apologetic social science. The following section will 
continue the comparison of Giddens with the Frankfurt School in relation to risk as 
a means of colonising the future. 
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III 
 
Modernity and the Colonisation of the Future 
Parts one and two of this chapter looked at the problem of modernity, what Taylor 
(2007) has called the central problem of modern social theory. They outlined that 
from the early 1990‟s there has been a return to notions of modernity in an attempt 
to describe our relationship to the present. While building on the classical themes of 
modernity, this new work opposes the intentions of the „classical‟ understanding of 
modernity.  
 
This work distances itself from the Frankfurt School and Foucault, who see 
reflexivity as domination, and instead understands contemporary modernity as a 
time where actors have gained greater control (reflexivity) over their selves and 
their environments, in the process becoming experts of the self.  This is done in 
relation to those therapeutic techniques and modes of knowledge that Foucault had 
theorised as relating to the discipline of the soul. For the Frankfurt School and 
Foucault „expert systems‟ are recognised as a series of discourses which govern, 
individualise and normalise subjects. What appears to be freedom of agency for the 
theory of reflexivity is just another means of control. For Foucault in particular the 
direct operation of power on the body has been displaced by its internalised 
operation on the body through the very processes of reflexivity that both Beck 
(1992) and Giddens (1991) celebrate (Lash, 1993). The history of the subject is 
understood in the new theories as a process of individualisation
127
. The pathologies 
                                                 
127
 „The thesis of the individualisation of social inequality has been developed by Ulrich Beck as 
characteristic of what he calls the „risk society‟. In this society, risks that were formerly absorbed by 
classes and by families are now borne by individuals, whose lives do not unfold within , and are not 
protected by, those traditional categories. As a sociological thesis, this is to offer a description of 
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and alienations of modernity are here translated into the positive affirmations about 
the power of the modern self and the emancipating contributions that new social 
movements make to the reconstruction of identity and society (Alexander 1996).  
 
The collectivity and standardisation of the resulting „individual‟ modes of 
living are of course difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, it is precisely the 
eruption and the growing awareness of these contradictions which can lead 
to new socio-cultural commonalities. It may be that social movements and 
citizens‟ groups are formed in relation to modernization risks and risk 
situations. It may be that in the course of individualisation expectations are 
aroused in the form of desire for a life of one‟s own (in material, temporal 
and spatial terms, and in structuring social relationships) – expectations 
which however face social and political resistance. In this way new social 
movements come into existence again and again. On the one hand, these 
react to the increasing risks and the growing risk consciousness and risk 
conflicts; on the other hand, they experiment with social relationships, 
personal life and one‟s own body in the numerous variants of the alternative 
and youth subcultures. Not least of all, therefore, communities are produced 
from the forms and experiences of the protest that is ignited by 
administrative and industrial interference in private „personal life‟, and 
develop their aggressive stance in opposition to these encroachments. In this 
sense, on the one hand the new social movements (ecology, peace, feminism) 
are expressions of the new risk situations in the risk society. On the other, 
they result from the search for social and personal identities and 
commitments in detraditionalised culture‟ (Beck, 1992: 90). 
 
 
Giddens (1990) counterposes this new empowering modernity with tradition and, 
like Beck (1992), extends its authority well into the industrial period.  It is within 
tradition that lurk the dark and hidden histories of the soul that were outlined by the 
earlier Critical Theory of Foucault and the Frankfurt School. Tradition for Giddens 
(1990) is ritualistic, irrational, dogmatic, repetitive, and elitist. It is only in reflexive 
                                                                                                                                         
political ideology as the explanation of social structural change. However, the social consequences of 
the political conceptualisation of individuals as tax-payers and consumers, and not as workers are 
critical….Libertarian ideology masks the concentration of the monopoly of legitimate violence in the 
centralised state, which, formerly, was effectively delegated and dispersed across the quasi-
independent institutions of the middle. And it masks the unleashing of the non-legitimate violence of 
individualised civil society‟ (Rose, 1996, 59:60) 
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or radical modernity that there has been a radical departure from its domination. 
Social actors and institutions have now become „disembedded‟ from tradition 
(Alexander, 1996). Today, Giddens (1990) asserts, tradition exercises influence 
through its return as fortuna; the opposite of risk and a concept outside of the new 
reflexive modernity. 
 
A world structured mainly by humanly created risks has little place for divine 
influences, or indeed for the magical propitiation of cosmic forces or spirits. It is 
central to modernity that risks can in principle be assessed in terms of 
generalisable knowledge about potential dangers – an outlook in which notions of 
fortuna1 mostly survive as marginal forms of superstition. Where risk is known to 
be risk, it is experienced differently from circumstances in which notions of fortuna 
prevail. To recognise the existence of a risk or set of risks is to accept not just the 
possibility that things might go wrong, but that this possibility cannot be 
eliminated. The phenomenology of such a situation is part of the cultural 
experience of modernity in general […] Even where the hold of traditional religion 
becomes relaxed, however, conceptions of fate do not wholly disappear. Precisely 
where risks are greatest – either in terms of the perceived probability that an 
unwelcome happening will occur or in terms of the devastating consequences that 
ensue if a given event goes awry – fortuna tends to return.‟ Giddens (1990: 111) 
 
A world that lives after nature and tradition is a world where life is no longer lived 
as fate (see also Beck, 1992). It is a world of manufactured risk. Risk and danger 
are key elements of the cultural experience of modernity. However, when discussing 
the difference between what he terms as the „risk society‟ and earlier forms of social 
order, Giddens makes an important distinction between risk and danger. Risk is not 
the same as danger, a „risk society‟ is not more dangerous than earlier forms of 
social order - where dangers were generally experienced as given – but a society 
that lives „after nature‟.  
 
Giddens‟ account of ontological security and the role of adaptive reactions 
performed to sustain it, tend to be discussed at the level of the individual i.e. how 
individuals develop strategies in order to maintain both a shared reality between 
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themselves and others and a sense of constancy in their surroundings. However, 
ontological insecurity is most strongly felt during periods marked by rapid change 
or transition leading to ruptures in the habitual continuities of everyday life. These 
changes are felt not only on an individual level but also collectively within larger 
organisations, including states - or what Giddens terms as the „major domains of 
strategic action‟ (Giddens, 1990:135). „The idea of risk is bound up with the 
aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the future‟ 
(Giddens, 1991: 3).  
 
„In modern social conditions, the more the individual seeks reflexively to 
forge a self-identity, the more he or she will be aware that current practices 
shape future outcomes. In so far as conceptions of fortuna are completely 
abandoned, assessment of risk – or the balance of risk and opportunity- 
becomes the core element of the personal colonising of future domains.‟ 
(Giddens 1991:129) 
 
Giddens‟ understanding of risk assessment as a core aspect of the modern social 
condition is contrary then to the analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer (1979), 
outlined in chapter one, where the technical mastery of the future brought about 
greater existential insecurity. For them, a rationalised modern world only appeared 
to be demystified and had not managed to free itself from its mythical origins. Not 
only was external nature objectified but the modern subject was also. For Adorno 
and Horkheimer (1979), the suppression of fortuna through the technical 
domination of nature resulted in the fear of vengeful external powers. As Bauman 
(1998) notes, the return of such vengeful powers is the result of classificatory 
systems themselves. 
 
„No binary classification deployed in the construction of order can fully 
overlap with essentially non-discrete, continuous experience of reality. The 
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opposition, born of the horror of ambiguity, becomes the main source of 
ambivalence. The enforcement of any classification inevitably means the 
production of anomalies….Thus „any given culture must confront events 
which seem to defy its assumptions. It cannot ignore the anomalies which its 
scheme produces, except at risk of forfeiting confidence.‟ (Bauman, 1998: 
61) 
 
As we saw in chapter one for the Frankfurt School that order can only be achieved 
through the „ritual offering of symbolically enhanced substitutes‟ Habermas (1982: 
15) which, in turn, according to Bauman (1998) can be traced through the social 
construction of „the stranger‟.  The „risk society‟ is therefore, not only a society with 
a fixation on the future, but one with a consequent preoccupation with maintaining 
security. We will return to this question later in the chapter when we investigate the 
link between risk and crime. Before that we look at risk in relationship to the control 
of the future, through drawing on the work of Luhmann as well as Giddens. 
 
The Colonisation of the Future 
Both Giddens and Luhmann conceptualise society as a social system, but whereas 
Giddens (1984) attempts to go beyond the structure/agency dualism to show how 
structure both mediates and is the outcome of individual agency, Luhmann 
prioritises structure. A key characteristic of modernity is our abstract relationship to 
time and both Luhmann and Giddens are interested in conceptualisations of space-
time in relationship to modernity: Where Giddens focuses on individual agents in 
relation to the colonisation of the future, for example through the notion of self 
reflexivity or projects of the self, Lumann focuses on system colonisation as a 
whole. Luhmann hints that the secularisation - or „disenchantment‟ even - of risk as 
a concept has come about through its relationship to the rationalisation of time. It is 
its relationship to time that gives the concept of risk its unique status and takes us to 
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the very heart of the current social and political controversies surrounding risk: in 
particular, the relations between claims to rationality and our modern conception of 
time.  
 
As we have seen risk depends on time-span because its concept is entirely „bound 
up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the 
future‟ (Giddens, 1991: 3). 128 However, our understanding of time-span depends to 
a great extent on aspects of the social structure. Risk calculation is a question of 
decisions that serve to bind time.
129
 
 
Risk therefore depends on time-span. In the passage of human life there is assumed 
to be a general abiding timeliness.
130
 Confidence in the prediction of future 
events
131
 has grown and is linked in part to the increased sophistication of the 
techniques and knowledge of the social sciences. This confidence is however 
tempered by the concept of risk. Risk guarantees that if events go awry or do not 
run as planned one can still have acted correctly (i.e. avoided error). In the face of 
an increasingly uncertain future, the secure basis for the making of decisions was 
required and was duly found in the securities of risk; risk „immunizes decision 
making against failure‟ (Luhmann, 1993: 13). However, the societal shift towards 
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 Douglas argues, against Giddens and Luhmann, that „we cannot gain sufficient knowledge of the 
future; indeed, not even of the future we generate by means of our own decisions (Douglas 1992:14). 
129
 In systems theory the concept of time binding refers to the way time generates structures within a 
system that allows that system to continuously self-renew. See Luhmann, (1993: 52) „although time 
itself cannot be bound, it can bind by giving events structural value‟. 
130
 „…the concept of risk indicates a form for confronting the problem represented by the future, i.e. 
it is a form for dealing with time (Luhmann, 1993: 51). 
131
 It is important to mention here that there were periods when society followed Cardinal Richelieu‟s 
maxim that 'A misfortune that cannot occur but rarely ought to be presumed never to occur. 
Principally if, in order to avoid it, one exposes oneself to many others that are inevitable and of 
greater import.' (Quoted from Luhmann 1993: 12). The period of the welfare state was one such 
moment. Keynes rejected the possibility of using statistical methods to forecast significant future 
events. On matters subject to „uncertain knowledge‟ there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know (O‟Malley, 2004). 
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technologies of risk has significant cultural and psychological costs. Luhmann 
(1993) traces these costs in the relationship of risk to the shifting meanings of 
securitas
132
. In Latin the term originally referred to a subjective frame of mind 
characterised by a freedom from care. The later concept sécurité in the French, and 
security
133
 in English, take on the objective meanings that they retain today
134
. The 
following section examines some of these costs, outlined by Luhmann above, in 
relation to the risk society and crime. 
 
Crime and the Risk Society 
„There is currently a bewildering array of developments occurring in penal 
policy and practice, many of which appear mutually incoherent or 
contradictory […]But while diversity of sanctioning has been characteristic 
of penal modernism for some time, even a brief survey of developments 
suggests a state of penological inconsistency that probably has few 
precedents in the history of modern criminal justice‟ (O‟Malley, 1999: 175-
176) 
 
O‟Malley (1999) highlights an increased emphasis within criminological literature 
on the incoherent and contradictory nature of much penal policy and practice. This 
„volatility‟, which for many, reflects a crisis in the institutions of punishment, has 
been explained by criminologists in different ways: as evidence of the limits of the 
sovereign state (Garland, 1996); as the result of the emergence of neo-liberalism and 
„new right‟ politics (O‟Malley, 1999, 2004); and as a sign of a postmodern 
                                                 
132
 The discussion on Hegel and the recognition of property rights relates also to security of property. 
Loader and Walker (2007) in their work on civilising security make a similar connection with 
security and recognition. In this context it is the recognition of security as a human right. 
133 Bentham in The Civil Code writes that „Among the objects of the law, security is the only one 
which embraces the future; subsistence, abundance, equality, may be regarded for a moment only; 
but security implies extension in point of time with respect to all the benefits to which it is applied. 
Security is therefore the principle object.‟ (cited in Burchell et al, 1991:19) 
134
 For a contemporary definition of security see Zedner (2003: 158) „security is used to connote the 
objective state of being without, or protected from, threat; it is used to describe the subjective 
condition of freedom of anxiety; and is used to refer also to the means or pursuit of these two end 
states.‟ 
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disintegration of penal modernity
135
 and the rehabilitative ideal (Pratt, 2000). A 
common theme in many of these explanations has been the emergence from the late 
70‟s of a set of new penologies influenced by neo-liberal ideas relating to individual 
responsibility and discourses on risk (Garland, 2001).
136
 However, as O‟Malley 
(2004: 135) points out: 
 
„Retrospectively, actuarial justice and penology have not emerged as the 
sole alternatives to modernist crime control and corrections […] only one 
trend among several others […] and it is clear that these alternative trends 
have become very influential in the succeeding decades. Yet there can be no 
doubt that in most jurisdictions, and in diverse areas of practice, risk-based 
justice has become a presence (O‟Malley, 2004: 135). 
 
The following section will outline the characteristics of this new penology and how 
it links to the preceding chapters. It has been argued that the new penology reflects a 
shift in society from the modernist/welfare project distinguished by commitment to 
rehabilitation towards one characterised by a focus on managerial efficiency and the 
identification and classification of risk (Feely and Simon, 1994, 1996, 2003). 
 
                                                 
135
 Penal Modernism, also referred to as the age of penal welfarism, or, more nostalgically as the 
golden age of the rehabilitative ideal (1945 – early 1970‟s), was underpinned by the long-term 
tendencies towards „rationalisation‟ outlined in chapter two and penal reform. However as Garland 
(1995: 188-189) notes, the „politics of penal modernism are deeply ambivalent. They depend upon 
the ideological orientation of those who staff the institutions, and upon the political and legal context 
in which they operate. They can range from the Fabian reformism that has dominated British 
Criminology and the British social work establishment to the crude authoritarianism of many fascist 
and communist regimes. Moreover, one cannot read off the effects of these programs from the 
declared objectives of the reformers‟ programs, as critical analyses sometimes do, since these aims 
have frequently been undermined or transformed in the process of implementation‟.  
136
 Although diversity and change has been characteristic of penal institutions throughout their 
history, and the term „crisis‟ has for some time been used in both media and academic accounts of 
the penal system (Cavadino and Dignan, 1997), O‟Malley distinguishes between the superficial 
conflicts that are a feature of all institutions at all times and historically specific structural crisis that 
are unique to their times. Reflecting on this latter form of crisis, O‟Malley (1999) argues that within 
the present period these contradictions appear more prevalent and keenly felt than they were in the 
past. 
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The rise in actuarial justice has been outlined by Feeley and Simon (1994, 1996, 
2003) in their designation of the new penology. Its key characteristic was the 
employment of risk calculation in relation to populations of offenders. 
 
„A central feature of the new discourse is the replacement of a moral or 
clinical description of the individual with an actuarial language of 
probabalistic calculations and statistical distributions applied to 
populations‟ (Feeley and Simon, 1996: 367) 
 
This new penology was not about punishment or rehabilitation but about identifying 
and managing unruly groups. This new discourse emerged in the late 1970‟s and 
was politically attached to the rise of neo-liberalism and its reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the individual and the state. As with the „right realism‟137 of 
criminologists such as Murray (1996) and Wilson (1996), the new penology does 
not aim to eliminate crime but to make crime levels tolerable. However, its 
emphasis on risk calculation and system goals as opposed to social goals separate 
the two perspectives
138
.  
 
The continuity of the new penology with the rehabilitative approaches of penal 
modernism is based on its close association with criminological positivism, that is, 
it has a reliance on expert knowledge and „knowledge professionals‟. Its 
divergences from penal welfarism however, are more significant, and can be seen in 
the shift away from the treatment model towards the management of offenders 
                                                 
137
 Right realism also emerged with the rise of neo-liberalism and argued for a common sense view 
of crime. It accepts crime as „real‟ and as a normal part of life which can be contained but not 
eliminated. Right realists are also uncritical of the Criminal Law and are unconcerned with due 
process or the extension of police power (see Jones, 2001) 
138
 The emphasis is on „system‟ goals as opposed to social goals can be seen in the changed 
significance of recidivism. In the new penology parolees returning to prison indicates system success 
rather than the failure it would have been perceived at under more rehabilitative regimes (Feely and 
Simon, 1996).  
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(Feeley and Simon, 1996). This move away from treatment means that individual 
classification, assessment and treatment has, in the new penology, become replaced 
by the classification of aggregate categories of offenders and a focus on preventive 
measures and an emphasis on social segregation (Feeley and Simon, 1996).  
 
The new penology and its reliance on actuarialism has altered not only the methods 
of social regulation, as outlined above, but perceptions of representations of the 
criminal as well (see Melossi, 2000). Discourses of risk have changed the way 
society views crime and who is a criminal. As van Swaaningen (1999) notes, the 
actuarial language of risk and probabilistic calculations alter representations of the 
criminal from an individual to a category, or, in other words from accountable 
citizen to an object of control.  
 
O‟Malley (2004) writes, that although aspects of actuarial justice have impacted on 
the majority of western penal systems
139
, that is through its concern with aggregate 
categories of offenders and its prioritisation of system goals over social goals, its 
influence as a dominant model has been confined mainly to the United States. 
However, risk awareness within criminal justice institutions is also concerned with 
the calculation of individual risk, and this has had a wider impact in Scotland than 
the aggregate categories of the new penology. The area where individualised risk 
has been seen as important is in the containment of serious and violent crime. The 
considerable investment by criminal justice institutions in risk assessment has partly 
                                                 
139
 In Scotland the influence can be seen in the emphasis on „system‟ goals as opposed to social goals 
and in system innovation and expansion e.g. drugs testing and treatment orders and electronic 
tagging. 
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been the result of the increase in violent and sexual crime (Cosgrove 2001), and also 
as a response to a perceived increase in the fear of crime
140
.  
 
Much of the critical debate on risk has focused on the fear of crime: are fear of 
crime and perceptions of likely risk quite separate from the actual risk of crime 
itself? Fear and concern about crime may be metaphors for other types of urban 
unease or a displacement of other fears (Young 1999). Many argue (Garland, 2001, 
Hudson, 2001a/2001b, Lianos and Douglas, 2000) that this high level of fear and 
risk awareness directed at the potential dangerousness of other people has pushed 
legislation in the direction of social defence (i.e. we should defend ourselves against 
these dangerous enemies rather than concern ourselves with their welfare and 
prospects for rehabilitation).  
 
Alongside the increasing public fear of violent crime this new legislation is also 
informed by what David Garland has called „the criminology of the dangerous 
other‟141. This criminology‟s central themes are the upholding of individual 
responsibility, the assertion of absolute moral standards (see Murray, 1996) and the 
affirmation of tradition and common sense in the administration of punishment (see 
Wilson, 1996). It typically depicts crime in dramatic and moralising terms and 
frames its analysis in the language of war and „zero tolerance‟. The relationship of 
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 Since the first publication of victim surveys (in the United Sates in the 1970s and in the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s), „fear of crime‟ has become the most popular representation for 
conceptualising vulnerability and for gauging the levels of anxiety over the likelihood of 
experiencing violence (Stanko, 2000).  
141 Garland (2001:183) argues that alongside the moralising and excluding discourse of this 
criminology runs a second amoral and technological approach to social control. These so called 
„criminologies of everyday life‟, e.g. situational crime prevention, routine activity theory etc, 
„approach social order as a problem of system integration. It isn‟t people who most need to be 
integrated, but the social processes and arrangements that they inhabit‟. 
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this criminology of the „other‟ to risk and the new penology outlined above is in the 
broadening of the strategy and techniques of what O‟Malley calls „categorically-
exclusionary risk‟ to persistent violent and sexual offenders. These offenders, writes 
O‟Malley (2004: 47) are not „inert‟ – as Feeley and Simon characterise the subjects 
of actuarial justice - they are the „other‟.  
 
Fears of unprovoked, randomised, sexual and/or violent crime have fuelled a new 
set of dangerous offender legislation that allow for enhanced measures of 
surveillance and detention. „Management‟ in this instance may include extended 
periods of incarceration for those individuals considered as high risk. These new 
measures also include proposals for the quantification and prediction of risk posed 
by this new category, now generally known as, the „dangerous and violent 
offender‟. As we have seen in chapter two criminologists such as Simon (1998: 456) 
have argued that such crimes, at one time „the most obvious example of crime as 
disease,‟ have been retranslated in recent criminal justice discourses from having an 
underlying psychopathological basis to one where it is treated as a crime of „moral 
depravity‟ or „evil‟; categories absent from legal or medical discourses. In this 
aspect of risk awareness the „veneer of technical “neutrality” of actuarial justice is 
transformed […] into a politics of vengeance‟ (O‟Malley, 2004: 47). These risk 
categories are aimed at a category of offender who are politically and 
governmentally demonised and excluded.  
 
Chapter two explored the relationship between legality and legitimacy and argued 
that the problem of legitimacy and the structuring of subjectivity extended beyond 
the reaches of law and of the economy to scientific knowledge. The acceptance of 
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an authority or social order is based as much on technical rationalisation and 
expertise as it is on the legality of its system of law. Hudson (2001, 2003) argues 
that these new systems of risk control violate some of the fundamental tenets of due 
process: no punishment without conviction; proportionality of punishment to harm 
done; equality – treating like offences alike; blurring the boundaries from „beyond 
reasonable doubt‟ to „balance of probability‟; increased advantage to prosecution; 
erosion of double jeopardy and „Habeas Corpus‟; the right to trial by jury and the 
right to silence. Justice in the risk society becomes synonymous with retribution 
(Hudson, 2003).  
 
„Justice is now very much less important than „risk‟ as a preoccupation of 
criminal justice/law and order policy; the politics of safety have 
overwhelmed attachment to justice in the institutions of late-modern 
democratic polities. If someone, or some category of persons, is categorised 
as a risk to public safety, there seems to remain scarcely any sense that they 
are nonetheless owed justice. The vocabulary of justice is almost entirely 
absent from current debates about sexual offending (in particular); about 
safety in public spaces; and about penal treatment of those deemed at risk of 
re-offending.‟ (Hudson, 2001:144)  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter argued that the concept of modernity was important to contextualise 
this case study. It sought to situate the Risk Management Authority as an institution 
which is representative of a particular contemporary discourse: the risk society. The 
chapter examined the conceptualisations of modernity in recent social theory and 
looked at what had been erased or repressed within these contemporary translations. 
What had been jettisoned in these new theories was the link between modernity and 
rationality, illustrated by the rejection of an emancipatory interest for social theory.  
What has been repressed is the historical contingency of modernity.  
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The chapter argued that Hegel‟s original understanding of modernity as reflexive 
was important as he returns us to the origin of the problem, i.e. the limitation and 
status of scientific knowledge and the legitimacy of science. The theories of Beck 
(1992) and Giddens (1990, 1991) while outlining the problematic of modernity, fail 
to note that their key themes of reflexivity, the discontinuities of history and the 
plurality and status of scientific knowledge were all central problems of the 
Enlightenment. The abstraction of these concepts from their base serves to reify 
social theory into ideology. It is therefore important to recover these themes in order 
to reinstate the historical specificity of modernity as a particular grounded and 
developing narrative, i.e. as related to particular geographical and cultural traditions. 
It is only by doing this that we can critically confront the history of social theory 
and history as such (Critchley, 2001).  
 
Both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) reverse the positions of the Frankfurt School 
in relationship to reflexivity, fate (fortuna) and the production of subjectivity. The 
Frankfurt School‟s darker vision of reflexivity as domination brings us back to the 
theme of legitimacy in relation to legality and scientific knowledge. The chapter 
concluded by arguing that in the risk society, through the ways the rationalities of 
risk have influenced the regulation of crime and punishment, justice as a virtue has 
been diminished. In chapter five these themes will be returned to again, in the part 
of the case study which looks at the Risk Management Authority.  
 
 
 
 182 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
 
„The diffusion of sexual psychopath laws has followed this course: a 
community is thrown into panic by a few serious sex crimes, which are given 
nation-wide publicity; the community acts in an agitated manner, and all 
sorts of proposals are made; a committee is then appointed to study the facts 
and to make recommendations. The committee recommends a sexual 
psychopath law as the scientific procedure for control of sex crime. This 
recommendation is consistent with the trend towards treatment policies in 
criminal justice in preference to policies of punishment‟ (Sutherland, 1950: 
142) 
 
Introduction 
On Thursday 17 July 1997 Stephen Leisk, 34, a former soldier with a 13-year 
history of convictions for sexual assault, strangled 9 year old Scott Simpson hours 
after picking him up from a park near his home in Aberdeen. Leisk, had been under 
the supervision of Aberdeen City Council's social work department at the time of 
Scott Simpson‟s abduction (McManus, 1998).  
 
On the 10
th
 November 1997 at the High Court in Aberdeen, the Crown 
recommended that Stephen Leisk should spend at least 25 years in prison. He was 
also sentenced to 10 years to be served concurrently for two separate charges of 
indecent assault on 14-year-old boys earlier in that year. Colin Boyd, QC, the 
Solicitor General, highlighted concerns over the handling of the investigation and 
instigated an official enquiry
142
 into the case. Scott Simpson's murder and the 
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 The official inquiry was carried out by Dr James McManus. The recommendations from the 
inquiry outlined in McManus, (1998) were influential on the Cosgrove Committee and provided the 
impetus for the MacLean Committee 
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subsequent enquiry sparked a major review of the way sex offenders are supervised 
in Scotland (McManus, 1998).  
 
In the year that Scott Simpson was murdered the Social Work Services Inspectorate 
for Scotland had already published A Commitment to Protect - Supervising Sex 
Offenders: Proposals for More Effective Practice. (The Scottish Office, 1997) The 
main purpose of this report was to review the current arrangements for the 
supervision, treatment and monitoring of sex offenders in the community and to 
assess the efficacy of the arrangements and protocols in place for the discharge of 
sex offenders from prisons and other institutions. 
 
One of the recommendations of the report was to establish the Expert Panel on sex 
offenders in 1998 under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Lady Cosgrove. This 
committee overlapped also with the MacLean Committee established in 1999 and 
the Millan Committee also established in 1999 with a remit to investigate the 
management of mentally disordered offenders.  In 2000 the Committee on Serious 
Violent and Sexual Offenders, chaired by Lord MacLean, made proposals for the 
sentencing and treatment of offenders who were perceived as presenting a continual 
danger to the public. As a way of containing such offenders the MacLean 
Committee recommended legislation which provided for a new sentence called the 
„Order for Lifelong Restriction‟ (OLR) (Scottish Executive, 2000). As part of its 
recommendations the MacLean Committee also proposed the establishment of an 
independent body whose role would be to ensure that those working with allegedly 
high risk and dangerous offenders - whether within the statutory, voluntary or 
private sector - systematically addressed and managed the risk posed by them. This 
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body, subsequently named the Risk Management Authority (RMA), was established 
by Section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, as an executive non – 
departmental public body (NDPB)
143
. 
 
What the above provides is a surface narrative of cause and effect, a description of 
institutional responses to particular forms of rare but extremely serious types of 
offending. Although this story, which is told through a range of policy documents 
from the mid 1990‟s to 2000s has clarity, it does obscure the broader social and 
cultural forces that contributed to the emergence of the RMA. The above narrative 
does not explain the nature of the reconceptualisation taking place around dangerous 
offenders at that time - a conceptualisation based on the management of risk and the 
calculus of probability. To help provide an outline of these broader social and 
cultural forces we need to ask why the re-emergence of the „dangerous offender‟ in 
both public debate and policy formation has taken the form that it has.  
 
This chapter offers a socio-historical account of the Risk Management Authority 
and a discourse analysis of the official documents that authorised and legitimated it. 
It also attempts to provide a broader narrative that allows us to grasp the complexity 
of the RMA by studying it within a socio-historical framework. As outlined in 
chapter three, this case study adopts an approach developed by Jameson (1998) 
from Jolles (1930) and Lukács (1971b) that interprets case as a „structure of 
typicality‟. In other words, the chapter draws on the broader socio-historical 
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 The term „non-departmental public body‟ (NDPB) was fashioned by Pliatsky (1980, cited in 
Hunt, 1995: 194) to describe: „A body which has a role in the processes of national government, but 
is not a government department, or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or 
lesser extent at arm‟s length from ministers‟.  
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framework and concepts outlined in earlier chapters as a means of situating the 
emergence of the particular institution of the RMA.  
 
The chapter falls into four parts: Part I provides a historical background to the 
notion of the dangerous offender and the legislation that relates to that category of 
offender. In particular, it focuses on the developments in the USA and Canada 
which have been particularly relevant to recent Scottish developments; Part II is an 
account of the Risk Management Authority via the official documents related to its 
emergence; Part III looks at the evidence drawn on by those responsible for setting 
up the RMA; and Part IV looks at the Risk Management Authority as it currently 
exists. 
 
I 
 
Exceptional Individuals Require Exceptional Sentences  
 
 „The term risk is preferred to „dangerousness‟, because the term 
dangerousness implies a dispositional trait, inherent in an individual, that 
compels him/her to engage in a range of violent behaviour across a range of 
settings. That approach fails to take into account the complex interaction of 
psychological characteristics and situational factors in the production of 
violent acts. Violent individuals (including those who may have certain 
personality characteristics) are more likely to be violent in certain contexts. 
The response to risks presented by individuals should, therefore, not be 
restricted to an attempt to modify those characteristics in order to make the 
individuals less of a risk, but also seek to reduce the opportunities or 
triggers for violence.‟(Scottish Executive 2000: 7) 
 
The MacLean Committee‟s contrast between risk and dangerousness is a relatively 
recent distinction (Castel, 1991) yet has had a long incubation in debates within 
western penal institutions. The concept of dangerousness has also long been used in 
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mental health legislation to refer to persons considered to be at high risk of harming 
themselves or others, either physically or psychologically (Petrunik, 1994). As the 
quotation above from the McLean Report points out, the concept of dangerousness 
refers not to violent or harmful acts themselves but to the individuals who carry 
them out, dangerousness „implies a dispositional trait‟ - a state of being. The 
concept of „risk‟ attempts to capture the relationship between these dispositional 
traits and their interaction with situational factors i.e. risk deals with the contextual 
aspects of forms of behaviour.  
 
The McLean committee‟s concerns were however with the exceptional category of 
offender and the means necessary for public protection. 
 
„while for many such offenders the present range is satisfactory, for a small 
number of others the current sentencing provisions are deficient since they 
do not require the courts to impose on exceptional individuals an 
exceptional sentence which both marks the gravity of what they have done 
and provides an appropriate level of public protection, having regard to the 
risk that such individuals pose. For this latter group of offenders we believe 
that new and separate provision requires to be made so that so that they are 
subject to the control of the State for the remainder of their lives‟. (Scottish 
Executive 2000: 34). 
 
Although the distinction between risk and dangerousness is relatively recent the 
context of the debate draws on „dangerousness‟ as a historical theme in criminal law 
jurisdictions. That is, it is concerned with legislation relating to preventive detention 
or parole restrictions. 
 
Before going on to deal with the official narrative of the Risk Management 
Authority - a narrative that is based on the necessity for new legislation and new 
requirements to address a new set of problems - the following section will situate 
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the MacLean and Cosgrove committees within socio-historical background of 
dangerous offender legislation. As the reports of both committees emphasise the 
significance of expert knowledge and the importance of clinical judgments in risk 
assessment, this section highlights the history of psychiatry - both in terms of its 
role in the definition of dangerousness and to its relationship to the courts.  The key 
importance of psychiatry and the influence of North American and Canadian 
approaches on Scottish developments, also relate to the indeterminacy of the 
concept of psychopathy.  
 
In chapter one it was argued that it was not reason that guided social action but 
indeterminacy. Indeterminacy was the concept Hegel (1976: 80) used to describe 
how external forces would attach themselves to an original action or concept and 
drive it into „alien and distant consequences‟. In the following section, 
indeterminacy offers analytical purchase in understanding psychopathy, exactly 
because a range of different behavioural characteristics are often attached to this 
concept, blurring notions of moral insanity, evil, sickness and sexual deviancy. The 
section shows how psychopathy has permeated both legal discourses on the 
dangerous offender, and the public imaginary, where it shapes the public view of 
the dangerous other. Hegel‟s (1967) concept of history was underpinned by the 
notion that institutional change related to broader social and historical change, and 
that this change cannot be separated from the history of the subject. The history of 
the subject constructed in this chapter is the history of the dangerous other.  
 
In the following account it is shown that both the MacLean and the Cosgrove 
committees are end points in a much longer history of dangerous offender 
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legislation within western jurisdictions. The section concludes with a brief account 
of the 1972 Scottish Council on Crime, which represents an early and unsuccessful 
predecessor to the later MacLean Committee.  
 
The History of Dangerousness in Western Jurisdictions 
Throughout the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century „dangerousness‟ 
was a concept that referred mainly to habitual criminals; more specifically, those 
criminals judged to be „incorrigible‟, those who were resistant to reform. In the 
nineteenth century, in particular, the reference to dangerousness was often in 
relation to the „dangerous classes‟ (Pratt, 1997). It was therefore to the „incorrigible‟ 
and habitual criminal that legislation on preventive detention was directed. 
However, as we have seen in chapter two, the new discipline of psychiatry that had 
begun to emerge in the nineteenth century, began to challenge classicism‟s authority 
in criminal courts, and that new conceptualisations of legal responsibility were 
focussed on that small number of offenders considered dangerous to society due to 
insanity. We saw how Pinel (1745 – 1826) formulated a science of mental illness - 
reproducing the classificatory methods of general medicine - that conflicted not only 
with the existing physiological approaches to mental illness but with the law as well 
(Castel, 1988).   
 
Foucault (2000: 194) outlines the influence of Garofalo
144
 and Italy's Positivist 
School of Criminal Anthropology in the shift from juridical to clinical notions of 
criminal responsibility: 
 
                                                 
144
 See Garofalo‟s Law of the Third Element „Criminal law knew only of two terms, the offence and 
the penalty. The new criminology recognises three, the crime the criminal and the means of 
repression‟ (Garofalo, cited in Foucault, 2001:178) 
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„Neither the „criminality‟ of an individual nor the index of his 
dangerousness, neither his potential or future behaviour nor the protection 
of society at large from these possible perils – none of these are or can be 
juridical notions in the classical sense of the term. They can be made to 
function in a rational way only within a technical knowledge-system, a 
knowledge-system capable of characterising a criminal individual in himself 
and, in a sense, beneath his acts; a knowledge-system able to measure the 
index of danger present in an individual; a knowledge that might establish 
the protection necessary in the face of such danger. Hence the idea that 
crime ought to be the responsibility not of judges but of experts in 
psychiatry, criminology, psychology, and so on. 
 
A second source of the clinical model to which Foucault (1975) refers is the concept 
of „homicidal monomania‟ which was used by the nineteenth century psychiatrist 
Jean Etienne Esquirol to explain crimes of a violent nature which were inexplicable 
according to the legislative provisions or criteria of insanity in France at that time. 
Esquirol made the first attempt to delineate the difference between insanity and 
mental deficiency. He wrote: 
 
„The character of mania is a general delirium whose principle lies in the 
disorder of the understanding, a disorder which entails also that of the 
moral feelings…for partial delirium we keep the term „monomania‟ […] 
whereas with mania the phenomenon proceeds from a disorder of the 
understanding to one of the passions, in monomania delirium derives its 
source from disorder of the moral sentiments, which react on the 
understanding.‟ (Esquirol, 1838, cited in Castel, 1988: 145) 
 
Esquirol, in an attempt to classify individuals with mental retardation, used 
language capability as a criterion rather than physiognomy.  In 1835 when Esquirol 
intervened in the Pierre Rivière
145
 case (Foucault, 1975); lawyers, judges and the 
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 The Case was first reported in the Annales d‟hygiène publique et de médicine légale in 1838. This 
report comprised a summary of the facts and the medico-legal experts‟ reports. Pierre Rivière own 
account was only published in part. Foucault and his research team came upon the manuscripts as 
part of a study into the relationship between psychiatry and criminal justice. Foucault argued that: 
„Documents like those in the Rivière case should provide material for a thorough examination of the 
way in which a particular kind of knowledge (e.g. medicine, psychiatry, psychology) is formed and 
acts in relation to institutions and the roles prescribed in them (e.g. the law with respect to the expert, 
the accused, the criminally insane, and so on)‟ Foucault (1975: xi). 
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courts at that time were resisting his concept of „monomania‟. A large number of 
magistrates saw it as a skilful stratagem for categorising the criminal act itself as 
homicidal monomania, a means of making it guilt-free
146
 (Castel, 1988). In 1838 
Esquirol wrote Des maladies mentales. This was the first work to adopt a scientific 
view of mental disorder. In it he developed Pinel's statistical classification of 
inmates by age, disorder, and other characteristics, as well as outlining both 
environmental and age factors as precipitants of mental disorder (Castel, 1988). As 
such Des maladies mentales laid the foundation for the development of 
classificatory schemes and explanations of criminal behaviour as being determined 
by individual pathology.  
 
According to Foucault (2000) the acceptance of psychiatric medicine in the penal 
system was to do with the double concern to introduce more rationality into penal 
practice and to adjust the general provisions of laws and legal codes more closely to 
social reality. This notion of the dangerous offender was used to advocate that social 
control should be proportionate, not to the seriousness of the offence, but to the 
offender's „dangerousness‟, his capacity for doing harm; acceptance of 
„dangerousness‟ as the basic grounds for social control meant a change in the 
conception of the relationship between an individual's responsibility for an offence 
and the sanction appropriate for an offence. Psychiatrists were able to justify their 
right to intervene in the case of „mentally abnormal‟ (but legally sane) dangerous 
offenders on the basis of a clinical model that stressed not just individual treatment 
but public hygiene (see Foucault, 1975). The psychiatrist as a diagnostician and 
                                                 
146
 Elis Regnault, a lawyer and contemporary of Esquirol wrote: „Let us repulse these courtiers of 
humanity who claim to do honour to it by making out a crime to be an illness, and a murderer a 
madman‟ (Regnault, E. 1828, cited in Castel, 1988: 145). 
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caretaker of the dangerous individual took on the role of public protector just as 
practitioners of physical medicine diagnosed and quarantined individuals who were 
actual or potential carriers of contagious disease.  
 
Legislation and the penal and medical practices associated with conceptualisations 
of „dangerousness‟ have occupied a shadowy existence within western jurisdictions. 
Intended to meet the protective objectives of „social defence‟,147 dangerous offender 
legislation has historically drawn from a continually shifting configuration of ideas 
to justify its implementation. Prominent within this configuration were the notions 
of anti-social behaviour and pathology. Concerns about social hygiene and 
pathology meant that medical and clinical expertise - discourses related to the 
assessment, diagnosis and treatment of individual pathology – outweighed the 
broader concerns of punishment: guilt, retribution, deterrence, the communication 
of wrong etc. Recognising „dangerousness‟ as a basis for social control challenged 
classical legal conceptions on the relationship between criminal responsibility and 
punishment; those offenders who traditionally would have been outside the scope of 
the criminal law, were, under these new laws, subject to penal sanctions on the basis 
of the risk that they posed. Depending on the nature of an offender‟s mental 
disorder and the seriousness of the threat that such a disorder might pose, 
confinement for an indeterminate period may be viewed as necessary, not only to 
facilitate treatment, but to protect both the offender and the public from harm. 
                                                 
147
 The term „social defence‟ was first used by Adolphe Prins in 1910 to characterise social 
prevention policies, i.e. policies that would „reduce socioeconomic misery and establish the positive 
social reintegration of offenders into society‟ (van Swaaningen, 1997: 41). The term was associated 
with criminological positivism and its focus was on treatment as opposed to punishment. After the 
Second World War the aim of „social defence‟ was to reintegrate „anti-social aberrations‟ into 
society. During the 1980‟s, social defence extended its focus on anti-social behaviour to include the 
threat from dangerous and sexual offenders while at the same time adopting a managerial discourse 
of risk management and economic rationality (see van Swaaningen 1997, and Simon, 1998). The 
term, which in more recent debates has lost its socio-economic elements, has been re-conceptualised 
under the banner of community safety and community protection. 
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(Petrunik, 1994). Not only does the concern over such offenders lie mainly in their 
propensity to commit future offences, but this representation of dangerousness - 
often blurring such notions of sickness, moral evil, madness and badness - has 
permeated the public consciousness and often help form the public view of who or 
what is dangerous (Petrunik, 1994). 
 
The notion of dangerousness to indicate an individual's predisposition to criminal or 
anti-social activity began to appear in nineteenth century writings in criminology 
and psychiatry which refer to the „born criminal‟ and to the „criminal psychopath‟, 
offenders who are afflicted with a form of „moral insanity‟.  As Lombroso writes in 
the third edition of Criminal Man in (1884): 
 
„For too many generations jurists have deemed the criminal‟s responsibility 
to be proportional to his crime and the public‟s need for revenge. Fearing to 
let the criminal go free, we saw no alternative but prison or death for 
evildoers. In short, the sentiments of revenge and fear, along with the 
tyranny of habit, closed off all other roads to expiation. 
 
 Earlier, I emphasised the differences rather than the similarities 
between the two wretched psychological pathologies of criminality and 
insanity. In many ways, born criminals seem to hark back more to savages 
than do the insane. Unlike insanity, criminal behaviour is congenital or 
begins at a young age […]Moreover, I instinctively feared that the two 
categories might be confused in terms of social dangerousness. And so […] I 
resisted making the connections. 
 
 But recent discoveries have changed my opinion completely. It is 
impossible to differentiate between insanity and crime now that researchers 
are uniting in support of criminal insane asylums and discovering cases, 
such as those of Verzeni, Guiteau, and Sbro
148…that prove the similarity 
between the two conditions. (Lombroso, 2006 :212-213) 
                                                 
148
 Verzeni, Guiteau, and Sbro were topical cases at the time Lombroso was writing. Vincenz 
Verzeni, was imprisoned in 1872, accused of attempted murder and suspected in several actual ones. 
He was included in Richard von Krafft-Ebing‟s book Psychopathia Sexualis with Especial Reference 
to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Forensic Study (1879). Charles Julius Guiteau was an 
American Lawyer who assassinated U.S. President James Garfield in 1881. Guiteau claimed that 
God had commanded him to kill President Garfield. At his trial he insisted that while he had been 
legally insane at the time of the shooting, he was not really medically insane, which was one of the 
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As Gibson and Rafter write in their notes to the third edition (Lombroso, 2006) the 
above section is interesting with regards to the slippage in Lombroso‟s usage of the 
terms insanity and moral insanity. This confusion, Gibson and Rafter argue, arose 
due to Lombroso‟s need to recast his earlier theory, that the insane and the criminal 
were separate and distinct categories, into a new understanding that incorporated 
moral insanity into the broader concept of born criminality. In the first edition 
published in 1876, Lombroso hardly mentions moral insanity.  
 
The concept of moral insanity, one of the key psychiatric concepts of the nineteenth 
century, was closely related to Pinel‟s designation of a condition he called mania 
sans délire and Esquirol‟s notion of mono-mania (Castel, 1988). The moral insanity 
that Lombroso highlights in his book was coined by James Cowles Prichard (1786-
1848). Prichard invented the term to label criminal behaviour that appeared insane 
but those who committed the crimes did not suffer from either delusions or 
hallucinations. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, moral insanity, under the 
influence of Lombroso, came to be understood as genetically conditioned. It has 
become known in more recent times as psychopathy (see Lombroso, 2006 note 33). 
 
Psychopathy, derived from psyche the Greek word for 'soul' or 'mind' and pathos the 
Greek for 'suffering' or 'ill', was coined around 1845 in an Austrian psychiatric 
textbook, and was developed as a psychiatric concept by German psychiatry. Two 
influential figures in its development were Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902), 
                                                                                                                                         
major causes of the rift between him and his defense lawyers and probably also a reason the jury 
assumed Guiteau was merely trying to deny responsibility.Antonio Sbro was born in 1863. In 1883 
he poisoned his father and killed his brother for no apparent reason. He was confined in the asylum 
of Regio Emilia till the end of his life (Lombroso, 2006). 
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and Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926). Both were significant influences on early 
American conceptualizations of psychopathy (Rafter, 1997). Both subscribed to a 
view close to Lombroso‟s moral insanity, that the psychopath was biologically 
degenerate, a deviant with hereditary physical and mental stigmata. Both Krafft-
Ebing and Kraepelin associated psychopathy with sexual and gender deviancy, 
providing the  foundation for later American work in the area (Rafter, 1997).  
 
Krafft-Ebing developed his ideas and helped to popularize the term 'psychopathy' in 
his textbook, Psychopathia Sexualis: With Especial Reference to the Antipathetic 
Sexual Instinct, (Krafft-Ebing, 1965) originally published in 1879.  It was translated 
into English and published in the USA around 1893. Krafft-Ebing (1965) argues in 
this work that moral insanity or ethic degeneration, a category close conceptually to 
American psychiatrists understanding of psychopathy, was organic in cause and 
incurable.   
 
Rafter (1997) argues that Krafft-Ebing and Kraepelin developed psychopathy as a 
distinct psychiatric category and forged a vocabulary with which it could be 
discussed. The concept of psychopathy, an alleged disorder relating to a lack of 
capacity for empathy and moral judgment, was important in developing a 
representation of a category of offender, who presented a serious threat to society on 
the basis of an inherent tendency toward predatory acts of sexual aggression. 
However, as Rafter (1997: 249) comments: 
 
We can now see why the authors of these first US texts on psychopathy often 
seem simultaneously authoritative and uncertain about the nature of the 
phenomenon they are describing: they do not completely understand the 
degenerationist foundations of German psychiatry. They are attracted by the 
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work of Kraepelin and Krafft-Ebing but do not fully grasp its key concepts. 
And the further the temporal and intellectual distance between them and the 
Germans, the weaker that grasp becomes.  
 
Rafter (1997) argues that the meanings given to 'psychopathy' and 'psychopath' 
varied significantly in the first American attempts to define these terms; when 
American psychiatrists did use the terms with a common meaning, that meaning lay 
in the term's undefinability. For early American writers, a psychopath was one 
whose difference was obvious but impossible to pin down. Significantly Rafter 
(1997: 250) argues that had the term „psychopath been defined more precisely, it 
would have been less effective metaphorically‟. 
 
It was in the legal realm that metaphorical quality of the term was effective in 
American society. One of the most significant influences of Krafft-Ebing‟s book, 
and of particular relevance to this thesis, was the claims he made in reference to 
pathological sexuality in its legal aspects: 
 
„A judge who considers only the crime, and not its perpetrator, is always in 
danger of injuring not only important interests of society (general morality 
and safety), but also those of the individual (honour). In no domain of 
criminal law is co-operation of judge and medical expert so much to be 
desired as in that of sexual delinquencies; and here only anthropological 
and clinical investigation can afford light and knowledge‟ (Krafft-Ebing, 
1965: 335.) 
 
Further on he adds: 
 
„The practical importance of the subject makes it necessary that the sexual 
acts threatened with punishment as sexual crimes be considered by jurists 
from the standpoint of the medico-legal expert. Thus there is advantage 
gained, in that the psycho-pathological acts, according to circumstances, 
are placed in the right light by comparison with analogous acts that fall 
within the domain of physiological psychology‟ (Krafft-Ebing, 1965: 337) 
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As Rafter (1997) argues, the work of Krafft-Ebing and Kraepelin were significant 
influences on early American conceptualizations of psychopathy and the 
development of the clinical model of dangerousness. Central to their understandings 
of psychopathy was the belief that it was organic in cause, incurable, and associated 
with sexual and gender deviancy. Both psychiatrists developed psychopathy as a 
distinct psychiatric category and developed a vocabulary with which it could be 
discussed. However, while the concept of psychopathy gave authority to clinical 
judgements its meaning was difficult to define. Nevertheless, the authority that the 
concept did possess was due to this very difficulty. Earlier in this section, the 
concept of indeterminacy was used to describe how external forces would attach 
themselves to an original action or concept and compel it towards contrary or 
unintended consequences. With regards to the concept of psychopathy, its 
productive power lay in its indeterminacy of meaning. As we have seen in the above 
account, psychopathy can be read as representing a range of different behavioural 
characteristics including moral insanity, evil, sickness and sexual deviancy. What 
was significant in the North American situation was the authority that the concept 
had legally, to the extent that certain crimes could only be considered by jurors, via 
the perspective of the medico-legal expert. It was this migration of a poorly 
translated concept from Europe to North America in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that has had such a significant effect on the conceptualisation of 
dangerousness in modern western jurisdictions. However, it was not only in the 
legal realm that the power of psychopathy made itself felt in the attempt to close of 
the indeterminacy of the dangerous offender, it also permeated the public imaginary, 
and as a result, influenced and shaped the public view of the dangerous other (see 
Jenkins 1994, Petrunik, 1994,). The intersection of the legal and public imaginary 
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emerged in the United States in the Sexual Psychopath, Sexually Dangerous 
Persons, and Defective Delinquency statutes enacted between the 1930's and 1960's. 
The following section is an account of this intersection and its influence on the 
North American legal system.  
 
Psychiatry and the Clinical Model of Dangerousness 
In North America, the clinical model of dangerousness was exemplified in the 
Sexual Psychopath, Sexually Dangerous Persons, and Defective Delinquency 
statutes enacted between the 1930's and 1960's
149
. In 1938, Illinois was the first 
American state to successfully enact special civil commitment legislation for sexual 
psychopaths to complement sex offender legislation in the State's Criminal Code 
and Civil involuntary commitment legislation for mentally ill persons. Twenty-five 
other states followed the lead of Illinois by enacting similar legislation. Canada 
enacted a criminal sexual psychopath statute as part of its Criminal Code in 1948 
(Petrunik, 1994). 
 
In response to this proliferation of Sexual Psychopath Laws, Edwin Sutherland 
(1950a, 1950b) carried out research on the enactment of dangerous offender 
legislation and argued that in many instances where such legislation had been 
passed, it was in response to a single incident which had incensed the community 
and resulted in the mobilization of special interest groups who in turn placed 
pressure on the legislature to enact laws in relation to such offenders. Sutherland 
argued that dangerous offender legislation can be better understood as a symbolic 
attempt to appease an angry and fearful populace and to serve special interests 
                                                 
149
 Although it is important to note that sexual psychopath laws were never used in some states and 
seldom used in others (Pratt, 1997). 
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rather than a means to reduce the threat of serious harm to the public. Anticipating 
Foucault‟s later work, Sutherland argued that key groups that benefited from such 
legislation were criminal justice and mental health professionals, in particular 
psychiatrists. 
 
„Not only has there been a trend toward individualization in treatment of 
offenders, but there has been a trend also toward psychiatric policies. 
Treatment tends to be organized on the assumption that the criminal is a 
socially sick person; deviant traits of personality, regarded as relatively 
permanent and generic, are regarded as the causes of crime‟……The sexual 
psychopath laws are consistent with this general social movement toward 
treatment of criminals as patients. Some laws define sexual psychopaths as 
„patients‟; they provide for institutional care similar to that already 
provided for psychotic and feeble-minded criminals; they substitute the 
criterion of „irresistible impulse‟ for the criterion of „knowledge of right and 
wrong‟; and they reflect the belief that sex criminals are psychopathic. The 
consistency with a general social movement provides a part of the 
explanation of the diffusion of sexual psychopath laws‟ (Sutherland 1950a: 
147-148). 
 
Sutherland argued that a number of key assumptions lay behind the sexual 
psychopath statutes. Most importantly, that sex offenders were typically predatory 
individuals whose victims were strangers rather than family members or 
acquaintances. The tendency to commit sex offences stems from a personality 
disorder or mental abnormality (sexual psychopathy) which predisposes those 
afflicted to continue to re-offend despite penal sanctions. That psychiatrists and 
other mental health experts can reliably diagnose sexual psychopaths and predict 
which individuals are most likely to re-offend. That sexual psychopathy is not 
amenable to control through punishment but rather requires indeterminate 
confinement and treatment until the disorder is cured or the offender, by virtue of 
increased age and maturity, is no longer deemed to be dangerous. All of these 
assumptions (all of which Sutherland argued were challenged by counter-evidence) 
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led to the proposition that the rise in sex offences by predatory strangers is a serious 
menace to society requiring urgent action by the community and its elected 
representatives.  
 
A consequence of the application of the clinical model to sex offenders was the 
depiction of dangerousness as a problem of individual pathology. Dangerousness 
was conceptualized in the clinical rhetoric of the diagnosis and treatment of disease 
and psychiatrists and other clinicians became the authorized experts pronouncing on 
the dangerousness of individuals and recommending to the courts and to corrections 
and mental health officials who should be confined and who should be released.  
 
It is important to note, as Bottoms, (1977) pointed out, that these laws were unique 
to the American and Canadian penal system, and not part of the penal language of 
Britain at that time: although in both Britain and Europe during the 1940s the 
grounds for preventive detention also changed from habitual crime to the protection 
of the public, its focus was more limited than in North America, and the laws 
regarding indeterminate detention were rarely used (Pratt, 1997).  
 
During the 1960‟s and 70‟s in both the United States and Europe, the public focus 
on dangerousness and sexual deviance began to wane and the previous certainties 
about what constituted dangerousness became more fragmented (Pratt, 1997). 
However, it is important to note that from the 1970s onward in both the United 
States and Europe, the classification of dangerousness referred almost exclusively to 
violent/sexual offending, particularly when the victims had been children. Those 
involved in legislating for such offenders have tended to make their primary focus 
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the perpetration of sexual and violent offences by predatory strangers; justifying 
such legislation by arguing that the risk from such offenders if realised would be 
intolerable (Castel, 1991).  
 
It was not until the 1980's that a resurgence of dangerousness, this time under a new 
guise of community protection, began to emerge in the United States, Australia and 
Canada. A major concern of this model is the perceived threat that predatory violent 
sexual offenders pose to vulnerable members of the community, particularly women 
and children. Early precursors of this „renaissance‟ of dangerousness were the 
Report of the Scottish Council on Crime (1975) (Bottoms, 1977), and the Canadian 
Dangerous Offender Act 1977.  
 
According to Petrunik, (1994: 55) the community protection model is based on the 
following claims:  
 
1. Predatory sexual and violent offenders pose a serious and pervasive danger 
to women and children. Even if the number of such offenders is not very 
large the amount of damage - physical and psychological - they do can be 
very great.  
2. Politicians and bureaucrats have given insufficient attention to victims of 
violent and sexual offences and their families and too much attention to the 
rights of offenders. Too little has been done to address issues of public safety 
from violent crime.  
3. Attempts to rehabilitate or treat sexual and violent offenders have had little 
success with the result that such individuals are being released from a 
prison are still a great risk to the public. Violent and sexual offenders should 
be kept locked up until it is clear that they no longer pose a serious threat to 
the public.  
4. The justice and mental health systems have failed to adequately monitor 
dangerous individuals who have been released from custody. In addition, 
these two systems provide inadequate information about such individuals to 
communities with the result that community members neglect to take or are 
unable to take measures to protect themselves.  
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The first two claims mirror the assumptions outlined in Sutherland (1950a, 1950b), 
the key difference between the clinical and the new community protection models 
are claims 3 and 4:the assumption that attempts at rehabilitation or treatment of 
sexual and violent offenders don‟t work and therefore such offenders should be 
detained until they are no longer a threat; and that the criminal justice system 
inadequately monitor dangerous individuals once they have been released from 
custody and fail to provide information to the community.  
 
In the United States, Australia and Canada, these claims had been made against a 
background of intensive media coverage of high profile murder cases where the 
victim was commonly a child. Simon (1998) highlights the „renaissance‟ of the 
dangerous offender under these new social conditions with reference to North 
American legislation and the reconfiguration of the sex offender as an incurable 
sexual predator; from „the most obvious example of crime as disease back to an 
earlier example of crime as monstrosity‟ (Simon, 1998:456) 
 
„Sex offenders were once taken to be exemplary of the underlying 
psychopathological basis of crime. Today their significance is very different. 
Rather than occasions for testing our modernist faith in scientific 
rationality, they have become a lesson in the intransigence of evil‟ (Simon, 
1998: 452). 
 
Key among this reconfiguration were two new style sex offender laws; the Kansas 
Sexually Violent Predator Act, and Megan‟s Law, upheld by the respective 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  In the 
first case, Kansas v. Hendricks (1996)
150
 the Supreme Court upheld a law permitting 
                                                 
150
 KAN.STAT.ANN. § 59-29(a) (01) December 10, 1996, Decided: June 23, 1997. 
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-1649.ZS.html) As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' 
release from prison, having served for child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his 
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the civil commitment of „violent sexual predators‟ including those who have already 
served the complete prison sentence for their respective crimes. In the second, Doe 
v. Poritz
151
 the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a statute mandating a system 
of registration and selective community notification of convicted sex offenders.  
 
In Canada however, the assumptions behind what Simon (1998) has described as 
part of a new penology of warehousing dangerous offenders - that attempts at 
rehabilitation or treatment of sexual and violent offenders do not work and that the 
justice and mental health systems inadequately monitor dangerous individuals once 
they have been released from custody - have been challenged by the research 
community and the Government. These distinctions between the Canadian and the 
US model are explored in more detail below as Scotland differs from the US 
approach in similar ways. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act. After testifying that he agreed with the 
diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks 
became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of 
persons likely to engage in „predatory acts of sexual violence‟ brought on by „mental abnormality‟ or 
„personality disorder[s]‟. The Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. However, the 
Supreme Court granted Kansas judicial review.  The question posed was did the Act's civil 
commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a „mental abnormality,‟ violate 
substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?  Despite Hendricks' claim that a 
certification of „mental illness‟ alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court 
held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past 
violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the 
Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized „civil‟ rather than 
„criminal‟ commitments. 
151
 First enacted in New Jersey in 1994 in response to the rape and murder of 7 year old Megan 
Kanka. The man charged with her death was Jesse Timmendequas, was twice convicted of sex 
offences against young female children. Megan was killed 6 years after Timmendequas was released 
from prison on his second offence. At the time of Megan‟s death he was living in a house across the 
street from Megan‟s home with two other convicted sex offenders. The registration and notification 
mechanism was adopted by more than a dozen states in 1995 under the name of „Megan‟s Law‟ 
(Simon, 1998). 
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From Sexual Psychopath to Dangerous Offender: The Canadian Experience 
 
„High risk violent offenders and the danger they pose to public safety are 
ongoing public concerns. Governments have used many different methods to 
minimize the risk posed by such offenders. One approach has been to apply 
indeterminate sentences. Historically, Canada used Criminal Sexual 
Psychopath legislation (1948), then the Dangerous Sexual Offender (1960) 
law and in 1977, the Dangerous Offender provisions under Part XXIV of the 
Criminal Code of Canada. The earlier laws focused exclusively on sexual 
offenders and although they were criticized on a number of grounds, one of 
the more serious was the failure to target nonsexual violent offenders 
(Canadian Committee on Corrections; Ouimet Report, 1969). Thus, one 
goal of the Dangerous Offender (DO) provisions was to extend the 
Dangerous Sexual Offender (DSO) law to include nonsexual offenders who 
pose a serious risk to society‟. (Bonta, et al 1996) 
 
Dangerousness legislation and practice in Canada has had a long history and follows 
closely the direction taken by the U.S. in relation to both the earlier clinical 
approach and the later community prevention approach. However, as mentioned 
above, the Canadian developments have challenged key assumptions behind the US 
model on the effectiveness of treatment. As such it could be said that Canada 
follows a hybrid model combining elements of both community and the clinical 
models.  
 
The first special preventive detention measures for dangerous offenders were 
enacted in Canada in the form of the 1947 Habitual Offender Act and the 1948 
Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act. The Act required mental health experts to identify 
and treat dangerous sexual offenders. The Crown could apply for designation of an 
accused as a criminal sexual psychopath if he or she was convicted of one of the 
sexual offences enumerated in the Act. The Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, 
however, was part of the same movement that led to the enactment of the Sexual 
Psychopath Statutes in the United States and shared the same assumptions of the 
 204 
Clinical Model including the need to protect the public through the diagnosis, 
confinement, and treatment of dangerous sexual offenders (Canadian Howard 
League, 1999) 
 
In response to criticisms of the measure, including criticism of the use of the term 
„criminal sexual psychopath‟ on the grounds that it was vague and unscientific, a 
Royal Commission was appointed in 1958 which resulted in a number of 
amendments in 1960. This led to a change in definition within the Act‟s criteria and 
the Dangerous Sexual Offender Act replaced the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act 
(Petrunik, 1994). As a result the term „criminal sexual psychopath‟ was dropped and 
replaced with the term „dangerous sexual offender‟ (DSO). Dangerousness was now 
based on the offender's criminal record and the circumstances of the current offence. 
These offenders could be subject to an indeterminate sentence to be reviewed every 
three years.  
 
In 1975, measures to reform the dangerous sexual offender legislation were again 
proposed to ease public concern due to the abolition of capital punishment and the 
potential increased risk posed by violent offenders. Although there were strong 
criticisms of the dangerous offender proposals made both from within and outside 
government, they were largely ignored
152. „A person found to be a dangerous 
offender may be sentenced by the Court to an indeterminate period in a penitentiary 
                                                 
152
 Since its enactment, the Dangerous Offender legislation has withstood a number of challenges in 
the courts. A notable case was R.v. Lyons, (1987, 37), in which the court ruled that the legislation 
did not (despite the false positive problem in clinical prediction) provide unfairly for indeterminate 
detention. The Court in the Lyons case also ruled that the legislation did not violate the unfair 
deprivation of liberty (section 7), arbitrary detention (section 9), and cruel and unusual punishment 
(section 12), provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Solicitor General of Canada, 1993: 
36) 
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in lieu of any other sentence that might be imposed for the offence for which he has 
been convicted‟. (Solicitor General of Canada, 1993: 36) 
 
Despite criticism from the The Law Reform Commission of Canada, new legislation 
was enacted again in 1977 as an amendment to the Criminal Code of Canada. This 
new law rescinded the Habitual Offender Act and the Dangerous Sexual Offender 
Acts, and was formulated such that it would apply to both sex offenders and those 
who had committed acts of a non-sexual violent nature. Since the passage of the 
1977 legislation and following a highly publicized sexual assault and murder in 
1987, there have been further measures undertaken in response to post-release 
crimes in 1988 that allows the Parole Board to detain inmates to the end of their 
sentence if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offender would cause 
death or harm to another upon release while under statutory release. 
 
As in Scotland a few years later, the early 1990‟s in Canada were times of growing 
public concern about „high risk offenders.‟ Similarly to Scotland, drops in the 
national crime rate during that period did not dispel the public anxiety over 
dangerous offenders. This anxiety was, in part, fuelled by the sensationalist media 
attention to several high-profile cases. In response to public concerns, the Federal 
and Territorial Ministers responsible for Justice established a Task Force on High-
Risk Violent Offenders in February 1993. Only three years before the MacLean 
Committee sat,  this Task Force presented its report on High-Risk Offenders in 
1994. Based upon the findings of the Task Force, the Government enacted a 
comprehensive package of reforms to improve public safety. These reforms were 
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tailored to address specific gaps within the Canadian criminal justice system. 
(Solicitor General, 2001: 70) 
 
„To provide a mechanism that allows dangerous convicted offenders to be 
removed from society for an indeterminate period. Should the offender 
continue to pose an undue risk to society they will remain in federal custody 
for life. This legislation also allows for periodic review of that offender‟s 
status and for their gradual and supervised return to society should they 
meet parole criteria in the future. However, even if released to the 
community with supervision and conditions on their behaviour, these 
offenders are supervised for the rest of their lives.‟ 
 
As with the Scottish Recommendations put forward a few years later the 
justification for such changes focussed on expert knowledge concerning the risk of 
sexual offender recidivism.  
 
„Knowledge concerning sexual offender recidivism risk has advanced 
considerably during the past 10 years. Prior to the 1990s, evaluators had 
little empirical guidance concerning the factors that were, or were not, 
related to recidivism risk. There is now a general consensus that sexual 
recidivism is associated with at least two broad factors: a) deviant sexual 
interests, and b) antisocial orientation/lifestyle instability (Hanson et al 
2004: 1)‟ 
 
Before moving on to part two of the chapter, it is useful to look at a precursor to the 
recent emergence of dangerous offender legislation in Scotland. The following 
section looks at the Scottish Council on Crime set up in 1972. The themes outlined 
by the council on multi-agency working illustrate that preventative detention and 
the category of dangerous and violent offender were „residual‟ (Williams, 1977) 
discourses in penal debates in Scotland at the time, and were overshadowed by the 
dominant welfare focused policies of the 1970‟s (see McAra, 2000) 
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Earlier Precursor to the MacLean Committee  
In 1972 the Secretary of State for Scotland
153
 set up the Scottish Council on Crime 
in order to carry out a review of offender management and crime prevention in 
Scotland. Over its three year lifespan the Council examined the specific issues 
within its remit and reported on various measures in relation to crime and the 
treatment of offenders. Although abandoned in 1975, after a change of Government, 
many of the themes of the Council‟s work, including that of multi-agency 
working
154
 and concerns over anti-social behaviour have permeated thinking about 
crime in Scotland. The establishment of the Scottish Council on Crime was however 
controversial on a number of accounts. Firstly, authorized by the central 
Conservative government at the time, it was a large and cumbersome body with 
representation from criminal justice agencies, academics, civil servants, a number of 
businessmen and a newspaper editor (Monaghan, 1997). Secondly, in 1975 it 
presented proposals for preventive detention for offenders who were perceived to 
present a significant danger to the community. At that time the legal distinction of 
dangerousness, as with many jurisdictions, referred to those with a mental disorder. 
The Scottish Council on Crime however broadened the definition of dangerousness 
to encompass all those convicted of serious violent crime and who posed a threat of 
re-offending. In other words dangerousness was defined as the probability that an 
                                                 
153
 The constitutional settlement of the Act of Union in 1707 allowed the existence of a separate legal 
system in Scotland. Before the passage of the Scotland Act 1998, domestic policy making was the 
responsibility of The Scottish Office, under the guidance of the Secretary of State for Scotland. The 
Scottish Office consisted of five separate departments including the Home Department which was 
responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of Scottish criminal Justice and 
penal policy (McAra, 2005).  
154
 Crime prevention policies and the development of multi-agency criminal justice initiatives in 
Scotland had until 1998 taken place within a political climate characterized by tensions between 
central and local government (Monaghan, 1997). Multi agency working was organized in a similar 
way as in England and Wales with no single criminal justice agency having overall responsibility for 
it. Responsibility was shared rather across the separate institutions, including criminal justice social 
work, the Scottish Prison Service and the police with a number of voluntary organizations involved 
on the periphery.  
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offender would inflict serious and irremediable personal harm in the future. The 
Scottish Council on Crime not only advocated preventive detention for such 
offenders but argued for greater involvement of the scientific expert in Criminal 
Justice decision-making in Scotland (Bottoms, 1977). As with similar proposals in 
England and Wales at that time recommended by the Butler Committee
155
, these 
recommendations were met with a great deal of surprise by many commentators. In 
1977 Anthony Bottoms in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Criminology in the 
University of Sheffield wrote: 
 
„Had I known two years ago that I would today be obliged to deliver this 
Inaugural Lecture, it would certainly not have occurred to me that its 
central subject would be the concept of „dangerousness‟. At that time, this 
concept would have seemed to me, as to most others concerned with penal 
policy in this country, to evoke overtones of the positivist school of 
criminology of the Continent, and the various aspects of American penal 
practice, such as its sexual psychopath laws. But it would have seemed very 
remote from the language of debate typically used in discussion of British 
penal matters‟ (Bottoms, 1977:70-71) 
 
Bottoms went on to criticise the proposals of both the Butler Committee and of the 
Scottish Council on two fronts; one at an empirical level and the second on a 
theoretical one. The first criticism concerned the problem of „false positives‟ and 
drew from a recent U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the constitutional status of 
preventive detention (Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107)
156
. The second, theoretical 
                                                 
155
 The Butler Committee was set up following the conviction in 1972 of Graham Young for two 
murders, two attempted murders, and two offences of grievous bodily harm. Graham Young was on 
conditional release from Broadmoor at the time that all the offences were committed. (Bottoms, 
1977)  
156
 „Petitioner, while a prisoner, was certified as insane by a prison physician and transferred to 
Dannemora State Hospital, an institution under the jurisdiction of the New York Department of 
Correction and used for prisoners declared mentally ill while serving sentence. Dannemora's director 
filed a petition in the Surrogate's Court stating that petitioner's sentence was expiring and requesting 
that he be civilly committed under § 384 of the N.Y. Correction Law. At the proceeding, the State 
submitted medical evidence that petitioner was still mentally ill and in need of hospital care. The 
Surrogate stated that he had no objection to petitioner's transfer to a civil hospital under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Hygiene, but that, under § 384, that decision was up to the 
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criticism argued that the proposals both from the Scottish Council and the Butler 
Committee were heavily dependent on the conceptual framework of positivism, a 
perspective on the retreat during that time within academic criminology and 
sociology. Bottoms highlighted three problems with this framework. Firstly, 
positivism ignores the world of meaning and its relation to the interpretation of 
human action.  Secondly, it avoids consideration of the role of the State and treats 
crime as a „natural‟ category. Thirdly, the positivist endorsement of the scientific is 
problematic: 
 
„Believing as he usually does that crime is a naturalistic category and that 
the meaning content of action can be ignored, the positivist naturally 
believes in the application of the natural science paradigm to the 
phenomenon in question, and that behavioural science experts can 
materially assist with the prediction and treatment of deviant behaviour‟ 
(Bottoms, 1977: 82) 
 
Questions arise as to why, only twenty years later, there was such a shift in the 
language of debate within British penal matters, to make unproblematic identical 
proposals as those found in the earlier Scottish Council Report, and to why 
recommendations by a discredited penal philosophy in the 1970‟s should make a 
resurgence in the 1990‟s. One answer to these questions may be found in the 
Canadian influence on Scottish policy makers and practitioners. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the anti-rehabilitation and treatment rhetoric of „nothing 
works‟, prominent in North American criminal Justice debates, were challenged by 
the research community and the Government in Canada. However it was not only 
                                                                                                                                         
latter Department. That Department had determined ex parte that petitioner was not suitable for care 
in a civil hospital. When petitioner's sentence expired, his custody shifted to the Department of 
Mental Hygiene, but he has since remained at Dannemora. Writs of habeas corpus in state courts 
were dismissed, and petitioner's request that he be transferred to a civil hospital was denied as 
beyond the court's power‟ (Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 Argued December 9, 1965 Decided 
February 23, 1966) http://supreme.justia.com/us/383/107/case.html. 
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the „nothing works‟ approaches of prominent realist criminologies that were 
challenged with the resurgence of positivism in Canada, the critical and sociological 
criminology that had challenged positivism in the 1960‟s and 70‟s had also come 
under attack. Two of the foremost Canadian criminologists in the development of 
risk assessment and treatment models were D.A. Andrews and James Bonta. Their 
influential work, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, began with an attack on 
critical and sociological criminology. 
 
„With regard to mainstream sociological criminology, we quickly learned 
from our students who were exposed to sociology of deviance/crime courses 
that major portions of their learning involved the denial of individual 
differences in criminality and denial of correlates of that variation […] The 
problem for us (and some of our students) was that actual research findings 
regarding variation in criminal activity and its processing contrasted 
dramatically with what mainstream criminology was teaching‟ (Andrews 
and Bonta, 1998: iv). 
 
They go on to write: 
 
„The psychology underlying the bold outlines of class-based theories reveals 
contempt for the diversity and complexity of human behaviour. The social 
locationists were only minimally interested in the criminal behaviour of 
individuals. They were primarily interested in promoting their visions and 
building an ideologically and professionally acceptable social 
theory‟(Andrews and Bonta, 1998:131). 
 
The absence of sociological perspectives in both official government documents and 
the practice literature related to risk based work with offenders, should be 
understood in the context of the individualised and psychological framework which 
underlies risk based approaches.   
 
 211 
In summary, part 1 of this chapter situated the MacLean and Cosgrove committees 
within a socio-historical background of dangerous offender legislation. The section 
began with the early history of psychiatry and examined the influence of Pinel and 
Esquirol - who first formulated a science of mental illness – and of Lombroso and 
Garofalo on an understanding of dangerousness defined by the propensity of an 
individual to commit crime, rather than on the act itself.  
 
This first section highlighted the importance of Krafft-Ebing and Kraepelin in the 
development of the clinical model of dangerousness through their early 
conceptualisations of psychopathy. The section described the migration of the 
concept to North America, where it gained authority within the criminal courts via 
the intervention of the medico-legal or forensic expert. It was argued that such 
authority that the concept did possess, however, was due to its indeterminacy. In 
other words, it could be read as representing a range of different behavioural 
characteristics and it was this which enabled it to permeate the public imaginary and 
shape the public view of the dangerous other.  
 
The intersection of the legal and public imaginary emerged in the United States in 
the Sexual Psychopath, Sexually Dangerous Persons, and Defective Delinquency 
statutes enacted between the 1930's and 1960's; where Sutherland (1950a, 1950b) 
argued that dangerous offender legislation could be better understood as a symbolic 
attempt to appease an angry and fearful populace and to serve special interests 
rather than a means to reduce the threat of serious harm to the public.  
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The consequence of the application of the clinical model to sex offenders was the 
depiction of dangerousness as a problem of individual pathology, reflected in the 
language of diagnosis and the treatment of a disease in relation to sexual offending. 
The section concluded after noting the resurgence of dangerousness, under a new 
guise of community protection in the 1980‟s with a short introduction to the 
Scottish Council on Crime, an early predecessor of the MacLean and Cosgrove 
committees. The following section brings this history up to the 1990‟s in the 
Scottish context with an account of the Risk Management Authority, told through 
the official documents related to its emergence. 
 
 
II 
 
The Strengthening of Public Protection in Scotland: The Emergence of the Risk 
Management Authority 
 
As we have seen, part one of this chapter argued that there is a need to locate the 
emergence of the Risk Management Authority as part of a longer history of 
legislative responses to dangerousness. The public account of the policy context 
which led to the Risk Management Authority however, focuses instead on the 
events surrounding the murder of Scott Simpson and with the setting up of the three 
committees: events occurring at a time when there was growing policy 
preoccupation with public protection and community safety in Scotland. The 
concern with high-risk offenders, defined as „serious violent and sexual offenders‟ 
in the MacLean Committee report (2000) was combined with a universal acceptance 
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within the committees that special measures were not only needed for such 
offenders, but could also be justified. This in turn gave rise to legislative change, the 
key aim of which has been to propose selective incapacitation, more rigorous 
release arrangements and intensive risk management measures for those in prison 
and the community. These changes have produced a „blurring of the boundaries‟ in 
terms of control between prison and the community (MacLean Committee report, 
2000). 
 
In the Scottish context the MacLean Committee report (2000) and its proposals for a 
Risk Management Authority and the Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR) in the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill (introduced in March 2002) have been the most 
significant developments in relation to the RMA. These proposals have been 
supported by the Cosgrove committee (2001) on the supervision of sex offenders 
and the Millan Committee (2001) on the provision for mentally disordered 
offenders. For this reason the MacLean Committee report will be the main focus of 
part two; however I will begin by briefly outlining its roots in an earlier key report - 
A Commitment to Protect. 
 
Beginnings: A Commitment to Protect (1997) 
As mentioned above, in 1996 the Secretary of State for Scotland requested a review 
of arrangements for the supervision of sex offenders in the community. This led to 
A Commitment to Protect - Supervising Sex Offenders: Proposals for More Effective 
Practice. (The Scottish Office, 1997). This report gave an overview of existing 
arrangements for supervising this group of offenders and provided 
recommendations for further improvement. In particular the report considered the 
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new arrangements for monitoring sex offenders introduced by the Sex Offenders 
Act 1997
157
.  
 
The report emphasised the complexity and difficulties surrounding the problem of 
sex offending. Key among these difficulties was the problem of definition.  Official 
statistics categorise all offences related to sexual activity under the heading 'crimes 
of indecency' which included a broad range of offences. The offences of concern to 
the report were those offences that involved exploitation or assault and which 
required those convicted to supply their names and addresses to the sex offender 
register. Such offences include rape, sexual assault, lewd, indecent or libidinous 
behaviour, indecency, and the possession of pornographic images of children under 
the age of 16. The arrangements for supervision of sex offenders in the community 
relate primarily to those convicted of such crimes.  
 
Other difficulties highlighted were the difficulties involved in the detection of sex 
offences relating to low levels of reporting; to the small proportion of those 
offences that are reported proceeding to prosecution due to lack of evidence. Lastly 
there are the difficulties involved in the treatment of sex offenders‟ behaviour and 
in supervising sex offenders after sentence completion. These later ones were also 
related to public anxiety over sex offenders in the community.  
 
The report recognised that perceptions of sex offenders have changed over time and 
                                                 
157
 The Sex Offenders Act 1997 imposes a requirement on certain categories of sex offenders who 
were convicted on or after the date on which the Act came into effect, or who were serving 
sentences, or were under post-release supervision at that date, to notify the police of their names and 
addresses. This requirement lasts for periods of time that vary according to the seriousness of the 
offence. The Act also makes it an offence by such a person to fail to register, or to fail to update the 
information in the light of any subsequent change. These provisions set the framework for the legally 
enforceable monitoring of sex offenders in the community. (see Cosgrove, 2001) 
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that most recent theories suggest that sex offenders have cognitive and behavioural 
dysfunctions that are associated with their offending. It was noted that in Europe sex 
offenders were treated in the same way as other offenders and that those countries 
that were seeking new ways of monitoring and treating sex offenders were looking 
to the USA and Canada for models of registration and treatment programmes. 
However, a significant aspect of The Commitment to Protect report was not only the 
influence of thinking from the USA and Canada on treatment programmes, but the 
treatment of such offenders as a distinct legal and clinical category. This 
unacknowledged shift in the sex offender as a distinct category is a constant thread 
throughout the committee, policy and practice literature in Scotland. 
 
The report also argued for strategic and operational collaboration, at both national 
and local levels, between all of the agencies involved in working with sex offenders. 
These included: local authorities, the prison service, police, health and voluntary 
organisations. Key to this collaboration was an emphasis on the importance of 
systematic risk assessment.  
 
Reducing the Risk 
In order to take forward the recommendations of A Commitment to Protect the 
Expert Panel on Sex Offending was established in 1998 under the Chairmanship of 
the Honourable Lady Cosgrove. The Panel‟s final report „Reducing the Risk: 
Improving the Response to Sex Offending‟ (2001), was divided into six thematic 
areas: 
 
1. Community and personal safety and prevention 
2. Risk assessment 
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3. Access to personal change programmes (for both children and adults) 
4. Monitoring sex offenders 
5. Housing provision for sex offenders 
6. Information management 
 
Although the Panel argued that their work was about building on good practice 
rather than recommending something which was either new, or for that matter 
costly; it was recognised that some of their proposals may give rise to legal disquiet 
in relation to the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly in 
relation to issues concerning disclosure of information and the monitoring of 
suspected sex offenders where no charges have been proven. 
 
Approaches to Risk Assessment 
The influence on the Cosgrove panel of developments in the USA and Canada can 
be seen in the panel‟s support of structured clinical risk assessments. 
 
„Structured clinical judgement requires consideration of risk factors that 
have received empirical support in the literature. The structured clinical 
approach is based on assessment by trained people with appropriate 
expertise. It supports a multi-disciplinary approach, rather than the more 
traditional model of investing a particular professional with an assumed 
unique insight into the danger presented by an individual. At its basic level, 
it requires due consideration to be given in risk assessment to a wide range 
of factors which have been shown empirically to have a bearing on risk. 
These include both historical factors (such as a history of previous violence) 
and those which may be subject to change (such as active symptoms of 
mental illness). It also has regard to questions relevant in risk management, 
such as the extent to which the individual would be exposed to destabilising 
factors‟ (Scottish Executive 2000: 11) 
 
At that time these were being adopted by social workers, psychologists and 
psychiatrists working within health, forensic and criminal justice settings in North 
America. This approach was recommended as it was shown by research to offer 
more accurate assessments of risk than other techniques, and, importantly, it was 
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based on the use of validated risk assessment tools. 
 
The recommendations on improving the application of risk assessment techniques 
also related to the notion that risk assessment should be underpinned by improved 
information exchange across and between all of the agencies involved. 
 
„To achieve the consistency which we advocate, the structured clinical 
approach to risk assessment should be used at each of the key stages in the 
progress of an offender through the criminal justice system. It should also be 
used in circumstances where an individual who gives cause for concern has 
come to the attention of the authorities but has not been prosecuted for an 
offence‟ (The Scottish Government 2001: 27). 
 
The Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders, chaired by Lord 
MacLean, reported during the lifetime of the Cosgrove Committee. The MacLean 
Committee, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, dealt with the sentencing, 
management and treatment of a very small group of high-risk offenders, including 
high-risk sex offenders. The scope of the MacLean Committee was therefore 
different from that of the Cosgrove panel, which was concerned with sex offending 
in general. However, there were areas of common concern in the area of risk 
assessment. In particular: 
 
“the role of risk assessment in sentencing, management and release needs to 
be more clearly acknowledged, and the different types of risk assessment 
and management need to be better integrated.”(Scottish Executive, 2000 ) 
 
Lady Cosgrove‟s Report recommended that if the Risk Management Authority 
proposed by the MacLean Committee was established with a wider remit, it could 
provide the mechanism for delivering a national protocol for risk assessment as part 
of its regulatory and advisory function.  
 218 
 
„The proposed Risk Management Authority might also issue guidance on 
best practice and other advice to assist local agencies in the management of 
high profile cases or high risk cases, although operational responsibility for 
the management of individual cases should continue to rest with the 
appropriate authorities at a local level‟(The Scottish Government 2001: 31). 
 
The following is an outline of the MacLean report on serious and violent sexual 
offenders. 
 
A New Regime for High Risk Offenders 
The MacLean Committee on serious violent and sexual offenders was established in 
March 1999 by the then Scottish Office Minister of State, Henry McLeish MP. It 
was chaired by Lord MacLean, a High Court judge, and its members included 
representatives from law, health services, the police, social work, and prison 
service. Its remit was: 
 
 „To consider experience in Scotland and elsewhere and to make proposals 
for the sentencing disposals for, and the future management and treatment 
of serious sexual and violent offenders who may present a continuing danger 
to the public, in particular:  
 
 To consider whether the current legislative framework matches the present 
level of knowledge of the subject, provides the courts with an appropriate 
range of options and affords the general public adequate protection from 
these offenders; 
 
 To compare practice, diagnosis and treatment with that elsewhere, to build 
on current expertise and research to inform the development of a medical 
protocol to respond to the needs of personality disordered offenders; 
 
 To specify the services required by this group of offenders and the means of 
delivery; 
 
 To consider the question of release/discharge into the community and 
service needs in the community for supervising those offenders.‟(Scottish 
Executive, 2000:16-25) 
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The MacLean Committee report stated that there was considerable public concern 
about the danger posed by high risk offenders. The concern tended to be focussed 
on those offenders who, following release from custody for a serious violent or 
sexual crime, go on to commit another offence of a similar kind. The report 
highlighted several problems relating to what was the current system of sentencing 
and managing high-risk offenders. It argued that there was uncertainty about the 
numbers of offenders that should be considered a high risk. This uncertainty was 
due partly to there being no universally accepted method of risk assessment in 
Scotland. The methods used by the different agencies were often not compatible and 
those risk management techniques that were being developing were not based on the 
best available international research evidence (The Scottish Executive, 2000).  
 
These problems meant that Judges did not have the kind of systematic risk 
assessment information that they needed to assist them when sentencing offenders 
who may pose a high risk; particularly in the case of offenders with mental 
disorders, who were not necessarily being given a sentence that reflected their 
underlying risk to the public. 
 
The Committee proposed three key recommendations 
 The creation of a new authority to have a general responsibility for 
gathering and promulgating best practice in risk assessment and risk 
management. 
 
 A new lifelong sentence imposed on the basis of risk. 
 
 More appropriate disposals for mentally disordered offenders. 
 
In making these recommendations the Committee emphasised that it was concerned 
only with those who had offended but had „yet to be sentenced or otherwise 
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disposed of by the court. These offenders are those who have committed serious 
violent and sexual crimes‟. The report argued that the focus of the committee should 
be on the offender and not on the offence
158
; and such a focus was consciously 
reflected in the language adopted in the terms of reference throughout the report. 
The focus should be on the offender who presents a „continuing danger to the 
public
159‟. The significance of this distinction is in the fact that while many 
individuals who commit serious violent or sexual offences will fall within this 
group, not all will. For example, many may only pose a risk to specific individuals 
related to that offender. Moreover, many individuals appearing for sentencing 
before the court may be considered as posing a serious threat to the public, although 
they have not yet been convicted of a serious act of violence or a serious sexual 
offence. 
 
Like the Cosgrove Committee, the MacLean Committee recommended the use of 
structured clinical risk assessments. The rationale for this again was evidence from 
research literature (particularly from Canada and the USA); that structured clinical 
assessment can only be carried out by trained staff with appropriate skills and 
expertise, and that it supported a multi-disciplinary
160
 approach to assessment. The 
committee noted that at the time of the report a clinical approach
161
 was currently 
                                                 
158
 See reference to Garofalo‟s „Law of the Third Element‟ earlier in the chapter (Foucault, 2001). 
159
 In Canada, the Supreme Court has held that where the predicate offence consisted of minor acts of 
sexual assault, the offender‟s overall past conduct, including more serious offences, justified the 
designation of „dangerous offender‟ (see MacLean, 2000). 
160
 It was emphasised that although risk assessment should be carried out in a multi-disciplinary 
setting uniformity may neither be desirable nor possible as different agencies make risk assessments 
for different purposes. Although there should be compatibility between different approaches, it was 
emphasised that it was the quality of assessment that should be standardised (see MacLean, 2000). 
161
 Bonta (1996: 19-21) argues that there are three generations of risk assessment, the clinical 
approach is considered a first generation risk assessment. First generation assessments are subjective 
assessment, professional judgement, intuition and gut-level feelings. Second generation risk 
assessments are empirically developed actuarial risk assessment tools. Third generation assessment 
tools are, what Bonta (1996) describes as risk-needs assessment, that link assessment processes to 
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most widespread in Scotland - both in clinical settings and in the nonclinical 
settings of parole and probation. Actuarial approaches - particularly favoured in the 
USA – were also criticised as having a number of weaknesses in relation to their 
predictive accuracy in relation to a Scottish offender population
162
. The following 
section deals with the role of the Risk Management Authority and its remit in 
relation to the accreditation of risk assessment and management methods and 
processes. 
 
The Risk Management Authority 
 
 „A new authority, to be called the Risk Management Authority, should be 
created with a view to securing the protection of the public from seriously 
violent and sexual offenders while restricting their freedoms no more than is 
necessary in the public interest (Scottish Executive, 2000: 17). 
 
In A Commitment to Protect (The Scottish Office, 1996) it was noted that countries 
that were seeking new ways of monitoring and treating sex offenders were looking 
to the USA and Canada for models of registration and treatment programmes. The 
findings of the MacLean Committee found evidence, particularly in Canada, of 
rapidly developing expertise in the assessment of risks presented by violent 
offenders. The committee was particularly interested in the operation of Canada‟s 
Correctional Service in which the responsibility for both prisons and supervision in 
the community is combined. Yet the recommendation of a Risk Management 
Authority came about because the Committee was not persuaded that there was any 
benefit to be gained in Scotland by investing responsibility for high risk offenders in 
                                                                                                                                         
rehabilitation. Structured clinical approaches are a combination of first and second generation tools, 
i.e. they combine clinical judgement with actuarial assessment. 
162
 Actuarial tools are based on analysis of re-offending amongst a specific, and often highly 
selected, population. 
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a single unified criminal justice service. The Committee argued that such a unified 
service would merely alter the boundaries between organisations and the remit of 
the Committee would be best achieved by investing responsibility for the 
management of such offenders in an independent authority that would commission 
appropriate services from existing agencies.  
 
„We recognise that our proposal will have consequences for the existing 
agencies that operate in this area. It would compete with them for resources. 
It would have authority to require approaches it considers the most effective 
to be developed. By advancing or withholding financial support, by 
recognising or not the validity of treatment interventions, its authority would 
supersede, in this area, that of the service providers‟ (The Scottish Office, 
1996: 24). 
 
The proposals put forward by the MacLean Committee in relation to the Risk 
Management Authority and its invested responsibility therefore can be read as 
accepting the authority of scientific expertise over that of statutory institutions in the 
sphere of criminal justice.  
 
Although the Risk Management Authority was devised counter to the Canadian 
experience in terms of organisational responsibility, the committee was impressed 
by the level of communication between researchers in the field of corrections and 
policymakers. In particular the Correctional Service of Canada provided a model for 
the independent accreditation of programmes in addressing offending behaviour; 
not only for serious, violent and sexual offenders but for offenders in general. The 
protection of the public can be improved only if  
 
„we better inform our approach to risk management by research evidence, 
the accreditation of methods used and the assessment of the competence of 
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all those working in the field to work with the methods that are 
demonstrably the most effective‟ (MacLean 2000). 
 
Although the remit of the committee was to make recommendations on the 
assessment and sentencing of serious, violent and sexual offenders, the MacLean 
Committee argued that the standard of rigour that it was proposing for the 
management of that group could be appropriate to other categories of offender. 
Therefore it was suggested that the Executive may wish to widen the scope of the 
Risk Management Authority to include other groups of offender. This coincides 
with the recommendations from the Cosgrove report, discussed earlier, on widening 
the remit of the Risk Management Authority.  
 
„We see further potential benefit in the approach we are recommending in 
that the model of an authority supervising the contributions of each of the 
service delivery agencies may well come to be seen as appropriate not just 
for the small but particularly threatening group of offenders with which we 
are concerned, but for serious offenders in general. In particular the 
approach may be expected to be appropriate for the management of all life-
sentence prisoners and for prisoners in general who are serving extended 
sentences. It is also relevant to the management of persons under restriction 
orders imposed under mental health legislation‟ (Scottish Executive, 
2000:25). 
 
 
The Operational Role of the Risk Management Authority 
 
„The Authority will have to be demonstrably expert in the field of risk 
management. To achieve that, it will have to derive its expertise from a wide 
range of disciplines. As much of its work will be in influencing and co-
ordinating the work of existing agencies, its authority will derive not only 
from its relationship to the Scottish Executive but from its credibility with 
those agencies‟(Scottish Executive,2000: 20). 
 
 224 
The role of the Risk Management Authority was not restricted to the influencing 
and the co-ordinating of work of existing agencies. It was recommended, in its 
designation as a non-governmental body, that it should have executive authority in a 
number of areas including: 
 
• commissioning research; 
• accrediting risk assessment and management methods and processes; 
• setting the standards by which the competence of practitioners to work in 
the area will be assessed; 
• commissioning services from agencies working with offenders subject to 
the new order and deploying a budget for that purpose;
163
 
• reviewing and developing the risk management plan for an offender within 
any specific licence requirements that have been set by the Parole Board. 
 
To carry out these functions it was proposed that the Risk Management Authority 
should command a budget to ensure the continuing development of services to 
serious, violent and sexual offenders and for commissioning specific services that 
are required for the management of such offenders, including the development of 
new processes and technologies. 
 
„We are aware that the approach we are proposing is premised on an 
emergent knowledge base. What is convincing about the knowledge that we 
have is the rigour with which it has been developed. That is sufficient for us 
to propose new procedures based on it. In doing so, however, we are 
conscious that those working in the field are going to be working in an area 
where knowledge can be expected to develop rapidly. This part of our 
recommendations therefore focuses on the role of the new Authority in 
keeping abreast of, and promoting, the best practice that is available 
internationally‟. (Scottish Executive, 2000: 19) 
 
The operational role of the Risk Management Authority is therefore to: 
                                                 
163
 It was not proposed that the RMA will commission individual services from statutory agencies. 
However, it was recommended that it financially support developments, research and pilot schemes, 
and may make recommendations to the Scottish Executive, if it wishes, about funding for specific 
projects (see White Paper Making Scotland Safer 2001). 
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„manage the risks presented by serious violent and sexual offenders, by 
agreeing a risk management plan for each and by commissioning 
appropriate risk management services from the agencies it considers give 
best value for money in protecting the public‟ (Scottish Executive, 2000: 25). 
 
It was proposed that the Risk Management Authority should accredit the assessment 
methods used by those supervising offenders on the extent and nature of the risk 
posed. The accreditation process will extend to the assessment tools, procedures, the 
circumstances in which they are employed and the agencies and practitioners who 
could use them. Importantly the Risk Management Authority should also provide 
guidance on the interpretation of evidence generated by any given risk assessment 
tool. All official reports submitted to the courts and to the Parole Board will 
eventually have been prepared by trained assessors using accredited methods. The 
Risk Management Authority would also have responsibility for the management of 
a new sentence called „An Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR)‟. This new 
sentence is designed for the lifetime control of serious violent and sexual offenders 
who are assessed as presenting a „high and continuing risk to the public‟. 
 
„We have already reviewed in the context of imprisonment the law and 
practice in relation to the imposition of a mandatory life sentence for 
murder and a discretionary life sentence for other crimes. Of its very nature, 
the latter species of life sentence need not be passed in any particular case, 
depending on the overall view taken by the sentencing judge. We believe 
there is a need for a lifelong sentence for certain individuals who commit 
crimes other than murder, which sentence would be passed only if strict 
legal criteria were met. We suggest that the new sentence should be called: 
„An Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR)‟ in order to distinguish it from 
(1) a sentence of life imprisonment, whether mandatory or discretionary
164
; 
and (2) an extended sentence‟ (Scottish Executive, 2000: 34) 
                                                 
164
 In Scotland, life imprisonment is the maximum penalty for all common law and certain statutory 
crimes. In cases of murder following the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 the sentence 
of life imprisonment is mandatory. Life sentences are either 'mandatory‟, that is, fixed by law, or 
'discretionary, the latter being the statutory term introduced under the Prisoners and Criminal 
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Part one of this chapter provided a historical background to the notion of the 
dangerous offender and the legislation that related to that category of offender. It 
focused on the developments in the USA and Canada which have been particularly 
relevant to recent developments in this area in Scotland. Part Two provided the 
official account of the emergence of the Risk Management Authority. It was 
highlighted in particular in this section that the Cosgrove and Maclean Committees 
were swayed by the authority of scientific expertise over that of statutory 
institutions in the sphere of criminal justice. The following section is a discourse 
analysis of the documents addressed in Part Two. As such, it is a study of language 
use in the particular context of the Commitment to Protect report and the MacLean 
Committee. This section will deal with the language of the reports, how the problem 
of dangerous offenders has been constructed and the blurring of science as an ideal 
and science in practice. For this last topic I will come out of the ideal notion of 
science constructed by the texts themselves and address the issue of validity in 
relation to risk assessment tools separately.  
 
 
III 
 
Legitimacy and the Neutrality of Language 
In chapter one we saw how subjects were elements of a linguistically disclosed 
world and that their understanding of that world was determined by the habitual 
manners and consciousness of a community of interests. Chapter Two argued that 
the role of language in erasing particularity and establishing such a community of 
                                                                                                                                         
Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 to distinguish life prisoners sentenced by the court to life (Machin, 
et al, 1999). 
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shared interests was essential for the legitimation of a social order. The erasing of 
particularity and the establishing of a consensus between agents or groups of 
differing interests occurs via the neutralisation of language and is particularly 
evident within the language of governmental reports. In Chapter Three the concept 
of mediation was presented as a means of establishing links between various levels 
of text to the broader historical context, and allowing the possibility of adapting 
analysis and findings from one level to another. Mediation is the classical dialectical 
term for the establishment of relationships between the formal aspects of a cultural 
or scientific work and its social ground (Jameson, 1989). The following section 
attempts to establish the mediatory links between the texts and the broader 
governmental legitimation strategies. These latter strategies will be outlined more 
clearly in part four of this chapter. 
 
„official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and its official uses. 
It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the 
constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language‟. 
(Bourdieu 1991: 45) 
 
In the discussion on epistemological beginnings in chapter three it was argued that 
in the social sciences the object of study is less the world itself than the 
interpretations through which we attempt to engage with and understand it 
(Jameson, 1989: 9). The approach adopted here is both historical and critical and is 
concerned with tracing the conditions of possibility
165
 of an emergent institution. 
The approach is negative in the terms outlined in chapter one as it does not attempt 
to propose or advance an alternative model of offender management in relation to 
sex offending to the one outlined. Instead it offers a socio historical study that sets 
out to contextualise the history of the Risk Management Authority and its functions 
                                                 
165
 See discussion of critique in chapter one 
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within the variety of discourses surrounding it. The focus of this section is therefore 
on what language does, how it relates to particular practices and how it is located 
within the particular network of discourses that produce a particular institution. The 
following is an analysis of the language by which the „official‟ account of the RMA 
is constructed. 
 
In chapter one, we saw that language was what we are born into. The symbolic 
world pre-exists us and because of this our understanding of the world is determined 
by the habitual manners and consciousness of a community of interests (Williams, 
1997). In chapter two, we also saw that in relation to the state, the liberal subject has 
been constructed as fully autonomous, transparent in their motives and in full 
possession of their rights. This form of recognition places the individual in the form 
of universality, in other words the subject is founded on the minimum 
commonalities of people and not on the properties that make them unique 
individuals. It was argued that this form of reasoning was a powerful mechanism of 
ideological legitimation from the eighteenth century onwards, for the very reason 
that it erased particularity.  
 
Not only does the state create its own subjects through the abstraction of 
recognition, but the state itself becomes a collective subject. As Burton and Carlen 
(1979: 46) argue: 
 
„State discourse uses the language of administrative rationality, normative 
redeemability and consensual values to indicate itself as functioning within 
a democratic mode of argument. The state‟s image as the embodiment of 
popular sovereignty appears because state discourse reproduces notions of 
the free choosing discriminating subjects and claims itself as their agency. 
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Within this imaginary form the state becomes the predicate of the collective 
subject‟. 
 
The usefulness in this distinction is that we may treat all texts of official discourse 
(those related to the official discourse of the state) as being composed by a single 
subject; the state.  
 
Bourdieu (1991: 40) emphasises the importance of language in erasing particularity. 
He writes that whenever it is a matter of establishing a consensus between agents or 
groups of differing interests, „the recourse to a neutralised language is obligatory‟. 
This neutralisation of language is particularly noticeable within the language of 
governmental reports; whether in the reports of expert committees such as those 
under discussion or research reports commissioned by government departments. 
Objectivity, or the apparent objectivity of such documents, is provided by the 
conventions of language rather than by the application of method
166
. It is important 
therefore at this point to recognise here a difference between the content of a text 
and the conventions on which it is constructed; the difference between the content 
of a text (its statement) and what in linguistics is called its mode of enunciation.  If 
we focus only on the content of a text we draw attention to its sense and reference. 
If we focus on its enunciation, we are interested in how something is being said, and 
in who is saying it. Enunciation is concerned with the conventions of language and 
in what language does; it is concerned also with the productive aspect of discourse, 
and in particular, with the authority of the author. In structuralist approaches to 
linguistics the author of a given text is constituted as a subject via language rather 
                                                 
166
 The relation between method and convention is more complex in research reports. 
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than existing as an autonomous individual, or group of individuals in the 
conventional sense
167
 (Barthes, 1982).  
 
In relation to the text chosen, devices used to neutralise official language include the 
situation of problems within a universal present. Official language avoids social 
scientific or historical concepts of time, e.g. episodic, structural or cyclical notions 
of time
168
. Official reports also avoid academic systems of referencing or citation; 
emphasis tends towards the conventions of „ordinary language.‟169 Neutralisation is 
also achieved by the avoidance or minimisation of any reference to cultural contexts 
or differences. For example, when the MacLean Committee outlined the RMA‟s 
areas of authority,
170
 which include the accreditation of risk assessment and 
management methods and processes developed within a cultural, social and legal 
context different from that of Scotland, the issue of neutralisation related to the 
content of the text as there was little space being given to a discussion on the 
possible problematic aspects of the migration of risk management tools and systems 
from one cultural context to another. But the techniques also related to the 
universalisation of certain assumptions; assumptions which are actually historical 
determined and relate to the broader themes of modernisation, best practice etc. 
These assumptions are connected not only to the constraints of form itself – for 
example the limitations designated via a particular report‟s remit– but to the 
habitual mode of address of official reports. An example of this habitual mode of 
                                                 
167
 „Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than 
the instance saying I: language knows a „subject‟ not a „person‟, and this subject, empty outside of 
the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language „hold together‟, suffices, that is to 
say, to exhaust it‟ (Barthes, 1982: 145) 
168
 See Wallerstein (1997) for a discussion on „TimeSpace‟ conceptions within the social sciences 
169
 See Williams (1980) on the limitations and ideological constraints of „ordinary language.‟ 
170
 „We would anticipate that the new Authority would monitor international developments in each of 
these areas, would evaluate their effectiveness and application to the Scottish context and, where 
appropriate, would accredit programmes, technologies and best practice for use by the service-
providing agencies in managing the offenders‟. 
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address – what Barthes171 (2000: 44) in another context termed the „universalisation 
of an intermediate myth‟ used by official institutions – is the assumed transparency 
and universality of language. This assumption relates specifically to a text‟s 
projected audience, the addressee to whom the „we‟ of the report communicates. 
The assumptions of education, social class, shared values and beliefs are reflected in 
a text‟s manner of enunciation, the choices of words, points of reference, and the 
tone and rhythm of its communication;  assumptions which in the end reflects the 
particular consciousness of the group of which the panel or committee is composed. 
The result of this mode of address is a framing of ideas within „reasonable‟172 and 
well defined limits. An example can be found below: 
 
„More generally, risk assessment is an example of David Hume‟s famous 
dictum, that one cannot derive an „ought‟ from an „is173‟. Decisions about 
what level of risk justifies some form of special measure are, ultimately, 
matters of social policy, not scientific measurement. Where thresholds are 
set, those who are just above the threshold may not differ markedly from 
those just below the threshold. Therefore, a graded and flexible set of 
responses is needed, not simply an attempt to „catch‟ the individuals 
presenting the highest risk‟.( Scottish Executive, 2000: 9) 
 
The above passage is unusual in that it directly makes a point of reference to a 
scientific authority by name, in this case the philosopher David Hume. It is unusual 
in the sense that whenever science is mentioned in the reports it is always referred to 
                                                 
171
 See discussion in chapter two on the liberal subject. 
172
 Official discourse represents what Rawls would characterise „public reason‟ a concept very 
different from a Habermas‟ notion of public reason. Rawls (2005) distinguishes public from non 
public reason. Public reason is related to governmental functions administrative acts and venues.  
173
 „In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the 
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, 
or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, that expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis 
necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; 
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.‟ Hume (1956) 
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in the abstract i.e. as a reference to a distinct body of knowledge. „David Hume‟s 
famous dictum, that one cannot derive an „ought‟ from an „is‟ assumes that the 
reader not only knows who David Hume is (there is no reference provided for the 
reader to find out if they do not) but also that they know the context of the dictum 
that one cannot derive an „ought‟ from an „is‟ (again there is no explanation given 
of Hume‟s argument).  The statement not only assumes a particular level of 
education but also that the reader shares particular values and beliefs in relation to 
what scientific enquiry should be. In this case: statements of value should not be 
derived from statements of fact.  It is therefore not only, in this case, the constraints 
of form, i.e. the remit of the panel that justify their recommendations – referred to in 
the line „Decisions about what level of risk justifies some form of special measure 
are, ultimately, matters of social policy‟ – but that their justification is based also on 
the support a very particular, although barely hinted at, conception of the role of 
science in relation to policy. That is, that decisions relating to morality or ethics are 
a matter of politics; decisions regarding, or drawn from science, are value free and 
neutral. The strict separation of policy decisions and scientific measurement is less 
clear than the statement infers. This last part of the statement, „Therefore, a graded 
and flexible set of responses is needed, not simply an attempt to „catch‟ the 
individuals presenting the highest risk‟, with its emphasis on „catch‟ in parenthesis, 
is another means of emphasising the distance of the committee from any hint of a 
baser intent. The statement makes clear that there is no populist or punitive 
motivation for their provisions, the committee‟s point of reference drawn from 
Hume, in the tone and rhythm of equitable reason, is the desire for „a graded and 
flexible set of responses‟. 
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What this mode of enunciation conceals however, is the fact that the Committee 
was set up on the very basis of an „ought‟ derived from an „is‟, i.e. there is a 
category of offender that presents a serious threat to the public and there ought to be 
a number of provisions available to prevent the harm that such an offender might 
pose.  
 
The point at issue here is the use of an idealised account of reason that is presented 
as the basis of decision making that is not only fraught with difficulty, but also can 
mask prejudice. One objection that has been raised against the logic of classification 
is that it entails negative labelling which results in stigmatising (Bauman, 1993)
174
. 
However, as Blackburn (1995) argues, classifying people or events is an inherent 
feature of language. Stigmatisation therefore does not occur within the classificatory 
systems themselves but when judgemental or informal stereotyping informs such 
schemes. It is not then the rigour or systematic quality of assessment that eliminates 
prejudice, as such schemes will reproduce or amplify the informal cultural and 
social prejudices of an institution. 
 
Risk assessment offers, along with its „emergent knowledge base‟, a scientific 
means of justifying this special measure of incarceration. A graded and flexible set 
of responses based on accredited risk assessment tools, in this reading, provides a 
rational and reasonable cover to a measure historically associated with more 
populist and punitive impulses. The arm‟s length guaranteed by systematic 
assessment is reflected also in the arm‟s length distance between the Risk 
Management Authority and Government.   
                                                 
174
 See chapter one. 
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„The RMA will be an executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB), 
funded by the Scottish Executive but working at arm‟s length from it. It will 
have three functions: 
 
– Policy and research. 
– Standards setting. 
– Operational. 
 
The Scottish Government drew from MacLean‟s recommendations on the Risk 
Management Authority, that it would „be operationally independent but carrying 
out functions on behalf of the Scottish Ministers‟ and therefore its appropriate status 
would be to function as a Non-Departmental Public Body. A feature of such a 
public body would be an expert Board supported by a standing staff complement.  
 
If the Risk Management Authority was to play a key role in the Executive‟s 
Programme for Government, it was argued that the arm‟s length distance between 
the Risk Management Authority and Government was necessary in the carrying out 
of the Executive‟s work in the area of public protection. It was not possible for the 
Risk Management Authority to carry out its three functions if it were to be 
positioned within the private sector; nor could any existing body or organisation in 
the public sector carry out its functions as, it was claimed, no existing body had the 
necessary combination of expertise, influence and cross-Scotland mandate that such 
a body would require. „The functions of the RMA are better undertaken at arms-
length from Ministers than by an agency under their control‟. As the Risk 
Management Authority would be involved in the setting of standards for and 
monitoring the work of agencies it was required that it should maintain an 
appropriate distance from them.  
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The Nature of the Problem 
„Some commentators suggest that the concern about sex offending over 
recent years and months reflects a form of 'moral panic', a preoccupying 
worry about a particular issue which sweeps across society and then abates. 
At times it has, for some, seemed as if the problems are beyond reasoned 
response, and this has sometimes ended in tragedy for innocent casualties.  
 
We do not think that the continuing expression of concern about sex 
offenders is a moral panic. Rather it reflects a determination that we should 
find more effective ways of dealing with sex offending to protect 
communities better. This report makes recommendations to achieve that.‟ 
(The Scottish Office, 1997: i) 
 
The above statement is striking in that it opens with a reference outside the context 
of the report: „Some commentators suggest that the concern about sex offending 
over recent years and months reflects a form of 'moral panic'. There is no citation 
regarding who these commentators are and no explanation of the arguments or 
evidence supporting this view
175
. The argument is presented merely to be dismissed 
as not worthy of consideration. It is dismissed outright in the first sentence of the 
second paragraph; „We do not think that the continuing expression of concern about 
sex offenders is a moral panic‟ – the „we‟ here indicating the view of the 
Government. However it is dismissed implicitly in the second sentence of the first 
paragraph; „At times it has, for some, seemed as if the problems are beyond 
reasoned response, and this has sometimes ended in tragedy for innocent 
casualties‟.  
 
There is no causal relation between the two sentences in the sense that the second 
sentence does not follow from the first. Yet a relation is made in the phrase „At 
times it has, for some…‟, the „for some‟ given particular emphasis as a counter to 
                                                 
175
 From Sutherland‟s (1950a and1950 b) work in the 50‟s there has been a number of works 
providing evidence on the background and nature of moral panics surrounding sex offenders (see 
Jenkins (1994) for the American experience and Silverman and Wilson (2002) for the British) 
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„Some commentators‟. It is clear from the passage that the „some‟ of the first 
sentence is not the same group as the „some‟ of the second sentence. The inference 
to be drawn from the first paragraph is not only that the second group does not have 
reason on its side (those caught up in the moral panic), but that neither does the first 
group, as their concerns or evidence for their views are not dealt with by the report. 
There is also an implication that the consequences of both views – not only the 
second, but the first view that the recent concern about sex offending is a form of 
'moral panic', and therefore leads to no action – may end „in tragedy for innocent 
casualties‟176. The above statement appears to mirror Luhmann‟s (1993) argument 
that the rationalist tradition can produce good reasons to adopt risk technologies; to 
reject them, particularly under today‟s conditions, would mean to abandon 
rationality. 
 
If the problem of sex offending can seem to be beyond reasoned response, what 
would a reasoned response look like? There is a category of offender that presents a 
serious threat to the public and there ought to be a number of provisions available to 
prevent the harm that such an offender might pose. However the statement does not 
go as far as saying that we know that the concern about sex offenders is not a moral 
panic, merely that „We do not think‟ that the recent concern about sex offenders is a 
moral panic. As a means of giving evidence to support the recommendations of the 
report it is argued that crimes of sex and of violence have not diminished in recent 
years.  
„The number of recorded crimes of violence rose by 75% between 1981 and 
1991 and has remained at an unacceptably high level since then. The 
                                                 
176
 As Soothill et al (2000) writes, it would be inappropriate to deny that there is a problem in 
relation to sex offending, there are also dangers in exaggerating the dangers related to sex offending. 
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number of recorded crimes of sexual assault fluctuated in the 1980s, but has 
increased by over 35% since 1991‟ (The Scottish Office, 1997:5) 
 
What is noticeable in the way that the evidence is presented is the lack of any 
context which would allow anything meaningful to be drawn from the two sets of 
statistics.  
 
We are told that the number of recorded crimes of violence rose by 75% between 
1981 and 1991; we are also informed that this has remained at an unacceptably high 
level since. Does this mean that it has remained at that level since then, and is 
unacceptable, or that it has dropped recently but is still unacceptable? 
 
The report gives the figures between 1991 and 1995 for crimes of sexual assault yet 
we are not presented with figures for violent crime. As we are not given the base 
rate for violent crime, we, therefore, cannot judge what 75% means in relation to the 
crime figures.  In relation to recorded crimes of sexual assault, unlike violent crime 
these figures fluctuated over the ten year period between 1981 and 1991, but have 
increased by over 35% since 1991. Again we are not given the base rate for crimes 
of sexual assault so therefore cannot judge what 35% means in this context.  
 
Most importantly for both these categories of crime we do not know whether there 
has been a rise in actual crime or a rise in the number of people reporting crimes 
within those categories. Obviously this does not provide a counter argument to the 
problem outlined; namely that we should not do something about the increased 
concern over sexual offending or find more effective ways of protecting the 
communities. It just means that such figures do not provide clear evidence as to 
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what the scale of the problem is.  
 
Not all crimes of violence are serious crimes; a distinction that is important if part 
of the intention of a reasoned response to sexual offending is to provide a clear 
definition of serious crime. The latter issue is a reflection on the problematic nature 
of defining violent or sexual crime from offence categories. This aspect is 
highlighted in the report. 
 
„Sex offending is difficult to define, as well as being complex to deal with. 
Criminal justice statistics categorise all offences related to sexual activity 
under the heading 'crimes of indecency'. This category includes a wide 
range of offences but our concern is with offences involving exploitation or 
assault. These include rape, sexual assault, homosexual assault, lewd, 
indecent or libidinous behaviour or practices, shameless indecency, and the 
possession of pornographic images of children under the age of 16. These 
offences require convicted sex offenders to register their names and 
addresses with the police in the area where they live. This report is about 
the arrangements for supervision in the community of sex offenders - 
primarily those convicted of these crimes‟. (The Scottish Office, 1997:4) 
 
Noticeable again in this statement is a split between two statements with no causal 
connection between them. The first statement tells us that „Sex offending is difficult 
to define, as well as being complex to deal with‟. It raises the issue outlined above 
on the problematic nature of defining violent or sexual crime from offence 
categories. The proceeding five sentences of the statement appears to tell us the 
exact opposite; namely that definitions are not only unproblematic but are clearly 
defined – rape, sexual assault, homosexual assault, lewd, indecent or libidinous 
behaviour or practices, shameless indecency, and the possession of pornographic 
images of children under the age of 16 - and can be used to categorise a specific 
group. 
 
 239 
What the paragraph shows is the complexity of the problem, both in terms of its 
definitions and the measuring of its extent, thus the need for a „reasoned response.‟ 
Yet we are still not presented with evidence that supports clearly the belief, so 
unambiguously outlined in the previous paragraph, that [w]e do not think that the 
continuing expression of concern about sex offenders is a moral panic‟.  
 
It is in search of such a reasoned response that the report looks to the „graded and 
flexible set of responses‟ of expert opinion and the promises of risk assessment. 
Earlier in the chapter we discussed the reference in the Maclean Report to Hume‟s 
dictum, „that one cannot derive an „ought‟ from an „is‟‟ and how it assumed a 
shared understanding on the part of the reader of what a reasoned approach to 
scientific enquiry might be. Central to this understanding was that statements of 
value should not be derived from statements of fact. This was further elaborated by 
reference to a more specific assumption that scientific statements are value free and 
neutral and that decisions relating to morality or ethics should be left to the political 
realm. The reasoning behind that statement was to use science, in particular the 
form of scientific measurement found in risk assessment, to provide a means of 
cancelling the perceived category error of Hume‟s dictum, and therefore perhaps 
remove the ambivalences found earlier in the report. If decisions on what level of 
risk should justify a special measure of security or incarceration are a policy matter 
- in other words the definition and degree of possible harms a particular offender 
may pose - science‟s hands are clean. The leap from fact to value is avoided by 
replacing values with probabilities. As Sparks, (2001) notes the question of risk 
arises wherever institutions attempt to scale negative outcomes and attach 
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probabilities to their future occurrence
177
. Wherever the avoidance of harm or an 
unwanted future event is articulated a moral judgement has been made (see also 
Douglas, 1994). The question for the MacLean Committee is a clear demarcation 
between those who make the moral judgments on levels of danger posed and those 
who carry out the assessment of risk. Another question however, is whether the 
scientific measurement of risk is as free from such moral judgement as the 
committee suggest. Although there is an assumption that such a notion of scientific 
impartiality is shared by the reader, it can only be maintained with reference to a 
very narrow conception of science.  
 
Throughout the MacLean Report there are references to new bodies of knowledge 
developing that, it is claimed, allow for the better management of particular 
categories of offender. In particular it is argued that there is greater expertise within 
criminal justice agencies in techniques for assessing risk. It is also argued that it is 
this „emergent knowledge base‟, developed, we are told, with such scientific rigour, 
and that it is sufficient in itself to justify new approaches to offender management. 
Central to these new approaches based on this knowledge is the creation of the Risk 
Management Authority itself.  
 
„We are aware that the approach we are proposing is premised on an 
emergent knowledge base. What is convincing about the knowledge that we 
have is the rigour with which it has been developed. That is sufficient for us 
to propose new procedures based on it. In doing so, however, we are 
conscious that those working in the field are going to be working in an area 
where knowledge can be expected to develop rapidly. This part of our 
recommendations therefore focuses on the role of the new Authority in 
keeping abreast of, and promoting, the best practice that is available 
internationally‟ (Scottish Executive, 2000: 19). 
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 See also O‟Malley „a future that may never happen but that must be guarded against‟ (O‟Malley, 
2004:8) 
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The role of language in official reports in establishing the habitual consciousness of 
a community of interests can be illustrated by the use of the first person plural in the 
quotation above. In the first and fourth sentence it is clear that the „we‟ refers to the 
committee, „we are aware that the approach we are proposing…‟, „we are 
conscious that those working in the field are going to be working in an area where 
knowledge can be expected to develop rapidly‟.  
 
However it is not clear who the „we‟ in the second sentence relates to. Is it the 
committee that possess the knowledge, or those agencies that work with or 
supervise offenders? Does it refer to all of us who in the end will be the 
beneficiaries of such knowledge? Whoever the „we‟ might refer to, its use 
establishes again a consensus between those on the committee and the reader, as 
well as conceals whatever differing theories, perspectives and interests there might 
be in relation to the knowledge discussed.  
 
This consensus is emphasised by the assurance that the knowledge is scientific, i.e. 
it is valid on account of its rigour, and it is the „best‟ available. The consensus is 
also maintained by the breadth of expertise promised by the Risk Management 
Authority. In order for the Risk Management Authority to demonstrate expertise 
within the different areas of its remit it is argued that it must draw from a wide 
range of disciplines. 
 
„The Authority will have to be demonstrably expert in the field of risk 
management. To achieve that, it will have to derive its expertise from a wide 
range of disciplines. As much of its work will be in influencing and co-
ordinating the work of existing agencies, its authority will derive not only 
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from its relationship to the Scottish Executive but from its credibility with 
those agencies‟(Scottish Executive, 2000: 19). 
 
The concealment of differing scientific theories, perspectives and interests 
mentioned above is furthered not only by the rhetorical use of the concept of 
„rigour‟ and „systematic‟ knowledge (both words are synecdoches178 that stand in 
for science in general) but by the concept of „expertise‟ and the new roles of the 
expert.  Both rigour and systematic knowledge are essential for science; whether or 
not it is „good‟ science or „best‟ possible knowledge is itself a judgement of value. 
However rigour and the unreflexive application of systematic method can also lead 
to scholasticism and forms of knowledge that have little explanatory power.  
 
The difference between forms of knowledge which help provide explanations of 
states of affairs and those which attempt to predict future events are very different 
and will be returned to later.  
 
The difference however is not between good and bad science. The language of best 
possible knowledge, or best practice does not come from the objective and rational 
scientific method, but from discourses of modernisation (an explicitly politicised 
form of discourse) and quality control; discourses that also use notions of rigour, 
systematic knowledge and expertise. The following statement draws on the idea of 
expertise firstly in relation to risk assessment and then slips unnoticed into its 
second frame of reference; that of quality control.  
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 A synecdoche is a linguistic device where a particular case stands in for the whole or a general 
case stands in for the specific. 
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The Panel found evidence of a growing expertise in criminal justice services 
in relation to their dealings with sex offenders. This is in large part due to 
the changes which followed the implementation of the Sex Offenders Act in 
1998. Agencies have responded quickly to the requirements placed upon 
them by the Act and there are now stronger systems and better working 
practices in place to manage sex offenders. An increasing awareness of 
techniques for assessing risk and the use of these has been an important 
development. All of this has taken place against a background of growing 
public concern for positive action to protect communities from harm 
(Scottish Executive, 2000: 19). 
 
Both forms of expertise are linked in this statement to public safety. As with earlier 
sections of the report there is again no causal link between expertise and safety, 
instead the association has been made implicitly in the phrase – „All of this has 
taken place against a background of growing public concern for positive action to 
protect communities from harm‟. 
 
The idea that science can „protect communities from harm‟ is nowhere more 
pronounced than in the faith in rigorous and systematic risk assessment. The 
rationale for the setting up of the risk management authority is based on this faith. 
 
The authority will be a centre of expertise for the assessment and 
management of risk. It will thus provide a valuable contribution to the 
Scottish Executive‟s objective of protecting the public from the risk posed by 
offenders, particularly serious violent and sexual offenders, whilst 
restricting an offender‟s liberty no more than is required for this purpose. 
 
In order to undertake its work effectively, the RMA will need to be an expert 
body, acknowledged as a leader in its field. The Board of the RMA will be 
appointed by the Scottish Ministers. It will comprise experienced 
representatives of a variety of disciplines which assess and manage risk, 
such as psychiatry, psychology, nursing, the law, the police, prisons and 
social work. 
 
The RMA will be expert in risk assessment and risk management. It will: 
Become a national centre of excellence in the field; Examine what works in 
risk assessment and risk management in a Scottish context; Promulgate best 
practice guidance; Set standards for risk assessment and risk management 
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of high risk offenders; and Ensure that the management of high risk 
offenders is based on those standards;  
 
The Maclean committee not only recommended the establishment of the Risk 
Management Authority but recommended particular approaches to risk assessment. 
 
All agencies involved in work with sex offenders should adopt the structured 
clinical approach to risk assessment and should use recognised structured 
tools as part of this approach. Each agency should undertake a regular 
audit of the use of such tools by its staff. 
 
Current research evidence suggests that the structured clinical approach to 
risk assessment provides a more accurate assessment than either the 
actuarial or clinical approach. Assessment frameworks which use actuarial 
information in a structured way to enhance professional judgements based 
on knowledge of the offender‟s personality, habits and lifestyle and analysis 
of the circumstances of the offence offer the best prospects both for risk 
assessment and for the management of identified risks. It is essential that 
best practice is disseminated throughout the relevant professions and 
agencies, and that staff adopt a consistent approach to this task based on 
research evidence. Regular audit by agencies of the structured clinical 
approach and associated tools used by their workers will help ensure that 
best practice is maintained throughout each organisation 
 
The fact that research evidence favours a structured clinical approach to risk 
assessment over other approaches does not necessarily mean that the predictive 
power of structured clinical assessments is compelling, merely that it is slightly 
better than the other two approaches, clinical and actuarial.  
 
Structured risk scales have sufficient accuracy in predicting sex offence 
recidivism to be useful in applied contexts. The predictive accuracy is far 
from perfect, but it is clearly superior to other methods commonly used to 
assess risk with sex offenders (e.g. unstructured clinical judgement) (Hanson 
& Thornton, 1999). 
 
The „sufficient accuracy‟ of structured clinical approaches must be understood in 
the context of the doubtful validity of unstructured clinical assessments. The latter 
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of which, in relation to the prediction of sex offence recidivism, is not much better 
than chance.  
 
„Although many decisions require risk assessments, the procedures used for 
making such assessments often have limited validity. In general, the average 
predictive accuracy of professional judgement to predict sex offence 
recidivism is only slightly better than chance (Hanson & Bussière, 1998). 
Some have even argued that the accuracy of prediction is sufficiently low 
that it threatens the very basis of risk-based legal sanctions for sex 
offenders‟ (Hanson 1997). 
 
 
The reference to „rigour‟ and „systematic knowledge‟ in relation to risk assessment 
while appropriate is also problematic. While risk assessment may draw on 
„systematic knowledge‟ and be rigorously pursued, neither of these attributes 
guarantees validity.  
 
The Blurring between Science as Ideal and Science in Practice 
The following section will take a step back from direct textual analysis of the 
Maclean report to look at non-structured (clinical), actuarial and structured clinical 
approaches in relation to the question of validity as assumptions about such 
approaches lie at the heart of the report. 
 
Unstructured Clinical Risk Assessments 
Blackburn (1995) argues that the traditional model of classification in the natural 
sciences is the Linnaean classification of plants. In this system particular attributes 
are divided into classes on the basis of a common principle, such as variation in 
form or function. Such classes are assumed to be both homogeneous and mutually 
exclusive. However, as Blackburn (1995) points out, the everyday categorical 
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thinking of psychiatry or criminology rarely meet such scientific requirements and 
frequently imposes artificial boundaries between normality and abnormality.  
 
Psychiatric classification falls into four types, the last being actuarial which we will 
return to later. The first is formed from subjective impressions of an ideal type. This 
system represents exemplary features shared by group members. An example of this 
classificatory system is the „Cleckley checklist for psychopathy‟179(Andrews and 
Bonta, 1998: 99).  The second system is one where members are distinguished by 
attributes drawn from a particular theory. An example of this is the classifications 
from the Freudian theory of neurosis. In the third, the members are grouped 
pragmatically by combining variables of immediate interest. Examples of these are 
forms of risk assessment that have drawn from a range of classificatory schemes to 
serve a range of purposes. Many early and contemporary structured clinical 
approaches fit this scheme. The fourth is generated actuarially using multivariate 
statistical methods. 
 
Blackburn (1995: 61-62) argues that whatever the system of classification, its 
adequacy depends on the reliability of the criteria, how consistently it is applied and 
its theoretical relevance to explanation and prediction.  
 
„Many systems fail to meet these requirements because they do not apply a 
common principle of classification. For example, psychiatric classification 
                                                 
179
 Characteristics of the Cleckley checklist for psychopathy are: „superficial charm; good 
intelligence (not retarded); absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking (not 
psychotic); absence of nervousness (not neurotic); unreliability; untruthfulness and insincerity; lack 
of remorse or shame; inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour; poor judgement and failure to 
learn from experience; pathological egocentricity and incapability for love; general poverty in major 
affective relations; specific loss of insight; unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations; 
fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink (and sometimes without); impersonal, trivial and 
poorly integrated sex life; and failure to follow any life plan (Andrews and Bonta, 1998: 99). 
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continues to identify some categories by observed dysfunctions (e.g. 
depressive disorder), others by aetiology (organic personality disorder), and 
others by theory (conversion hysteria). This creates classes which are not 
mutually exclusive, and although the reliability of psychiatric classification 
has recently been improved, validity of many classes remains to be 
established‟180.  
 
Actuarial Risk Assessments 
As we have seen earlier the MacLean Committee recommended the use of 
structured clinical risk assessments; the rationale for this being based on research 
evidence from Canada and the USA. The committee noted that at the time of the 
report a clinical approach was currently most widespread in Scotland. Actuarial 
approaches were criticised as having a number of weaknesses in relation to their 
predictive accuracy in relation to a Scottish offender population. Although this is 
certainly the case, the key problem with actuarial approaches is one of false 
positives. This question was not addressed in the reports, presumably because 
purely actuarial tools were not being considered. However, structured clinical 
approaches do involve an actuarial element, and the false positive problem is still 
relevant. The following section will deal with the limitations of actuarial tools and 
outline the problem of false positives. 
 
The aim of actuarial risk assessment tools, while based on scientific method 
(inferential statistics), is at the same time a distortion/inversion of the principles of 
inferential statistics. Inferential statistics infers to a general population the 
                                                 
180
 The psychological classification of offenders has developed separately from psychiatric 
classification. Offender classification is concerned more with behaviour patterns than with the 
diagnosis of disorder. However, shared characteristics can be found in criminal and clinical samples. 
One such overlap is in the shared use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III-R; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1987) DSM-III sought to improve the reliability of psychiatric 
diagnosis by introducing operational criteria for each disorder to define specific categories. However, 
despite this innovation the reliability of clinical judgements of personality disorders remain low. This 
low level of reliability seriously restricts the usefulness of the classification (Blackburn, 1995). 
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characteristics of a sample population. For example from a sample population it will 
be possible to infer the probability of what characteristics correlating to offending 
behaviour may be prevalent in the community at large.  What actuarial risk 
assessment tools aim to do is the opposite of this. Actuarial risk assessment tools 
attempt to calculate the probability of the person being assessed committing an 
offence within the next six to twelve months based on knowledge we have of 
offender characteristics of the population at large. In other words it infers from the 
general population to the sample (the person being assessed). While unusual, there 
is no doubt that this inversion has methodological arguments in its favour (see 
Andrews and Bonta, 1998). Actuarial approaches are both rigorous and systematic; 
however being rigorous and systematic does not necessarily mean we can have the 
same confidence in the results as we might with the results of statistical analysis as 
it is conventionally understood. It is important also to point out that the outcome of 
actuarial assessments are measures of probability, i.e. a value between 1 and 0. 
Whether, for example, a 0.45 likelihood of reoffending in six months presents a 
low, medium or high risk is a matter of judgement (i.e. value) and not one of fact. 
Even in attempts to predict general criminal recidivism there is agreement that this 
is achieved only with moderate accuracy (Andrews & Bonta, 1998).  It is these 
weaknesses of actuarial tools which makes structured clinical approaches attractive. 
This structured clinical approach is a combination of clinical and actuarial 
approaches i.e. the approach has the probability scores of actuarial tools combined 
with the judgment of a professional based on professional opinion; although, as we 
have seen above, the validity of the latter has been severely questioned. 
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Structured Clinical Approaches 
The purpose in saying all this is not to dismiss risk assessment as a process, as 
Steadman & Monahan et al (1996: 297) argue „Risk must be treated as a probability 
estimate that changes over time and context‟, risk assessment must be a continuous 
process rather than a one off assessment. The aim here, however, is to show that the 
rigorous and systematic aspects highlighted in the literature do not reside in the 
tools themselves but must be brought to the tools by the practitioner. The tools do 
not provide an answer to whether or not an individual poses a risk, but help to 
structure the thinking of those who have to make that decision. In relation to this it 
is interesting to note that although research has suggested that it is possible to 
predict sexual recidivism - in this case The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) 
which uses a different set of factors than those that predict general recidivism - the 
resource requirements are considerable.  
 
„it is unlikely that assessors concerned with cost and efficiency would be 
interested in using the VRAG as a measure of sex offense recidivism risk, 
given the VRAG‟s substantial resource requirements (i.e., professionally 
trained interviewers and careful file review)‟ (Hanson, 1997). 
 
Rigour and systematic method alone does not offer a protection against the 
weaknesses of the tools, they also require to be combined with considerable 
professional training and investment.  
 
As mentioned above, because the accuracy of prediction of risk assessment tools is 
so low it threatens the foundations of risk-based provisions for sex offenders 
(Hanson 1997). An important issue in relation to the poor predictive powers of risk 
assessment tools is the problem of false positives or negatives. A „false positive‟ is a 
 250 
case where an individual is assessed with a high risk of reoffending, who does not 
offend when eventually released from custody or supervision. A „false negative‟ is 
the reverse where someone is assessed as having a low risk of reoffending but 
offends after release. The first is a civil liberty concern the second is one of public 
protection. Hood et al (2002) in researching Parole Board decisions on sex 
offenders found that out of 162 prisoners followed up four years after their date of 
release from custody, there was a high proportion (92%) of those who were 
identified as „high risk‟ by a member of the Parole Board panel turned out not to 
have been convicted of a sexual offence by the end of this follow up period; in the 
sense given to the term above they were the „false positives‟; when the researcher 
team included reconvictions for serious violent offences, i.e. offences that were not 
sexual, the proportion of „false positives‟ were still as high as 87%. When 94 
individuals from this group of prisoners were followed-up after six years from their 
release, the „false positive‟ rate fell, but remained a high proportion at 78% per cent 
for a sexual reconviction and 72% when reconvictions from both sexual and serious 
violent offences were combined. An interesting finding in relation to risk offences 
was also noted in this research, as noted above, risk assessment must be a 
continuous process rather than a one off assessment. Hood et al (2002) found that 
there was a higher proportion of „false positives‟ in the last review than in earlier 
reviews or the original assessment, i.e. in the last assessment before release. The 
factor that raised the level of risk in this case appeared to be the circumstantial 
factor of immanent release.  
 
In contrast to the „false positive‟ findings, where the prisoner was not identified as a 
„high risk‟ by a member of the Parole Board panel, the prediction was nearly always 
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found out to be correct; only one such prisoner was reconvicted of a sexual offence. 
In other words out of the 162 cases there was only one „false negative‟. In terms of 
the civil liberty and public protection concerns, the above research indicates the 
balance of error to be strongly weighted towards producing „false positives‟. That is, 
if decisions regarding preventive sentences were based on such assessments, it is 
more likely for individuals who may not pose a threat to be incarcerated, than for 
those that do to be released.  
 
It is important to mention that we also have to be careful what we draw from such 
conclusions. The research focuses on reconviction after a particular time period not 
reoffending.  It is generally true in research on reconviction, that sex offenders have 
lower reconviction rates than other categories of offender. The reason for this is not 
that sex offenders are less likely to re-offend than other offenders, but because of 
the nature of the offence. Victim surveys show that the reporting of sexual abuse or 
assault is lower that the reporting of other offences; whether due to the risk of 
further violence; emotional trauma in reliving the experience in court; shame on the 
part of the victim; and a lack of confidence in the court system. It is also an offence 
that is difficult in getting a conviction even when the charge is brought to court. So 
in terms of re-offending, we simply do not know whether those who were „false 
positivists‟ did or did not re-offend over that period. We only know whether they 
were reconvicted. This may lower the actual proportion of „false positives‟ in the 
sample. The research also was carried out during the early 1990‟s and from the 
paper it could be drawn that the risk assessments that were carried out were clinical 
assessments with limited validity in predictive accuracy. So this research does not 
provide arguments in favour or arguments against risk assessment in general. If 
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structured clinical approaches were used it is possible that the „false positives‟ 
would have been lower. Better risk assessment will obviously reduce the problem of 
„false positives‟ and „false negatives‟. However, it is important to note that risk 
assessment by itself will not eliminate them. The question that this research raises is 
whether the risk-based provisions for sex offenders as a particular category of 
offender, i.e. post-sentence detention, community notification, lifetime community 
supervision etc, can be justified on the basis of assessment tools, even at the level of 
accuracy that they claim today.  
 
The investing of risk assessment tools with the qualities of rigour and „scientific‟ 
objectivity raises serious questions about the role that research evidence is expected 
to play. To return to the Maclean report, it recommends that research is essential to 
improve risk assessment, that best practice is disseminated throughout the relevant 
professions and agencies, and that staff adopt a consistent approach to this task 
based on research evidence. It also suggests that regular audit by agencies of the 
structured clinical approach and associated tools used by their workers will help 
ensure that best practice is maintained throughout each organisation. However, there 
is a blurring between science as a body of knowledge, in this case psychology and 
its instruments (risk assessment instruments), and science as management (systems 
of audit and control etc). Not only are specific approaches recommended on 
research evidence of a particular discipline but the designation of expert in the 
scientific or criminological sphere as opposed to the expertise of the practitioner has 
been narrowed to forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. Here the report not only 
recommends that all agencies involved in work with sex offenders should adopt a 
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particular approach but that a particular discipline is highlighted as the privileged 
site of knowledge for such offenders. 
 
Additional resources should be provided to recruit, train and employ more 
clinical or forensic psychologists and more forensic psychiatrists. 
 
Forensic and clinical psychologists have a key contribution to make to the 
assessment of risk by administering psychometric and other tests. We are 
aware that there is already insufficient provision of forensic and clinical 
psychology services in some parts of the country to the extent that there have 
been difficulties in obtaining post conviction reports for the court. The 
current lack of provision is unlikely to improve unless there is substantial 
additional investment in the recruitment and training of psychologists […] 
and the increased involvement of psychologists in the delivery of community 
based personal change programmes which we advocate (The Scottish 
Government, 2001: 32) 
 
As mentioned earlier, a synecdoche is a linguistic device where a particular case 
stands in for the whole or a general case stands in for the specific. In this case it is 
the psychological sciences that stand in for science as a whole. At one level this is 
understandable, both forensic and clinical psychologists have a central role because 
the development of assessment tools and the correct administration of assessments 
rely on their expertise. However, the recommendation for a singular approach to sex 
offenders regulated by research from a singular discipline not only privileges a 
distinct body of knowledge but advocates a specific understanding of human nature.  
 
Part one of this chapter attempted to locate the Risk Management Authority in a 
longer history about dangerousness – a historical perspective that it is argued is 
missing from current policy debates relating to sexual offending.  Part two and part 
three of the chapter shifted focus from the broadly historical to the particular in 
order to analyse specific policy documents relating to the Risk Management 
Authority.  The aim here in part three was to critically examine the legitimation 
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claims of the commitee responsible for setting up this organisation by analysing the 
Maclean report both in content and style.  The final section brings us up to date and 
looks at how the Risk Management Authority fits in with recent crime initiatives 
from the Scottish Government. In doing so it present the thesis that the Risk 
Management Authority intersects with residual discourses about multi-agency crime 
prevention as well as new discourses which relate to modernization, community, 
and dangerous and violent offenders 
 
IV 
 
Community, Modernisation and Risk 
Part four of this chapter will examine the Risk Management Authority as it 
currently exists. It will show how the RMA fits in with a reconceptualisation taking 
place within Scottish debates on dangerous offenders which has been brought about 
by the intersection of three key discourses. Firstly, the symbolisation of community 
and the restructuring of institutional boundaries related to the establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament in 1999. This was characterised by a concern with finding 
culturally relevant solutions to a home grown crime problems and which focussed 
on „protecting the public‟ from crime and „improve community safety‟. Secondly, 
the Risk Management Authority‟s managerial remit was instrumental to New 
Labour‟s modernization agenda; thirdly, discourses not only about the management 
of dangerous offenders, but managing offenders in general. Earlier in this chapter in 
relation to the concept of psychopathy, it was argued that it was not reason that 
guided social action but indeterminacy. In the following section we return to 
indeterminacy, this time in relation to the conceptualisation of community. Here a 
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range of discourses drawing on locality, accountability, security and modernization 
are all called upon as a means of enunciating consensus and legitimating 
Government policy on crime. Perhaps the most surprising articulation of community 
in relation to the legislation surrounding dangerous offenders is the blurring of the 
local and the international, where the resurgence of dangerousness offender 
legislation, under the guise of community protection, directly influenced by earlier 
initiatives in the USA and Canada, has been re-branded as „Scottish solutions […] 
devised to meet Scottish problems‟. 
 
Language and the Migration of Symbols 
 
„To speak of rites of institution is to suggest that all rites tend to consecrate or 
legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary 
nature of the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate; or, what 
amounts to the same thing, they tend to involve a solemn transgression, i.e. one 
conducted in a lawful and extra-ordinary way, of the limits which constitute the 
social and mental order which rites are designed to safeguard at all costs‟ 
(Bourdieu, 1991:118) 
 
When analysing institutional forms and their relationship to discourse it is important 
to note that we are concerned not only with language, but also with how language 
structures and legitimises these forms. In chapter two it was argued that legitimacy 
was related to belief and as such was distinct from coercion in that it describes the 
acceptance of an authority or social order without the imposition of violence. We 
saw that belief in the rationality of science competes with belief in the rationality of 
law in modern societies (Lyotard, 1984). The belief in science is based in the 
certainty that the existing social order has the competence to find a „technical‟ 
solution to its gravest problems. Therefore the acceptance of a social order was 
based as much on technical rationalisation and expertise as it is on the legality of its 
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system of law. It was argued that it was in this context that the legitimacy of the 
scientific expert, whether in the forms of psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis or 
criminology, has been important.  
 
In the case of the Risk Management Authority, it is part of its remit to play an active 
role in the symbolisation/mobilisation of its own authority. 
 
„we have identified national indicators that are relevant to our work and 
have used these as reference points in developing our strategy. We are also 
looking at ways to strengthen our relationships with our sponsor 
department, ensuring we are working in alignment with each other. We are 
identifying public bodies and other key stakeholders to develop and improve 
communication with them. This is to establish how we can effect savings, 
increase effectiveness and efficiency and create a synergy. These are all 
ongoing processes and we will build on the work of the last four years, 
strengthening our position as we move forward.‟(Risk Management 
Authority (2001a: 3) 
 
This section of the chapter focuses on the symbolic redrawing of institutional 
boundaries and examines the role of symbolism in understanding how the Risk 
Management Authority became embedded and extended its influence in Scotland‟s 
criminal justice scene. The background of this symbolic restructuring of 
institutional boundaries was the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999.  
 
The Symbolisation of a Community 
 
The Scotland Act 1998 reconstituted a separate Scottish Parliament in 1999 
with its own Justice Department with sole responsibility for criminal justice 
matters. Over this period of the reconstitution of the Scottish Parliament, the 
Commitment to Protect report had already been published and the Cosgrove 
and McLean Committees had been established. However, these 
developments were only a part of a broader agenda for change that related 
to the reconfiguration of criminal justice institutions in Scotland (The 
Scottish Office, 1999: 23).  
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The first statement of intent for the new parliament in relation to crime was the 
document Safer Scotland: Tackling Crime and its Causes (The Scottish Office, 
1999).  
 
We were elected in May 1997 on a promise to be tough on crime and the 
causes of crime. The Government's paramount concern is public safety and 
a belief that everyone should feel safe in their communities and in their own 
homes. That means protecting the public by crime prevention and by dealing 
effectively with crime when it is committed. But our promise, and our 
distinctive approach, means attacking the causes of crime and disorder, as 
well as crime itself (The Scottish Office, 1999: 1). 
 
While the foreword outlined the government‟s strategy - one that recognised the 
complexity of the crime as a problem which needed a comprehensive and thoughtful 
range of solutions – it also emphasised in the New Labour language of the time, that 
Safer Scotland: Tackling Crime and its Causes was a people's agenda. The 
Government's approach was based on four key principles. Fairness for all those 
involved in the criminal justice system with particular emphasis on victims and 
witnesses; addressing the social causes of crime via a range of social inclusion and 
an emphasis on responsibility; a justice system that was to be more efficient and 
effective in the delivery of justice; and, most importantly in terms of emphasis, a 
commitment to protect the public. These principles were further underlined by a 
declared commitment to treating the problem of crime as culturally embedded and 
to finding local solutions to local problems. 
 
„The Government's emphasis is on long-term planning to produce long-term 
results and the paper provides a description of what we have done, what we 
plan to do and how it all fits together to improve public safety for all those 
who live in Scotland…the Scottish Parliament will provide the forum for 
considering any necessary changes to the criminal law. The creation of the 
Parliament will help ensure in this field, as in others, that Scottish solutions 
are devised to meet Scottish problems‟ (The Scottish Office, 1999).  
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This commitment to finding culturally relevant solutions to a home-grown crime 
problem was outlined within a symbolic appeal to „the people‟. This appeal sought 
consensus not through the objective and expert language of the committee reports, 
but through an assumed discourse of intimacy with the reader and shared 
membership of a distinct political community. A key theme throughout government 
documents at this time was a „safer Scotland‟. A corporate logo was also designed 
at this time for the cover of a range of official publications including: Safer 
Scotland: Tackling Crime and its Causes; Reduce, Rehabilitate, Reform: a 
consultation on reducing reoffending in Scotland.  
 
The public is entitled to expect protection from crime and the Government 
are committed to building a society in which individuals, families and their 
communities can live and work without fear of crime. The Government are 
committed to tackling the unacceptable level of anti-social behaviour and 
crime on Scotland's streets and to addressing problems of disruptive 
neighbours (The Scottish Office, 1999: 2).  
 
The theme of a „Safer Scotland‟ was bolstered by a set of initiatives (Safer 
Communities Through Partnerships; Communities that Care) that the Government 
were aiming to pursue to „protecting the public‟ from crime and „improve 
community safety‟ [ref]. Three areas that the Government argued gave particular 
cause for concern to the public was anti-social behaviour, drugs misuse and sex 
offending. 
   
On Modernisation 
A second area of symbolisation within the new Parliaments proposals was related to 
New Labour‟s modernization agenda.  
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„A successful criminal justice system never stands still. It must be 
continuously reviewed and modernised‟. 
 
Although there is little debate as to what a successful criminal justice system might 
be - it is difficult to grasp what „successful‟ means in the context of the system as a 
whole – nor why it must be continuously reviewed and modernised. The closest we 
get to an answer is that in order to improve crime detection and conviction rates the 
system must be „streamlined‟ to ensure efficiency and that there must be improved 
coordination between the institutions involved.  
 
„The Government recognise the need to streamline the criminal justice 
system to improve crime detection and conviction rates. A high risk of 
conviction, rather than any particular penalty, is the most effective deterrent 
to crime. We have taken that commitment forward by addressing the way in 
which the various organisations and agencies involved in the system work 
together to ensure an effective, efficient and co-ordinated approach‟ (The 
Scottish Office, 1999: 19). 
 
The changes outlined in this paper are embedded in a series of overlapping 
discourses whose boundaries are not distinct. Discourses that are often perceived as 
antagonistic (the Gesellschaft values of modernization vs the Gemeinschaft values 
of community) are here merged; impersonal discourses of economic rationality and 
managerialism (Total Quality Management in the form of continuous improvement 
and best value) are combined with the intimacy of political populism and its appeal 
to the local, community and the people. Both of these distinct discourses were 
neatly brought together under the slogan: Smarter Justice, Safer Communities. 
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In relation to the managerialist discourse of the former, the „success‟ of the law 
itself is characterised not by legality, but as an institution with particular social 
objectives, legitimated through criteria of efficiency rather than the classical 
principles of justice
181
. 
 
„How the law succeeds in achieving its objectives also depends crucially 
upon how efficiently it operates‟ (The Scottish Office, 1999: 26). 
 
The merging of the symbolism of „community‟ with a language of „modernisation‟ - 
of „partnership working‟ and „effective management‟ - is also present in the 
language of the Risk Management Authority as it currently defines itself.  
 
„The RMA undertakes work with agencies, organisations and individuals to 
ensure effective assessment and management of serious violent and sexual 
offenders. The RMA contributes to a number of national working groups and 
projects including: National Advisory Body for Offender Management, 
MAPPA Working Group, Risk Assessment Management Pathways Working 
Goup, National Standards for Criminal Justice Social Work Project 
Advisory Group, SA07 Implementation Group and the LSCMI
182
 
Implementation Group. In addition we are often asked to advise on specific 
matters related to risk management for example the Scottish Prison Service 
recently approached the RMA to advise them in their internal review of their 
Open Estates following the Foye case
183
. The RMA sponsored and chaired 
the second ACPOS/RMA/ADSW Think Tank on January 23rd. The themes 
discussed were performance management, public confidence and media 
management‟ (Risk Management Authority, 2008:4) .184 
 
                                                 
181
 See chapter two on the shift from legality as a category of legitimacy to substantive 
understandings of law and the economy.  
182
„SA07 targets two types of dynamic risk factors considered to be associated with the sexual 
offender population. The RMA have recently commissioned the design of an evaluation package for 
the SA07 in Scotland. The Level of Service Case Management Inventory (LSCMI) is an offender 
assessment and management tool that incorporates the principles of risk, need and responsivity. It is 
a substantial revision of the existing, widely used LSI – R assessment tool‟. 
183
 In January 2008 an internal review was carried out by the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) into the 
case of Robert Foye. Foye admitted raping a 16-year-old girl in Cumbernauld in August 2007 while 
on day release from SPS Open Estate. He was previously sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for the 
attempted murder of a policeman. 
184
 The director of the RMA also sits on a British Psychological Society (BPS) working party on the 
risk assessment of terrorists. 
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The statement above from the Risk Management Authority illustrates how broadly 
the remit of the Authority has been interpreted. Here the Authority‟s influence is 
much broader than its original focus, outlined in the Maclean report, on dangerous, 
violent and sexual offenders. Two new key areas of involvement are The National 
Advisory Body on Offender Management established in 2006 and the Multi Agency 
Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). 
 
The first of these bodies was established to deal with what were perceived to be 
Scotland's high re-offending rates. This was set up under the Government‟s national 
strategy for managing offenders and operates as a similar model to the earlier 
Scottish Council on Crime; that is, as a panel of experts that will provide advice on 
best practice and on the shape and direction of offender management. The National 
Advisory Body‟s remit is also to support the work of the new Community Justice 
Authorities (CJAs)
185
.  
 
As well as including representation from the Risk Management Authority, members 
of the The National Advisory Body on Offender Management include the Minister 
for Justice (Chair) and two other members of the Justice Department, the Scottish 
Prison Service, members from the Association of Directors or Social Work, the 
Parole Board, the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, the Scottish 
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 The Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) were established after the consultation document 
'Supporting Safer, Stronger Communities'  in 2005. Eight local Community Justice Authorities 
(CJAs) were set up to provide a co-ordinated approach to planning and monitoring the delivery of 
offender services by planning, managing performance and reporting on performance by local 
authorities or groups of local authorities. Their aim is to target services to reduce reoffending and to 
ensure close co-operation between community and prison services to aid the rehabilitation of 
offenders. The legislation supporting the CJAs also give Ministers new powers to intervene if either 
SPS or councils fail to adequately reduce reoffending. 
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Association of the Care and Re-settlement of Offenders, COSLA, Victim Support 
Scotland  and APEX, as well as a number of academics and two lay members.  
 
„The RMA has plenty more to contribute to the National Performance 
Outcomes, to MAPPA and the challenges laid down by the Prisons‟ 
Commission and I look forward to seeing the influence of the RMA 
continuing to make a significant contribution to public safety in Scotland‟ 
(Risk Management Authority, 2008:4). 
 
The Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) were set up under the 
provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act 
2005. They fulfil recommendation 49 of the report of the Expert Panel on Sex 
Offending:  
 
„to place a statutory duty on Chief Constables and Chief Social Work 
Officers to jointly establish arrangements for assessing, monitoring and 
managing risk‟.  
 
MAPPAs developed along the lines of those of the Multi Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements (MAPPA) in operation in England and Wales. Their key purpose is 
to ensure public safety and the reduction of serious harm. The guidance highlights 
the protection of children and vulnerable adults as paramount. Like The National 
Advisory Body on Offender Management MAPPAs draw from expert knowledge 
and are multi-disciplinary in their membership. They include the Scottish Prison 
Service the Health Service, the police and local authorities. The Risk Management 
Authority is a key voice in the co-ordination of MAPPAs and is central to its remit 
in developing best practice in the risk management of sexual and violent offenders. 
 
The Symbolisation of the Dangerous Offender 
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The MAPPAs relationship to the Risk Management Authority is particularly 
interesting in relation to this thesis as a whole, as together they bring the two 
discourses already mentioned, modernization and community, with the third one of 
dangerous and violent offenders. In terms of efficiency, MAPPAs were partly 
constructed as a means of targeting resources where they were most required. 
However, these three discourses have been brought together explicitly as a means of 
breaking down and reconfiguring institutional boundaries. 
 
„The need for the introduction of statutory provision and a partnership 
approach to the management of the risk posed by sexual and violent 
offenders has been further highlighted by recent high profile sex offender 
cases in which it was apparent that the capacity of individual agencies to 
assess, plan and manage the needs of offenders who pose a risk to the 
community is diminished because of the natural limit imposed by each 
agency‟s statutory function and professional boundaries (The Scottish 
Office, 1999: 6)‟ 
 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue that discourses are continually being 
operationalised in new ways of acting and interacting. In this case not only can 
residual discourses become operationalised within new settings and languages (e.g. 
positivism becoming operationalised via the language of risk, political populism and 
managerialism) but,  and despite the declaration that Scottish solutions will be 
devised to meet Scottish problems, they are also given new life by borrowing from 
different cultural practices.  
 
The emphasis on „Scottish solutions […] devised to meet Scottish problems‟ is part 
of the symbolisation of community brought about by the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament, however, it could also be argued that the discourses around community 
have also been „learned‟ from other jurisdictions where appeals to the community 
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have been used to legitimate penal policy. As outlined earlier in this chapter, one of 
the remits of the Risk Management Authority was to keep abreast of international 
developments in what the MacLean Committee identified as a new and emergent 
knowledge base in relation to dangerous, sexual and violent offenders. As we have 
seen, this emergent knowledge base was particularly identified with the 
developments occurring within the North American and Canadian jurisdictions both 
of which, contrary to the earlier Scottish approaches to working with offenders, 
treated dangerous offenders as a distinct category of offenders. Although both the 
MacLean and the Cosgrove Committee were cautious about the applicability of 
these approaches to the Scottish context they were enthusiastic in adopting a distinct 
category for such offenders, and in their support for structured risk assessment and 
systems of accreditation of programmes and programme delivery systems.  
 
Both in our work looking at developments in the United Kingdom and in our 
fact finding visits abroad, we were presented with evidence of a rapidly 
developing expertise in assessing the risks presented by violent offenders 
and in developing interventions designed to lessen the risks. We saw 
evidence of a lively but small international community working in this field, 
and in Canada, in particular, there was evidence of effective communication 
between that community and policymakers. The developments we saw offer a 
real opportunity in Scotland to achieve better protection for the public from 
this group of offenders. What we did not find, however, were effective 
mechanisms in Scotland for benefiting from the developments we saw. We 
see a need, if that opportunity is to be realised, to introduce means for 
keeping abreast of the methodologies and technologies of risk management 
as they are developed, and for making them available to practitioners 
(Scottish Executive, 2000: 16). 
 
Importantly, the McLean Committee were interested in the reconfiguring of 
institutional boundaries as a means of ensuring cross institutional collaboration, not 
only in terms of the criminal justice system, but in terms of the research community 
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and the state; in both of these areas they looked towards the Correctional Service in 
Canada for a model.  
 
The result of this is the blurring of the local and the international, as the resurgence 
of dangerousness offender legislation, under the guise of community protection, is 
presented as a response to local problems, while directly adopted from the earlier 
initiatives in the USA and Canada. The key tenets of the community protection 
model which developed in this North American context are all recontextualised 
within current multi-agency approaches in Scotland. These include the following 
beliefs that sexual and violent offenders pose a serious and persistent threat  to 
women and children; too much attention has been given to the rights of offenders 
and insufficient attention to the rights of the victims of violent and sexual crimes; 
not enough has been done to address issues of public safety from violent crime; 
sexual and violent offenders respond poorly to treatment and therefore present a risk 
to the public on release from prison; the criminal justice system has inadequately 
monitored dangerous individuals upon release from prison and fails to provide 
adequate information to the public (Petrunik, 1994). 
 
That a dominant model of community protection with a clearly international origin, 
as outlined earlier in this chapter, can be presented as a local response to local 
problems lies in the indeterminacy of the idea of community. With this concept, a 
range of discourses -- locality, accountability, security, modernization - are all 
drawn upon, not only as a means of enunciating consensus, but of legitimising 
particular courses of action. As Williams (1989)
186
 notes, the word community is 
                                                 
186
 See chapter one of this case study. 
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unusual in that it is almost never used in a negative sense. People are never against 
community or against the community. However as we saw in chapter one 
community can also have more negative and reactionary formations, such as 
conformism, unreflective custom, and the coerciveness of habitual ties
187
. 
 
In terms of our discussion of the legitimation of new operational boundaries we find 
that the surface story of „Scottish solutions […] devised to meet Scottish problems‟, 
fails to explain this reconfiguration. Instead this chapter, and this case study as a 
whole, has looked towards a more complex socio-historical picture where 
contemporary problems regarding violent and sexual offending become 
recontextualised within a network of relations from a different structure, history and 
culture and where residual discourses can re-emerge under this new narrative.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to provide a counter narrative to those provided by 
official reports, of the emergence of the Risk Management Authority. More 
specifically it was an attempt to place the Risk Management Authority within a 
socio- historical framework and to trace the reconceptualisation taking place within 
Scottish debates on dangerous offenders. These debates centred on what the 
MacLean Committee, called „a new regime for high risk offenders,‟ a regime where 
the Risk Management Authority was identified as playing a key role. The chapter 
was in four parts: the first part situated the MacLean and Cosgrove committees 
within a socio-historical background of dangerous offender legislation. It provided 
                                                 
187
 See Plessner (1999: 91) on the limits of community and its constraint on an open and democratic 
politics: „The community is always an enclosed sphere of intimacy set against an indeterminate 
milieu. Its essential and necessary opponent is the public sphere [Öffentlichkeit], the background 
from which it distinguishes itself. Such a sphere is the epitome of people and things that „no longer 
belong‟. 
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an early history of psychiatry and how the clinical model of dangerousness came 
into being.  
 
It looked at indeterminacy in relation to the concept of psychopathy and that 
concept‟s translation within North American Psychiatry, where it gained authority 
within the criminal courts and in the public imaginary. The significance of this 
history was the consequence of the application of the clinical model to sex offenders 
and the depiction of dangerousness as a problem of individual pathology, 
conceptualized in the language of diagnosis and the treatment of a disease. The 
section discussed also the resurgence of dangerousness, under a new guise of 
community protection in the 1980‟s.  
 
Part two provided an account of the Risk Management Authority, told through the 
official documents related to its emergence. It began with A Commitment to Protect 
- Supervising Sex Offenders: Proposals for More Effective Practice. (SWSIS, 
1997), which focussed on new ways of monitoring and treating sex offenders based 
on theories that were being developed in the USA and Canada. A significant aspect 
of the report was to treat such offenders as a distinct legal and clinical category. It 
then dealt with an analysis of the Cosgrove and MacLean reports. The section gave 
a detailed outline of the MacLean report and its recommendations for the creation of 
the Risk Management Authority and a new lifelong sentence imposed on the basis 
of risk. 
 
Part three was a discourse analysis of the documents addressed in part two. It 
looked at the evidence drawn on by the Maclean committee and the use of language 
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in legitimating its emergence. This section argued that within the language of 
governmental reports a neutralisation of language is noticeable, the function of 
which is to establish a consensus between agents or groups of differing interests 
(Bourdieu, 1991) and between the author and reader. It described the language of 
these reports and what the expression of that language achieved. In other words, it 
addressed those aspects of the texts concerned with the authority of language and 
how such authority establishes a particular state of affairs. Part three also looked at 
how the problem of dangerous offenders has been constructed and the blurring of 
science as an ideal and science in practice.  
 
Throughout the official documents there are references to new bodies of knowledge 
and an „emergent knowledge base‟ that allows new approaches to offender 
management. These new bodies of knowledge not only provide a solution to the 
main concern of the committee, i.e. those offenders who, following release from 
custody for a serious violent or sexual crime, go on to commit another offence of a 
similar kind, but also resonate with a more general desire to modernize the criminal 
justice system.  
 
Part four of this chapter, looked at how the RMA has become embedded in the 
Scottish criminal justice setting in the present and in particular it explored its role in 
recent Scottish debates on dangerous offenders – debates that are at the intersection 
of three key discourses. Firstly, the symbolisation of community and the 
restructuring of institutional boundaries related to the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament in 1999. This was characterised by a concern with finding culturally 
relevant solutions to a home grown crime problems and which focussed on 
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„protecting the public‟ from crime and „improve community safety‟. Secondly, an 
important area of symbolisation in which the RMA was instrumental was New 
Labour‟s modernization agenda; and thirdly was the symbolisation surrounding the 
category of dangerous and violent offenders that was explicitly drawn from the 
resurgence of dangerousness, under the guise of community protection, that 
emerged in the United States, Australia and Canada in the 1980‟s and which the 
Scottish Council on Crime (1975) was an early precursor. The story of „Scottish 
solutions […] devised to meet Scottish problems‟, in the area of dangerous offenders 
therefore is more complex than it at first seems and follows from a network of 
relations adapted from many different sources, and in the case of dangerous 
legislation, from entirely different historical and cultural backgrounds.  
 
The residual discourse on multi-agency crime prevention initiatives and the 
sentencing of dangerous offenders in Scotland, dating back to  The Scottish Council 
on Crime, had been recontextualised in light both of international developments of a 
community protection model and a local appeal to community and national 
membership facilitated by the new Scottish Parliament. The Risk Management 
Authority itself has been instrumental in bringing together the three strands of 
discourse (modernization, community, and dangerous and violent offenders) and 
has had a key role in the breaking down and reconfiguring of institutional 
boundaries.  
 
The concluding chapter will draw the case study together by returning to the 
importance of the concept of modernity in relation to its inherited and repressed 
pasts and its influence on the present.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
THE INHERITANCE OF MODERNITY 
 
MRS ALVING…„I am afraid and timid, because there is in me something of 
that Ghost-like, inherited tendency, I can never quite get rid of […] I almost 
think we are all of us Ghosts. It is not only what we have inherited […] that 
walks again in us. It is all kinds of dead opinions, and all manner of dead 
old beliefs and things of that sort. It is not living matter in us; but it stays 
there, all the same, and we can‟t get rid of it […] there must be Ghosts all 
the country over. They must be as thick as the sand of the sea […] And that 
is why we are, one and all, so dreadfully afraid of Light. (Ibsen, Ghosts, 
1891: 54-55) 
 
Introduction 
 The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is from Ibsen‟s (1891) Ghosts, a play 
about the constraints of inheritance, the influence of „all kinds of dead opinions‟, 
and „dead old beliefs‟ on the living. It refers to an inherited past that „is not living 
matter in us; but it stays there, all the same, and we can‟t get rid of it‟ (Ibsen, 
1891). In relation to the inherited past of modernity how do we judge the living 
matter and the dead, the vital content from the ghosts? As outlined in chapter three, 
the problems of inheritance are related to the problems of beginning. The 
constraints of this thesis are associated not only with the practicalities at the start of 
a particular project but one‟s relationship to residual traditions and current work. 
Not only was it argued in chapter three, that it was necessary to be reflexively aware 
of one‟s relationship to these residual and current influences in order to „ground‟ the 
thesis historically, it was also an aim of this thesis to provide a „groundwork‟.  In 
this concluding chapter I outline how the thesis can be read as a „groundwork‟ for 
future research and explore some of the limitations of the project. 
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Hegel (1977) argued that a ground (Grund) must exist for the determination of 
thought; a ground was necessary in order to posit sufficient reason. For Hegel, 
thought, reflection, must ground its own ground. This aspect of Hegel‟s thought has 
been interpreted as an example of Hegel‟s idealism (Taylor, 1975; Beiser, 2005), yet 
this notion of reflection, of grounding its own ground, is also reflected in Marx‟s 
(1986) famous groundwork, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy 1857-58, 
often referred to and published under the title Grundrisse. In this work Marx argues 
that if one were to start merely with what at first appears as real, the presupposition, 
then all that one would achieve would be a distorted and limited conception of the 
whole. What Marx means by this is, that in order for an object of study to become 
concrete, a „rich totality of many determinations and relations‟ (Marx 1986: 38), it 
requires to be situated within a conceptual framework that allows us to grasp its 
complexity as a totality. Just as Hegel opposed making an objectivised (non-
historical) reality the starting point of scientific endeavour, so Marx argued that the 
knowledge of objects does not presuppose their existence at the starting-point in the 
raw material. In this way we can read Capital not as the description of a historical 
society, but rather the construction of the abstract concept of capitalism. It is this 
distinction of the object of knowledge as real-concrete objects that distinguish meta-
critique from more objectivist approaches.  
 
The shift towards a meta-critical approach during the life of the thesis, meant 
rethinking chapter five, the „data chapter‟.  Chapter five, although appearing last in 
the thesis, was, as the introduction made clear the chronological starting point for 
the project, and in a sense the general „feeling‟ in writing the thesis was of working 
backwards from that starting point. It was this working backwards from a set point 
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that provided the overall themes and structure of the thesis, but it also createda set 
of problems; in particular, a gap between chapter five and the preceeding chapters. 
This gap is between what we might call the empirical „core‟ of the thesis and its 
theoretical „ring‟ (see Heller188, 1989). As outlined in the introduction, the thesis 
grew out of the initial debates surrounding the Risk Management Authority. 
However, as the thesis developed, the main focus of interest no longer lay with the 
RMA as it was constituted through criminal justice policy, but with how to 
conceptualise the intersection of the institutional culture of criminal justice and the 
formation of human subjectivity. In other words it moved from an interest in the 
emergence of a particular institutional form at a particular social and historical 
context, to an elucidation of the conditions which made this emergence possible. To 
address this question required a different theoretical understanding of historical 
emergence than the original question allowed.  It was this different theoretical 
understanding of historical emergence – one that retains an internal relationship 
between modernity and rationality - that brought the thesis into a relationship with 
the work of Hegel and led to an antagonism between the starting point and the rest 
of the thesis. That is, the antagonism between the (positive) empirical „core‟ of the 
thesis and its (negative) theoretical „ring‟.  
 
This shift of emphasis created the gap between chapter five and the preceding 
chapters, a gap which isbest understood at two levels  
                                                 
188
 „A work that is the product of the social sciences could […] be said to contain a core and a ring, 
not as two separate parts of  a theory but as its two aspects […] Core knowledge is knowledge of the 
type that one has good reason to believe that any person would arrive at, if this person studied the 
available sources […] and entered into discussion with the members of the scientific community 
familiar with the matter under scrutiny […] Ring knowledge is knowledge […] of a kind one arrives 
at from a particular standpoint, perspective, or cultural interest not shared with others.‟ (Heller, 1989: 
299) 
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1. First, it relates to the gap between empirical data and theoretical reflection (a 
conflict at the level of abstraction).  
2. Second it relates to the gap between two conceptualisations of the subject (a 
conflict at the level of ontology). 
 
In relation to this first gap, Mills (1963: 554) has argued, there are two forms of 
social scientific research, on one hand, what can be called the „macroscopic‟, which 
attempts to deal with total social structures in a systematic and historical way, and 
the „molecular‟ form of sociological research, characterised by more focussed 
empirical studies into particular social problems. The „molecular‟ or „micro‟ form of 
sociological research operate on lower levels of abstraction, in that they isolate from 
the wider social contexts a small number of narrowly defined elements to study. The 
„macroscopic‟, or „macro‟ rely on higher levels of abstraction, in that such forms of 
research are more generalised, and although there may be a pattern of numerous 
variables on which it draws, there is no discrete one that can be measured. There is 
no clear cut variable that can be applied to the concept modernity. Or to put it 
another way, there is no easy way to „operationalise‟ modernity.  It is the gap 
between the „molecular‟ and „macroscopic‟, the gap in levels of abstraction that 
distinguish the relationship of chapter five to the rest of the thesis. The 
methodological attempt to bridge this gap was in the adoption of an Hegelian 
approach that understood the case, not only as representing a „typical‟ moment 
within a particular historical conjuncture, but one which problematised the 
particular structure from which it originated. The adoption of the Jolles‟ (1930) 
model of casus,  the case as form, was a methodological attempt to reconcile 
universality with concrete particularity. 
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As outlined in chapter three, the casus or case is a narrative or representative-image 
which can work to „crystallize‟ and explain specific cultural, national or global 
states of affairs (Frow, 2003: 70). Casus as a form of immanent critique, a 
problematisation of the form it brings to light (Frow, 2003). As Jameson (1998) 
notes, the problem of casus deploys and exacerbates a fundamental philosophical 
problem: the relationship between the universal and the particular. It mediates 
between the contingency of its occasion and the generality of „field of 
interpretation‟. Casus juxtaposes two different levels of analysis. On further 
reflection, however, the typicality of the case could have been embedded more fully 
into the broader themes outlined in the earlier chapters. This would have involved a 
more radical application of Hegel‟s conceptual framework to the empirical work in 
chapter five, a more consciously dialectical approach which has a precedent in the 
work of the early Frankfurt school. It is possible that such an approach might have 
preserved the initial impulse of the research to offer a more critical and socio-
historical account of criminal justice approaches to risk and the Risk Management 
Authority. 
 
The second ontological gap, the gap between two conceptualisations of the subject 
was, on reflection, necessarily unbridgeable. As we have seen, for Hegel, the ground 
of knowledge is always in flux and unstable, Hegel‟s ontology did not presuppose 
the actuality of its object (society) and therefore of the autonomous subject. This 
approach is opposed to the subject/object split of psychological and individualistic 
accounts of the human subject: The subject for Hegel was „pure simple negativity‟, a 
mere function of the social structure. These two opposing views of the subject, the 
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autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent one of individualistic approaches, 
and the split and intersubjective account of Hegel are irreconcilable.  
 
Within the philosophy of science this idea of being unable to reconcile opposing 
frameworks of thought or scientific paradigms is captured by the notion of 
incommensurability (Kuhn, 1996: Feyerabend, 1993) and is closely connected with 
the question of the rationality of science. One solution to the problem of 
incommensurability in this thesis would have been to remove chapter five and 
replace it with another theoretical chapter on the contemporary development of the 
subject. This would have solved the problem of gaps but would not only have 
excluded the point of beginning from the thesis but would have lost the 
juxtaposition of the two incommensurable frameworks, which in turn would have 
prevented the opportunity of productively interpreting the products of the criminal 
justice system outside the system. 
 
Jameson (2006) argues that incommensurability not only refers to irreconcilable 
theories, but to the predicament that one requires both at the same time yet cannot 
fit them together in a systematic way. In other words, it is this need for both levels 
that clash with the inability to construct a coherent system out of their differences 
that make incommensurability a significant problem. It reflects Critical Theory‟s 
focus on the constraints of scientific method and the significance it places on 
contradiction and conflict as essential elements to social reality. Defeat therefore 
does not cancel the validity of the original impulse of a work. The necessity of some 
degree of failure points to the defective nature of sociology‟s own concepts. In other 
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words, the dissonance at the heart of a contradiction reflects the limitation of 
knowledge. As Jameson (1990: 38) writes: 
 
„[E]ven at their most intellectually energetic, the concepts of sociology 
cannot but be flawed and fractured, since their very object is contradictory, 
faithfulness to it thereby requiring a certain transfer of the social 
contradictions into thought‟. 
 
The limitation of sociological thought is apparent in both the simplified and false 
opposition between the „macro‟ and the „micro‟ as well as the aporias at the heart of 
the subject.  
 
In conclusion, the groundwork provided by this thesis is a conceptualisation of the 
relationship of the individual to the social that counters the positivistic and 
individualistic („common sense‟) accounts that have structured much of the legal 
and practice settings of the contemporary criminal justice system and that have led 
to the Risk Management Authority. The thesis argued that Hegel‟s notion of „ethical 
life‟ provided an alternative way to conceptualise intersubjectivity and the 
understanding of crime and its relation to the state. The thesis closes however by 
arguing that the gap between the two conceptualisations of the subject - the 
autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent emphasis of individualistic 
approaches, and the split and intersubjective aspects focussed on by Hegel - was 
necessarily unbridgeable. This thesis, at a theoretical and methodological level, has 
drawn on Hegel to recover the „social‟ character of our thought and practices in 
relation to the dangerous other/actuarial subject both through examining 
institutional responses such as the Risk Management Authority and current social 
science approaches to crime and risk. In doing so it can be read as part of an 
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Hegelian inspired legacy to challenge the artificial distinction between the 
individual and society. 
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